In an era of heightened concern about injustice in relations of identity and difference, political theorists often prescribe equal recognition as a remedy for the ills of subordination. Drawing on ...the philosophy of Hegel, they envision a system of reciprocal knowledge and esteem, in which the affirming glance of others lets everyone be who they really are. This book challenges the equation of recognition with justice. Patchen Markell mines neglected strands of the concept’s genealogy and reconstructs an unorthodox interpretation of Hegel, who, in the unexpected company of Sophocles, Aristotle, Arendt, and others, reveals why recognition’s promised satisfactions are bound to disappoint, and even to stifle.
Menschenrechte - und mit ihnen die Menschenwürde - sind weltweit in den Verfassungen zahlreicher Staaten verankert. Und dennoch werden sie immer wieder relativiert, sodass ihre Um- und Durchsetzung ...selbst in der Demokratie - dessen Grundlage die Menschenrechte darstellen - nicht mehr sichergestellt werden kann. Wirken sich direktdemokratische Entscheide unter Umständen als menschenrechtlich problematisch aus? Wie sollen wir mit humanitären Interventionen umgehen? Wie kann der Begriff der Menschenwürde begründet werden - und wie lassen sich Menschenrechte global absichern? Die Beiträge des Bandes widmen sich diesen Fragen aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven.
In this article, I draw attention to the value of community in John Mbiti’s philosophy using his famous axiom by reconciling the tension between the individual and community his philosophy envisages. ...To do this, I offer a reconstruction of Mbiti’s communitarian axiom: “I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.” Mbiti is considered one of the forerunners of the communitarian debate in African philosophy. His axiom, which describes his idea of Afro-communitarianism, accounts for the importance of individual and community in thinking about social existence in African thought. However, Mbiti’s argument for the direct influence of the community in the formation of the individual is taken to mean the supremacy of the community over the individual. Mbiti’s concept of community has implications for the idea of personhood in that it raises the question of individual agency. This has affected the reception of Mbiti’s contribution to the idea of community in African political thought. While Mbiti’s contributions to Afro-communitarianism transcend the discourse of personhood, I argue that maximising the potential of his idea requires reconstruction and a critical analysis of his axiom. In doing that, I demonstrate that a possible relationship exists between the “I” and “we” in his axiom that represents a harmony between the community and individual and does not suggest a primacy of either but the significance of community. This analysis will enable fair engagement with Mbiti’s conception of community.
