Resumo Este artigo tem um objetivo duplo: i) oferecer um mapa teórico capaz de sistematizar os fatores que explicam a variação na intensidade da inserção do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) no processo ...decisório e as diferentes formas pelas quais ele pode ser mobilizado por atores políticos; e ii) definir uma tipologia da judicialização da política que combine as diferentes formas de acesso ao tribunal com as características do seu processo decisório interno. Nesse sentido, em um extremo, a judicialização seria resultado de uma manifestação de natureza duplamente coletiva (ator relevante coletivo demandando e conseguindo decisão coletiva do STF); no outro, um formato duplamente individualizado (um parlamentar individual demandando e conseguindo uma intervenção de um ministro individual no processo decisório). São apresentados casos que ilustram quatro dimensões pouco estudadas na literatura sobre judicialização da política: o acesso ao STF por classes processuais diferentes da Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade (ADI); a mobilização do STF por parlamentares individuais; a atuação de atores governistas, que evidencia a importância de dinâmicas contingentes da conjuntura política na motivação de judicializar; a intervenção individual dos ministros do STF.
Abstract This paper has two goals. First, in dialogue with scholarly efforts to explain variations in the intensity of the Brazilian Supreme Court’s role in the political process, we propose a theoretical map that can account, in a more systematic fashion, for the different ways and mechanisms by which judicialization can take place. Second, we offer a typology of varieties of judicialization of politics that combines different mechanisms for accessing the court’s jurisdiction, and features of the court’s internal decision-making process. At one side of the spectrum, judicialization as a phenomenon would result from a combination of two collective decisions - a collective actor (such as a political party) triggering a collective decision by the STF. At the other side, it would result from a combination of two sets of individual decisions - an individual politician, for example, obtaining a favorable ruling or injunction by a single STF justice. Within this framework, we exemplify and discuss four understudied dimensions of the judicialization of politics: mechanisms of access to the STF beyond abstract review lawsuits (ADIs); appeals to the STF by individual politicians; appeals to the STF by members of the ruling coalition, which highlight the relevance of contingent political dynamics in judicialization strategies; the individual judicial powers and their implications for the political process.
Women’s participation in political decision-making process was the main goal of any demand concerning female suffrage (to vote and to be elected). But what means political decision-making process? ...There are many theories which explain this concept: from the Game Theory to the Decision Theory and various types of Computational Agent Based Modeling. After a review of these theories, more interesting will be to follow the way of a legislative project to an adopted law in the Romanian Parliament, the way from theory to practice, the real manifestation of the concept of political decision-making. Our research is focused on women’s position in political decision-making in Romania along the 2004-2008 legislature. We opted for this legislature due to its importance derived from the necessity of adopting the EU accession legislation until 2007. This new legislation contained many provisions concerning the status of Romanian women. Our analysis starts by asking the following questions: Are the women in the Romanian Parliament involved in the political decision-making process? Can they influence the destiny of a law? In order to clarify those queries we analyze (quantitatively and qualitatively) the paper registrations, but also the video records of any legislative debate which took place in the mentioned legislatures.
The article deals with the problem of the political decision-making process at the court of the Hellenistic Kings. The Hellenistic Kings possessed a strong power and vast material and human ...resources. They took the administrative, legislative, juridical, military and other branches of power in their hands. Nevertheless in many cases when we have the possibility to follow the decision–making process one can notice that many kings preferred the collective forms of searching for the best solution of the state problems. The Hellenistic Kings involved courtiers who were their advisers and consultants in the decision-making process and in many cases were open for dialogue and for free discussions, for the alternative opinions of the advisers. The phenomenon of collective discussion could be easily explained as a political pragmatism, when dialogue, discussion or a brain-storm give much better result to find the right solution and to avoid mistakes. At the same time dialogue and discussion were the immanence of the Greek culture, the Greek cultural “code”. The culture of dialogue and discussion was highly developed in a Greek world. It influenced the education, the cultural and political life, etc. The Hellenistic Kings were educated according to the Greek tradition and they transferred the culture of dialogue and discussion into the political life of the state. Thus political pragmatism was combined with the features of Greek culture.
This new edition contains a revised guest chapter and a concluding chapter by the editor suggesting a number of strategies for improving the state of theorizing in the field of frameworks.
A framework to evaluate the performance of alternative management strategies taking fleet behaviour and uncertainties in biological and economic data into account, is suggested. The evaluation ...framework incorporates an underlying system model generating the dynamics of the simulated structure, and a perceived system model which is an assessment-prediction model used to evaluate the state of the underlying system and to specify the fishery tactics. Biological and economic data from the shrimp (Pandalus borealis) fishery in the Davis Strait, is applied to the model. The study demonstrates that the long-term performance of the fishery tactics may deteriorate significantly if they are modified by implementation errors, exemplified by high-grading of catches, or by a political TAC setting process giving weight both to the biological advice and requests based on profit of prior years of fishing put forward by the fishery sector. In both cases the loss, expressed as a decrease in net present value of 10 years resource rent, may be greater than the loss due to incomplete knowledge of the underlying system structure.
Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to “buy favors”, this paper assumes that contributions ...influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups achieve influence by providing political decision makers with policy relevant information, we also assume that lobbies engage in non-negligible informational lobbying. We focus on a single political decision to be taken and offer a simple model in which the optimal influence strategy is a mixture of both lobbying instruments. Our main result is to show that campaign finance reform may have important side-effects: It may deter informational lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient.
Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to ‘buy favors’, this paper assumes that contributions ...influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups achieve influence by providing political decision makers with policy relevant information, we also assume that lobbies engage in non-negligible informational lobbying. We focus on a single political decision to be taken and offer a simple model in which the optimal influence strategy is a mixture of both lobbying instruments. Our main result is to show that campaign finance reform may have important side effects: It may deter informational lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient.
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the ...lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and leads to interesting insights into the behavior of the interest group. Moreover, we show how conclusions of models that take into account only one of these activities may change. Our main results say that the relationship between the pressure exerted and the amount of information transmitted is not monotonic, and that an increase in the amount of information that the lobby transmits may be socially harmful. This analysis has immediate implications for the current discussions in the United States and Europe concerning the reform of their respective rules of party and candidate financing.
How professionalization and scholarly "rigor" made social scientists increasingly irrelevant to US national security policy
To mobilize America's intellectual resources to meet the security ...challenges of the post-9/11 world, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates observed that "we must again embrace eggheads and ideas." But the gap between national security policymakers and international relations scholars has become a chasm.
InCult of the Irrelevant, Michael Desch traces the history of the relationship between the Beltway and the Ivory Tower from World War I to the present day. Recounting key Golden Age academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling and Walt Rostow, Desch's narrative shows that social science research became most oriented toward practical problem-solving during times of war and that scholars returned to less relevant work during peacetime. Social science disciplines like political science rewarded work that was methodologically sophisticated over scholarship that engaged with the messy realities of national security policy, and academic culture increasingly turned away from the job of solving real-world problems.
In the name of scientific objectivity, academics today frequently engage only in basic research that they hope will somehow trickle down to policymakers. Drawing on the lessons of this history as well as a unique survey of current and former national security policymakers, Desch offers concrete recommendations for scholars who want to shape government work. The result is a rich intellectual history and an essential wake-up call to a field that has lost its way.
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