Gibt es Parallelen zwischen Michel Foucaults und Ernst Jüngers politischem Denken? Auf den ersten Blick scheint dies abwegig. Doch Nasser Ahmed deckt in Foucaults »Sexualität und Wahrheit I« und ...Jüngers »Der Arbeiter« denselben Typus biopolitischen Denkens auf und zeigt, wie nah sich beide Ansätze sind. Zwischen der Biomacht auf der einen und der Lebensmacht auf der anderen Seite erhellt er einen Raum, der in bisherigen politischen Einordnungen unsichtbar geblieben ist: Foucault und Jünger stehen als biopolitische Denker auf derselben Seite einer fundamentalen Zweiteilung des politischen Denkens, welche das Politische weniger als Funktion der Verständigung, sondern eher als Funktion des Kampfes versteht.
This study sees the political ontology developed by Deleuze and Guattari regarding Marxism as a political intervention in relational Marxism. The philosophers who adopt the concept of relationality ...as a plane rather than a method in their works, handle to Marxism in the focus of relationality. This relationality isn’t built with the common sense approach and the philosophy of internal relations. It is not part-whole relationship based on organism understanding. For thinkers, it is the main point of departure that the terms in the relationship can’t be reduced to the relationship itself. Based on this claim, the relation of terms isn’t the relation of two independent entities, but an assembly relation inherent to each other. The encounter between the “free labor” and the “owner of money” that Marx put forward for the social organization of capitalism is considered as the relation of capitalist assembly as flows. The encounter of these two elements is presented in Deleuze and Guattari as the virtual or the actualization of the virtual. The actualization of the virtual is dealt with in the context of the productions of subjectivity. “Free labor” and “owner of money” are revealed as the productions of subjectivity. Analyzing through subjectivity productions can’t be conceived independently from Deleuze and Guattari’s machine theory. Firstly, this study put forward the issue of autonomy of terms against relation in Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy through assembly theory and will address how thinkers grasp relationality. Then, it will analyze how is handled the encounter between the “free worker” and the “owner of money”, perceived as the relationality of capitalism in Marx.
The article is devoted to the study of the essential characteristics of the subject of cognition. The process of cognition, being one of the oldest issues in the history of humankind, has always been ...and remains highly relevant today. This is due to the irrepressible desire of a person to know the world around her/him and herself/himself. If the study of the surrounding world is basically the prerogative of the natural sciences, then self-cognition is the object of study in the humanities. The process of cognitive activity is considered by a number of the humanities and social sciences: philosophy (in a generalized sense), history, psychology, pedagogy, sociology, etc., but it begins to occupy a separate place in the philosophy of law. Modern human needs to know the measure, opportunity, freedom and responsibility of the process of cognition. In the article, from the point of view of critical realism, the current state of the methodology of cognition is analyzed and the necessary tendencies in changing the worldview and defining the new methodology of the humanities are substantiated. The experience of the post-Soviet countries with dogmatic ideology and destructive methodology was used as an illustrative material. It has been established that only a free-thinking subject and a methodology developed on the principles of the supremacy of spiritual values can improve the reverent approach to the person and the world as a whole and come closer to the cognition of absolute truth.
Few topics have in recent years caused more controversy in studies in the history of philosophy than the issue of Immanuel Kant's conception of race and its significance for the universalism of his ...moral and political philosophy. Here, Krogh turns to these debates to make the case that it matters not simply that people recognize the centrality of Kant's conceptual work in natural history to his critical philosophy, but also how they subsequently conceive of the importance of such a realization to the universalisms of later works in the Kantian tradition of philosophy and critical theory.
Why Limitarianism? Robeyns, Ingrid
The journal of political philosophy,
June 2022, Letnik:
30, Številka:
2
Journal Article
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This article discusses ‘limitarianism’, which in its most general formulation is the idea that in the world as it is, no one should have more than a certain upper limit of valuable goods, in ...particular, income and wealth. What, if anything, does ‘limitarianism’ add to normative political philosophy? In Section I, I describe the context in which limitarianism has been introduced. Section II will provide a more detailed statement about limitarianism, including some more recent contributions to and developments in the literature. In the next two sections, I discuss egalitarianism (Section III) and sufficientarianism (Section IV) and ask whether they can do what I envision to be the task of limitarianism. Section V argues that within theories of distributive justice, limitarianism is best seen as part of a pluralist account. This is illustrated by sketching the proposal of a pluralist account combining sufficientarianism, opportunity egalitarianism, and limitarianism. Section VI concludes by pulling everything together, and will give an answer to the question of what limitarianism contributes to normative political philosophy.
Cet article défend l’idée que la nouvelle philosophie politique proposée par le mouvement convivialiste est beaucoup plus apte à affronter les enjeux actuels que les doctrines politiques modernes ...classiques. L’argumentaire se décline ainsi : 1) toutes les pensées politiques reposent sur un fondement métaphysique , c’est-à-dire de l’arbitraire ; 2) ces fondements métaphysiques sont choisis et assumés dans la pensée convivialiste, alors que dans les pensées modernes ceux-ci sont niés ; 3) étant donné que les modernes nient leurs fondements métaphysiques ils en sont dépossédés et ils en perdent le contrôle, contrairement aux convivialistes qui les reconnaissent. Ces derniers se font ainsi maîtres de leurs principes fondateurs : tout en acceptant une part d’arbitraire qui structure leurs pensées, les convivialistes sélectionnent en pleine conscience le meilleur pour l’humanité. Une porte s’ouvre alors pour l’émancipation.
The text is based on two premises. The first is that we live in the times of neoliberalism, and the second is that the political subject of neoliberalism is the individual, the “one” qualified as ...indivisible, independent, sole owner of one’s self. To define what an individual is, I will revisit several 19th-century claims which at the same time posit individual as an empty universal – anyone qualifies for entitlement of an individual – and reveal it as profoundly exclusionary – as the holder of entitlements. I will claim that the indivisibility of an individual is also the basis for its understanding as sovereign and self-actualized. Liberal politicization of a sovereign possessor of interests introduces not only homo oeconomicus, but it also integrates economic mode of governmentality into the sphere of the political, it becoming a space of incessant play of exclusions and inclusions. If another kind of political imaginary is to be developed, I argue we need to distance ourselves from the figure of the individual, bearing in mind that homo oeconomicus triumphs today as the exhaustive figure of the human, amidst the patently unequal distribution not only of precarity but also of vulnerability. Critical engagement with neoliberalism assumes
engaging with the political centrality of a figure of an agentic individual.
Menonas: dorybė kaip δόξα Ἀληθησ Jankauskas, Skirmantas
LOGOS - A Journal of Religion, Philosophy, Comparative Cultural Studies and Art,
04/2023
114
Journal Article
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The article is an interpretation of the fourth part of the Meno (96d–100a), in which Plato continues his investigation into the nature of virtue. Having established in the third part of the dialogue ...(86c–96c) that virtue cannot be learned and therefore cannot belong to the domain of (true) knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), the question arises as to how eminent men of antiquity could have given the impression that they were guided by virtue in their political activities. The answer is found by drawing attention to the distinction that was exploited in early philosophy, i.e., to the distinction between opinion (δόξα) and (true) knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Since the Sophists had rehabilitated the realm of opinion, which had been devalued by the early philosophers of antiquity, Plato concludes that the reputable politicians of antiquity may have been guided by right opinion (δόξα ἀληθὴς). This notion implies the mere knowledge of the correct instructions for action and is therefore considered to be a form of knowledge, albeit correct, but incomplete. In Meno, Plato still hopes that by means of anamnesis, i.e., by the way of reconstructing the logical connections between right opinion and (true) knowledge, it is in principle possible to transform the first kind of knowledge into the second. The paper demonstrates that Plato’s reasoning on the relation between the two kinds of knowledge raises a few questions. It is shown that analytically revealed contradictions in Plato’s reasoning are due to the assumption, which is characteristic of the ancient way of thinking, namely, the assumption of a logical connection between imagination and thought. The paper concludes by showing how the abandonment of this assumption would deconstruct the fundamental constructs of Platonic philosophy.
Is that a matter of expressing opinions or of aggregating votes or of deliberating together? (And if "all three," then combined how and in what proportions?) Insofar as it is a matter of aggregating ...votes, according to what rules? (Simple majority rule or something else?) Insofar as it is a matter of elections, what makes them free and fair? (How are campaigns to be conducted, electors apportioned to districts, and so on?) Are there any substantive constraints on what democracies may or must do? (Respect human rights, for example.) Such questions constitute the warp and the woof of democratic theory. The point remains that the basic rule in international law and public economics is something less than is proposed under the "decisional power" interpretation of the "all affected interests" principle.
The illiberal democracy is the political system where majority of citizens rule, but where is not the freedom of consciousness or where the liberal dividing of power is absent. In the modern history ...of Europe the best example of this political system we find in the Calvinist Republics as Geneva, Emden and Netherlands. It’s not the democracy in the contemporary meaning of this word because the notion of “citizen” is aristocratic. The citizens are the members of aristocracy and patricians of towns. But in this time the citizens are the people only. This system is not liberal, because the Catholics are persecuted. The aim of this text is the presentation vision and ideology of theses Republics. It’s the mixture of sovereignty of the people-citizens with the theocratic tendency of Calvinism. In the theory of Calvin, and in the practice of theses Republics we are the tension between the “too swords”: spiritual (Calvinist consistories) and temporal (political power). In the literature we are many of allusions that the theological-political thought of Jean Calvin is inspired by medieval papal theocracy. It’s theocracy with “purified” Word of God, and inspired by the fear of the “caesaropapism”. This fear was just. Every theocratic rule in the Calvinist republican regime is finished by the supremacy of temporal swords. This text present the process of change from papocaesarism to caesaropapism in every republican case.