The landmark Roe vs Wade Supreme Court decision in 1973 established a constitutional right to abortion. In June 2022, the Dobbs vs Jackson Women’s Health Organization Supreme Court decision brought ...an end to the established professional practice of abortion throughout the United States. Rights-based reductionism and zealotry threaten the professional practice of abortion. Rights-based reductionism is generally the view that moral or ethical issues can be reduced exclusively to matters of rights. In relation to abortion, there are 2 opposing forms of rights-based reductionism, namely fetal rights reductionism, which emphasizes the rights for the fetus while disregarding the rights and autonomy of the pregnant patient, and pregnant patient rights reductionism, which supports unlimited abortion without regards for the fetus. The 2 positions are irreconcilable. This article provides historical examples of the destructive nature of zealotry, which is characterized by extreme devotion to one’s beliefs and an intolerant stance to opposing viewpoints, and of the importance of enlightenment to limit zealotry. This article then explores the professional responsibility model as a clinically ethically sound approach to overcome the clashing forms of rights-based reductionism and zealotry and to address the professional practice of abortion. The professional responsibility model refers to the ethical and professional obligations that obstetricians and other healthcare providers have toward pregnant patients, fetuses, and the society at large. It provides a more balanced and nuanced approach to the abortion debate, avoiding the pitfalls of reductionism and zealotry, and allows both the rights of the woman and the obligations to pregnant and fetal patients to be considered alongside broader ethical, medical, and societal implications. Constructive and respectful dialogue is crucial in addressing diverse perspectives and finding common ground. Embracing the professional responsibility model enables professionals to manage abortion responsibly, thereby prioritizing patients’ interests and navigating between absolutist viewpoints to find balanced ethical solutions.
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Mirror of Nature, Mirror of Self considers theories of consciousness in Indian philosophical traditions through the metaphor of reflection in a mirror. Just as a face appears where it is not in a ...mirror's reflection, so do consciousness and its properties, such as the sense of self, subjectivity, and experience. In a dialogue with psychoanalytical theory and contemporary philosophy of mind, the book develops a new model of consciousness and contributes to contemporary debates.
The A and B-theorists of time disagree over whether time passes in reality. The B-theorist denies it does, and so, despite its successes, stands at an intuitive disadvantage. The A-theorist on the ...other hand is able to argue that our experience of time provides evidence of its passage. This ‘argument from experience’ expresses what I take to be the main motivation behind the A-theory. My aim is to provide the B-theorist with a response. The general thrust is that the argument from experience rests upon a mistaken view about the self – namely, Non-Reductionism. If we instead assume a Reductionist view, it should be rejected. Derek Parfit argues that, given Reductionism, it can be an empty question whether persons persists through change. After defining and justifying Reductionism, I argue for a stronger claim: it is always an empty question whether persons – and their experiences – persist. That is to say, what we naturally describe as a single persisting person (or experience) could just as accurately be described as a series of distinct momentary persons (or experiences). This claim is defended, then put to work against the argument from experience. Firstly, I argue it follows from this claim that we could not have veridical experiences of temporal passage. So, even if we do experience time as passing, we couldn’t take this as evidence that time really does pass. Finally, I propose a cognitive error account of temporal experience whereby although we believe we experience time as passing, this belief is false. I argue that the intuition to the contrary should be regarded as a side effect of a faulty, Non-Reductionist conceptual scheme. If we were to assimilate a Reductionist conceptual scheme instead, it would be impossible to conceptualise an experience of passage. In other words, time would not seem to pass.
Perspectiva da pesquisa contábil na América Latina: um olhar para a Argentina, Brasil e Colômbia Resumo: Este trabalho objetiva analisar, avaliar, e sugerir novas perspectivas à pesquisa contábil na ...América Latina sob o olhar autonômico e emancipatório, focando, particularmente, nas culturas contábeis da Argentina, Brasil e Colômbia. Fez-se uma breve retrospectiva histórica da contabilidade desses países para permitir contextualizações e alçar propostas reflexivas acerca de novos horizontes à pesquisa contábil latino-americana. A linha de investigação adotada é o ensaio teórico (artigo de reflexão), com abordagem descritiva. O que se constatou foi a hegemonia da pesquisa contábil positivista-normativista na Argentina e Brasil, e uma forte reação dos contadores colombianos a esse modelo anglo-saxão (reducionismo-contabilidade privada). Também constatou-se uma tímida reação da Argentina e Brasil em favor da perspectiva crítico-interpretativa, e um movimento representativo e fecundo desenvolvido pelos colombianos a partir dos anos de 1970. Propostas de reformulação da pesquisa contábil surgem da Argentina e Colômbia como possibilidade de construções genuínas e emancipatórias para o futuro da contabilidade.
Despite decades of clinical, sociopolitical, and research efforts, progress in understanding and treating mental health problems remains disappointing. I discuss two barriers that have contributed to ...a problematic oversimplification of mental illness. The first is diagnostic literalism, mistaking mental health problems (complex within-person processes) for the diagnoses by which they are classified (clinically useful idealizations to facilitate treatment selection and prognosis). The second is reductionism, the isolated study of individual elements of mental disorders. I propose conceptualizing people’s mental health states as outcomes emerging from complex systems of biological, psychological, and social elements and show that this systems perspective explains many robust phenomena, including variability within diagnoses, comorbidity among diagnoses, and transdiagnostic risk factors. It helps us understand diagnoses and reductionism as useful epistemological tools for describing the world, rather than ontological convictions about how the world is. It provides new lenses through which to study mental illness (e.g., attractor states, phase transitions), and new levers to treat them (e.g., early warning signals, novel treatment targets). Embracing the complexity of mental health problems requires opening our ivory towers to theories and methods from other fields with rich traditions, including network and systems sciences.
The Problem of Class Abstractionism McCarthy, Michael A.; Desan, Mathieu Hikaru
Sociological theory,
03/2023, Letnik:
41, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
With renewed interest in Marxism, class is back on the intellectual agenda. But so too is the familiar charge of “class reductionism.” This charge conflates two distinct claims regarding what we term ...the structural and political primacy of class. Structural primacy refers to the determinant role of class in social explanation, whereas political primacy refers to its centrality in radical politics. Crossing these distinct claims, we identify four possible positions on the primacy of class. Here, we focus on the two that affirm the structural primacy of class. What we call “class abstractionism,” which presumes to derive the political primacy of class from an account of its structural primacy, ultimately relies on an abstract conception of class that effectively presupposes its political primacy. In contrast, a more adequate account of structural primacy—what we call “class dynamism”—requires us to abandon the presupposition of class’s necessary political primacy.
Injury prediction is one of the most challenging issues in sports and a key component for injury prevention. Sports injuries aetiology investigations have assumed a reductionist view in which a ...phenomenon has been simplified into units and analysed as the sum of its basic parts and causality has been seen in a linear and unidirectional way. This reductionist approach relies on correlation and regression analyses and, despite the vast effort to predict sports injuries, it has been limited in its ability to successfully identify predictive factors. The majority of human health conditions are complex. In this sense, the multifactorial complex nature of sports injuries arises not from the linear interaction between isolated and predictive factors, but from the complex interaction among a web of determinants. Thus, the aim of this conceptual paper was to propose a complex system model for sports injuries and to demonstrate how the implementation of complex system thinking may allow us to better address the complex nature of the sports injuries aetiology. According to this model, we should identify features that are hallmarks of complex systems, such as the pattern of relationships (interactions) among determinants, the regularities (profiles) that simultaneously characterise and constrain the phenomenon and the emerging pattern that arises from the complex web of determinants. In sports practice, this emerging pattern may be related to injury occurrence or adaptation. This novel view of preventive intervention relies on the identification of regularities or risk profile, moving from risk factors to risk pattern recognition.
According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; ...one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie.
This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain unsatisfactory. Second, it goes on a rescue mission on behalf of anti‐reductionism. I put forth a novel, knowledge‐first anti‐reductionist account, which I dub ‘Testimonial Contractarianism’. According to the view defended here, in virtue of the social contract in play, compliance with the norms governing speech acts is the default position for speakers. Insofar as norm compliance is the default for speakers, I argue, all else equal, entitlement to believe is the default for hearers.
The direction of an association at the population-level may be reversed within the subgroups comprising that population-a striking observation called Simpson's paradox. When facing this pattern, ...psychologists often view it as anomalous. Here, we argue that Simpson's paradox is more common than conventionally thought, and typically results in incorrect interpretations-potentially with harmful consequences. We support this claim by reviewing results from cognitive neuroscience, behavior genetics, clinical psychology, personality psychology, educational psychology, intelligence research, and simulation studies. We show that Simpson's paradox is most likely to occur when inferences are drawn across different levels of explanation (e.g., from populations to subgroups, or subgroups to individuals). We propose a set of statistical markers indicative of the paradox, and offer psychometric solutions for dealing with the paradox when encountered-including a toolbox in R for detecting Simpson's paradox. We show that explicit modeling of situations in which the paradox might occur not only prevents incorrect interpretations of data, but also results in a deeper understanding of what data tell us about the world.
In this article, we take stock of the institutional logics perspective and highlight opportunities for new scholarship. While we celebrate the growth and generativity of the literature on ...institutional logics, we also note that there has been a troubling tendency in recent work to use logics as analytical tools, feeding disquiet about reification and reductionism. Seeding a broader scholarly agenda that addresses such weaknesses in the literature, we highlight nascent efforts that aim to more systematically understand institutional logics as complex, dynamic phenomena in their own right. In doing so, we argue for more research that probes how logics cohere and endure by unpacking the role of values, the centrality of practice, and the governance dynamics of institutional logics and their orders. Furthermore, we encourage bridging the study of institutional logics with various literatures, including ethnomethodology, phenomenology, professions, elites, world society, and the old institutionalism, to enhance progress in these directions.
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