In this article I intend to justify six theses: (1) Temporal becoming is founded in an intuition-form of self-intuition, whereas physical space-time is independent of any form of intuition; ...(2) communicable thoughts are, as Kant says, products of self-consciousness; (3) both roots of idealism are connected by the tensed form of predication; (4) the thinking subject is, as Kant says, an appearance for itself; (5) the subject has, in virtue of this nature, the capacity of mental causality; and (6) mental causality is a sufficient basis for a Kantian “causality from freedom”.
The most extensive English-language study of Schopenhauer's
metaphysics of the will yet published, this book represents a major
contribution to Schopenhauer scholarship. Here, John E. Atwell
...critically but sympathetically examines the philosopher's main
work, The World as Will and Representation , demonstrating
that the philosophical system it puts forth does
constitute a consistent whole. The author holds that this system is
centered on a single thought, "The world is self-knowledge of the
will." He then traces this unifying concept through the four books
of The World as Will and Representation , and, in the
process, dissolves the work's alleged inconsistencies.
In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a
, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder
. “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” ...Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
Schelling's goal is to find a total consciousness for human; therefore, in the philosophy of nature, he tries to reach from the real to the ideal. On the other hand, the conscious spirit is a product ...of human subjectivity, so, an unconscious spirit manages things. Therefore, Schelling's transition from natural philosophy to the system of transcendental idealism occurs. Reaching this level of consciousness is possible when I goes through different stages. The first stage is sensation, then reflection and after that comes praxis. But since the will of the subject of and the will of nature are the same, and ethics is in the realm of practical reason, then the subject of action does not have free will. Therefore, there is a gap between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy that Schelling must somehow fill. He solves this problem with the free and creative will of an artist, a will that acts not out of necessity but freely. Schelling reaches the absolute from the identity of natural philosophy and transcendental idealism. The absolute is the result of identity of the real and the ideal. It is crystal clear that expounding how to objectify the absolute leads to a better comprehension of Schelling's philosophical system. In this article, it is investigated that among theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom and art, which one Schelling deems the most functional mechanism to objectify the absolute, and what are the roles of genius and the beauty through this path.
Friedrich Jacobi (1743-1819) is known mainly as a representative of the “philosophy of feeling and faith” and as one of the first critics of Kant, who drew attention to the fundamental contradiction ...in his system: without the concept of “thing in itself” (or “thing in oneself”) it is impossible to enter into his “Critique of Pure Reason”, but it is equally impossible to remain in it with this concept. The consistent development of the transcendental philosophy system leads to the elimination of its own initial, fundamental premise. The discovery of this contradiction and the indication of its significance for the evaluation of critical philosophy was often seen as almost the only contribution of Jacobi to world philosophy. In the historical and philosophical literature, the opinion prevails is that Jacobi, by and large, simply did not understand Kant and was in comparison with him, just a “grumpy scoundrel” (Heinrich Heine) and a “lower monad” (Kuno Fischer). This pejorative assessment significantly simplifies and distorts both Jacobi’s philosophy and Jacobi’s actual attitude towards Kant, which was not so unambiguous. It should be considered in a much broader historical and problematic context. The study briefly examines the history of the long and difficult relationship between the “privileged heretic” and the “gray eminence” of the German philosophical classics with the creator of the transcendental philosophy system. The main directions of a deeply thought-out and well-founded serious criticism of Kant’s philosophy (i.e. its inconsistency, idealism, rational intellectualism, subjectivism, “speculative egoism”, etc.) are outlined and analyzed from the positions of radical realism, common sense, Christian faith, metaphysical “sense of the supersensible”, direct knowledge of the most important truths for a person, the absolute values of life, moral intuition, freedom, and dignity of the individual.
Lossky N.O. and his Metacritique of Pure Reason Balanovskiy, Valentin V.
Vestnik Rossiĭskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Serii͡a︡ Filosofii͡a,
09/2023, Letnik:
27, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The publication of the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant marked the beginning of an intellectual revolution not only in Philosophy, but also in other spheres of intellectual activity. Every ...year interest to this work is only growing up, especially in the context of the development of cognitive sciences and technologies related to the development and implementation of artificial intelligence systems. However, both Kant’s contemporaries and subsequent generations of researchers had questions about the basic concepts, outlined in the first Critique. Nikolay Lossky became one of such outstanding experts in Kant’s philosophy, who carried out a metacritique of transcendental idealism. His analysis is interesting because it is characterized by consistency, depth and inclusiveness, despite the fact that he was not a supporter of Kant’s philosophy. The proposed article explicates the main points of the metacritique of pure reason carried out by Lossky. The aim is to systematize the advantages and disadvantages of transcendental idealism highlighted by him in order to assess the validity of objections and identify points that paradoxically escaped Lossky’s attention. In particular, it is shown that the highest evaluation of Lossky is awarded to Kant’s efforts to create an epistemology that does not rely as presuppositions on any other branches of human knowledge; the resolution of contradictions between Empiricism and Rationalism; the creation of the doctrine of synthetic rationality and transcendental logic; the idea of the need for the immanence of knowledge to consciousness. Lossky identified as the key shortcomings of transcendental idealism a range of contradictions grouped around such concepts as the things in themselves, affection, experience, inner sense, transcendental schema, and unity of apperception. At the same time, it is shown that such a key concept for Kant’s theoretical philosophy as transcendental reflection has disappeared from the Lossky’s field of consideration. The study is preceded by a brief description of Lossky’s characteristics, including personal ones, as a meta-critic of pure reason.
In recent times, Kant’s theory of the moral feeling of respect has increasingly come to the centre of Kant research. His diverse and seemingly contradictory characterisations of this feeling in ...particular have led to continued controversial discussion. While a number of scholars try to understand the special role of respect in Kant by isolating this feeling from its conceptual context or solely referring to its role as moral motivation, I will concentrate on the systemic position of respect within the framework of Kant’s theory of the autonomy of reason. Furthermore, I will try to elucidate the different characterisations of respect given by Kant, referring not only to his ethics, but also to his general theory of transcendental idealism. Examining the special place of respect within Kant’s transcendental idealism, I will plead for a compatibilist reading of respect, according to which the “intellectualist” as well as the “affectivist” view both hold true. This is motivated by interpreting respect as a volitional structure featuring rational as well as emotional dimensions.
Psychoanalysis, as conceived by Freud, originates from an epistemological position that is often at odds with related disciplines such as psychology and psychiatry. We argue that psychoanalysis is ...wedded to a Kantian epistemology that is rigorously committed to modesty. The aim of the article is to illustrate how Freud's thinking was embedded within a Kantian epistemology. Even if he was not explicit, a prevailing Kantian philosophical discussion influenced Freud. Hence, the article shall not argue for Freud as working with Kant as a philosopher, but more narrowly address his epistemological stance as influenced by Kant. Drawing on recent philosophical work, we clarify the difference between a Kantian transcendental idealism and the more modern critical realism, and show why the former is best suited for the psychoanalytic enterprise. This leads to a discussion of how we may understand transcendental idealism as a crucial if tacit premise in modern object-relations theory. We touch upon the implicit epistemological position in Klein and Winnicott, and the more explicit one advanced by Bion. Finally, we explore the psychoanalytic attitude towards the possibility of knowledge.
The relation between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism awaits more careful determination, i. e. whether the issue of their compatibility hinges on their ontological view on the ...relation between physical and mental phenomena (i. e. whether it is supervenience or emergence) or on their epistemological view on our access to mental content. The aim of this paper is to identify a tension between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism, which lies not in their ontological view on the nature of substances, but in their epistemological view on the relation between self-awareness and the first-personal access to mental content. I will first trace the (mis)understanding of transcendental idealism as Berkeleyan idealism to a misinterpretation of the self-knowledge premise in transcendental arguments. I will argue that transcendental idealism is not so much concerned with grounding reality of the external world as with establishing the agential nature of the first-personal perspective of experience, and it has an important implication on the meaning and function of self-awareness in transcendental idealism.
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