Presented in V PARTS, containing 18 Chpts, & an Introduction is a theoretical study of the philosophical underpinnings of Max Weber's methodology & Heinrich Rickert's influence on it, asking where social science now stands in relation to Weber's work, & under what conditions subjective values can provide the basis for the conceptualization of social phenomena as objects of knowledge. PART I - WEBER AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES - in (1) Introduction; (2) The Irrationality of Reality; (3) The Sciences of Concrete Reality and the Constitution of Culture; (4) Value Relevance; & (5) The Problem of the Objectivity of the Cultural Sciences -- explores the premises in Weber's methodological writings that are responsible for generating the question of the influence of subjective values on social science conceptualizations. PART II - RICKERT AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE - in (1) The Problematic of the Southwest German School; (2) Windelband and the Idea of Idiographic Knowledge; (3) Lask's Analysis of Concept Formation and the Irrationality of Reality; (4) Rickert's Project; (5) The Problem of Concept Formation in History; & (6) The Doctrine of Value Relevance -- traces Rickert's more systematic analysis of the same questions posed in philosophical & methodological concerns with subjective values. PART III - RICKERT AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF VALUES - in (1) The Objectivity of Value Relevance and the Objectivity of Values; (2) The Analysis of Values; & (3) The Objectivity of Values -- provides an analysis of the elements of Rickert's value theory on which his solution to the problem of the objectivity of values depends. PART IV - CRITIQUE OF RICKERT - in (1) Introduction; (2) Critique of the Value/Valuation Dichotomy; (3) Critique of the Transcendental Solution; & (4) The Incommensurability of Values -- assesses Rickert's solution to the problem of objectivity. It is concluded that Rickert fails to solve the problem &, since the objectivity of concept formation rests on the objectivity of values, he fails to solve this problem as well; the problem of the objectivity of social science cannot be solved by employing the conceptual apparatus & the arguments of philosophy. PART V - CONCLUDING REMARKS - considers the implications for Weber's work of this critique of Rickert's failure, arguing that to the extent that Weber's methodology depends on these elements of Rickert's thought, the critique of Rickert also destroys the basis of Weber's methodology. It is opined that from the standpoint of Weber's own Rickertian premises, Weber's sociology of religion also presupposes a solution to the problem of value relevance that is not possible on the basis of an axiological decisionism; in the end, Weber's turn from a philosophy of values to a sociology of values has the same result as Rickert's turn from a normative theory of values to a purely formal taxonomy of values: the irresolvability of the problem of the objectivity of the cultural sciences. Chpt Notes include references. M. Crowdes