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Crerar, Charlie
The Philosophical quarterly, 10/2021, Letnik: 71, Številka: 4Journal Article
It is widely held that for an agent to have any intellectual character virtues, they must be fundamentally motivated by a love of epistemic goods. In this paper, I challenge this ‘strong motivational requirement’ on virtue. First, I call into question three key reasons offered in its defence: that a love of epistemic goods is needed to explain the scope, the performance quality, or the value of virtue. Secondly, I highlight several costs and restrictions that we incur from its acceptance. In so doing, I show that my titular question is more than just a question about the nature of virtuous motivation or the structure of intellectual virtue. Ultimately, it is a question about the very function of virtue epistemology itself.
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JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP |
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Vir: Osebne bibliografije
in: SICRIS
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