In a critique of A. MacIntyre's (eg, 1985) analysis of what, in liberal sentiment, is currently regarded as "moral scandal," MacIntyre is taken to task for his reading of the decline of Aristotelian ethics of virtue or morality based on the idea of a common good. He places too much emphasis on the nihilism of the modern age as the primary cause of the falling away from classical notions of virtue as a motivator in social interactions. It is argued that it may not be possible to assume that there are such things as social values that result from social practices, at least as the foundation for a morality that incorporates the common good, individual ego, & social equity; Aristotelian philosophy is inadequate for examining the interplay of such a variety of social forces. MacIntyre also spends too much time attacking modern philosophical attitudes toward utilitarianism, pragmatism, & individualism. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.