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  • Arguing about free will : Lewis and the consequence argument
    Šuster, Danilo
    I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and ... determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is power necessity (“no choice” operator), while Lewis analyses the version where the central notion is the locution “cannot render false.”Lewis accepts closure of the relevant (in)ability operator under entailment but not closure under implication. His strategy has a seemingly strange corollary: a free predetermined agent is able (in a strong, causal sense) to falsity the conjunction of history and law. I compare a Moorean position with respect to radical skepticism and knowledge closure with ability closure and propose to explain Lewis’s strategy in the framework of his Moorean stance.
    Source: Croatian journal of philosophy. - ISSN 1333-1108 (Vol. 21, no. 63, 2021, str. 375-403)
    Type of material - article, component part
    Publish date - 2021
    Language - english
    COBISS.SI-ID - 91994371
    DOI

source: Croatian journal of philosophy. - ISSN 1333-1108 (Vol. 21, no. 63, 2021, str. 375-403)

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