Conventional views of African politics imply that Africans' political opinions are based either on enduring cultural values or their positions in the social structure. In contrast, we argue that ...Africans form attitudes to democracy based upon what they learn about what it is and does. This learning hypothesis is tested against competing cultural, institutional, and structural theories to explain citizens' demand for democracy (legitimation) and their perceived supply of democracy (institutionalization) with data from 12 Afrobarometer attitude surveys conducted between 1999 and 2001. A multilevel model that specifies and estimates the impacts of both individual- and national-level factors provides evidence of learning from three different sources. First, people learn about the content of democracy through cognitive awareness of public affairs. Second, people learn about the consequences of democracy through direct experience of the performance of governments and (to a lesser extent) the economy. Finally, people draw lessons about democracy from national political legacies.
This book is a fascinating exploration of public opinion in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on the Afrobarometer, a comprehensive cross-national survey research project, it reveals what ordinary Africans ...think about democracy and market reform, subjects on which almost nothing is otherwise known. The authors find that support for democracy in Africa is wide but shallow and that Africans feel trapped between state and market. Beyond multiparty elections, people want clean and accountable government. They will accept economic structural adjustment only if it is accompanied by an effective state, the availability of jobs, and an equitable society. What are the origins of these attitudes? Far from being constrained by social structure and cultural values, Africans learn about reform on the basis of knowledge, reasoning, and experience. Weighing supply and demand for reform, the authors reach cautious conclusions about the varying prospects of African countries for attaining fully-fledged democracy and markets.0
Vote buying and political intimidation are characteristic dimensions of African election campaigns. According to survey-based estimates, almost one out of five Nigerians is personally exposed to vote ...buying and almost one in ten experiences threats of electoral violence. But when, as commonly happens, campaign irregularities are targeted at the rural poor, effects are concentrated. These effects are as follows: violence reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty. But, perhaps because most citizens condemn campaign manipulation as wrong, compliance with the wishes of politicians is not assured. Defection from threats and agreements is more common than compliance, especially where voters are cross-pressured from both sides of the partisan divide.
This article focuses on political relationships between citizens and local government in sub-Saharan Africa, with special attention to leadership responsiveness. Cross-national survey data provide ...popular insights into performance. Citizens regard local councils as weak institutions with limited functions (rarely performed well) and elected councilors as largely unresponsive. Although civic activism is a corrective, people have yet to make use of tax payment as a device to hold councilors accountable. In endeavoring to improve client satisfaction, policy actors should attend as much to the procedural dimensions of local government performance as to the substance of service delivery.
This article asks what Malians think about their country's political crisis, including its causes, status, and possible solutions. An Afrobarometer survey of public opinion conducted at the end of ...2012 finds the electorate in an apprehensive and ambivalent mood. Malians express declining faith in democracy as well as considerable (but diminishing) trust in the army. In a sign of democratic resilience, however, a large and broad majority continues to believe in elections as the best way to reconstitute a government. But only in the context of a stable and intact state - with an inclusive constitutional settlement, trustworthy civilian institutions, and engaged citizenry - will Mali be ready again for routine presidential and legislative elections.
This article examines the political crisis in Mali, 2012-2013, to test the impact of violent conflict on public attitudes to democracy. In post-conflict situations, democracy building depends on ...interim steps to restore trust among citizens and to address national reconciliation and transitional justice. According to the results of a custom-designed opinion survey, recent experiences of violence and displacement in Mali have undermined both interpersonal and interethnic trust as well as public confidence that elected governments can resolve national conflicts. While internal displacement is frequently accompanied by violence against property, violence against persons increases popular demand for a retributive brand of transitional justice. Nonetheless, the Malian experience suggests that citizens in post-conflict societies - including those displaced from their homes - still yearn to live in a peaceful and unified country and have not abandoned a widespread preference for democracy.
Bratton explores some political implications of the current boom in information and communications technology (ICT) in sub-Saharan Africa. As a striking manifestation of globalization, perhaps half ...of Africa's one billion people are now signed up as subscribers to cellular telephone networks. Africans are enthusiastically adopting mobile phone technology, here called 'cell' phones. By foregoing landlines in favor of advanced telecom systems, their choices of technology are leapfrogging over other parts of the world. Evidence is mounting that this modern communications revolution is beginning to have promising economic consequences.
This article proposes revisions to the theory of political transitions by analyzing patterns of recent popular challenges to neopatrimonial rule in Africa. The approach is explicitly comparative, ...based on contrasts between Africa and the rest of the world and among regimes within Africa itself. Arguing against the prevalent view that transitions unfold unpredictably according to the contingent interplay of key political actors, the authors contend that the structure of the preexisting regime shapes the dynamics and sometimes even the outcomes of political transitions. They find that in contrast to transitions from corporatist regimes, transitions from neopatrimonial rule are likely to be driven by social protest, marked by struggles over patronage, and backed by emerging middle classes. Following Dahl, the authors compare African regimes on the basis of the degree of formal political participation and competition allowed. They find that regime variants—personal dictatorship, military oligarchy, plebiscitary one-party regime, and competitive one-party regime—are associated with distinctive transition dynamics. Whereas transitions from military oligarchies are typically managed from the top down and are relatively orderly, transitions from plebiscitary systems often occur discordantly through confrontational national conferences. A consolidated democracy is least likely to result from the abrupt collapse of a personal dictatorship and is most likely, though never guaranteed, from a graduated transition from a competitive one-party regime. In general, getting to democracy is problematic from all regimes that lack institutional traditions of political competition.
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