Strategic thinking is an essential component of rational decision-making. However, little is known about its developmental aspects. Here we show that preschoolers can reason strategically in simple ...individual decisions that require anticipating a limited number of future decisions. This ability is transferred only partially to solve more complex individual decision problems and to efficiently interact with others. This ability is also more developed among older children in the classroom. Results indicate that while preschoolers potentially have the capacity to think strategically, it does not always translate into the ability to behave strategically.
Decision-making in children and adolescents is receiving increasing attention among economists. Studies shed light on opportunities for economists to understand the developmental causes of anomalous ...behavior in adults and to propose interventions at a young age capable of improving adult outcomes. Nevertheless, the study of children brings also new challenges that require methodological adjustments. Indeed, children are not little adults. They have their own ways of accounting for information, their own motivations, and their own limitations. These are critically linked to brain development and cognitive development, which operate in concert and shape behavior. These differences with respect to adult populations impose constraints on experimental designs. This special issue provides several examples of paradigms in which children behave differently from adults. All these studies share the need to account for age-related factors in the design of protocols. In this introduction, we discuss the pitfalls, challenges and opportunities associated with experiments in children and adolescents.
We develop a novel graphical paradigm of a strict-dominance-solvable game to study the developmental trajectory of steps of reasoning between 8 years old and adulthood. Most participants play the ...equilibrium action either always or only when they have a dominant strategy. Although age is a determinant of equilibrium choice, some very young participants display an innate ability to play at equilibrium. Finally, the proportion of equilibrium play increases significantly until fifth grade and stabilizes afterward, suggesting that the contribution of age to equilibrium play vanishes early in life.
We investigate iterative reasoning in children from pre-kindergarten to first grade (4–7 years old). We consider two-person games that have a unique Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium but vary in ...three key features: iterative complexity (the number of iterations required to reach the equilibrium), perspective requirement (the identity of the player with whom the iteration should start) and action symmetry. The beliefs of participants regarding the decision of their partners are elicited either before or after their own choices are made. We obtain the following findings. (1) Iterative complexity is not necessarily a cause of equilibrium failure. (2) Games where the equilibrium action is the same for both players are correctly solved more often. (3) Starting a recursion by solving the problem of a different player is non-intuitive in all our age groups but it can be overcome by asking participants to think about their partner’s decision before making their own choices. (4) Such ex-ante belief elicitation can, however, be detrimental in complex asymmetric games. We discuss these results in the context of the development of logical abilities and theory of mind abilities.
The downward fluxes of Fe and Na, measured near the mesopause with the University of Colorado lidars near Boulder, and a chemical ablation model developed at the University of Leeds, are used to ...constrain the velocity/mass distribution of the meteoroids entering the atmosphere and to derive an improved estimate for the global influx of cosmic dust. We find that the particles responsible for injecting a large fraction of the ablated material into the Earth's upper atmosphere enter at relatively slow speeds and originate primarily from the Jupiter Family of Comets. The global mean Na influx is 17,200 ± 2800 atoms/cm2/s, which equals 298 ± 47 kg/d for the global input of Na vapor and 150 ± 38 t/d for the global influx of cosmic dust. The global mean Fe influx is 102,000 ± 18,000 atoms/cm2/s, which equals 4.29 ± 0.75 t/d for the global input of Fe vapor.
Key Points
Small Fe/Na flux ratio indicates cosmic dust enters atmosphere at slow velocity
The majority of the mass influx originates from the Jupiter Family of Comets
The total cosmic dust influx is estimated to be 150 ± 38 t/d
We develop a graphical, non-analytical version of the two-person beauty contest game to study the developmental trajectory of instinctive behavior and learning from kindergarten to adulthood. These ...are captured by observing behavior when the game is played in two consecutive trials. We find that equilibrium behavior in the first trial increases significantly between 5 and 10 years of age (from 17.9% to 61.4%) and stabilizes afterwards. Children of all ages learn to play the equilibrium, especially when they observe an equilibrium choice by the rival. Our younger children are the weakest learners mainly because they are less frequently paired with rivals who play at equilibrium. Finally, the choice process data suggests that participants who play at equilibrium in the second trial are also performing fewer steps before reaching a decision, indicating that they are less hesitant about their strategy.
The interchange between the previously disconnected faunas of North and South America was a massive experiment in biological invasion. A major gap in our understanding of this invasion is why there ...was a drastic increase in the proportion of mammals of North American origin found in South America. Four nonmutually exclusive mechanisms may explain this asymmetry: 1) Higher dispersal rate of North American mammals toward the south, 2) higher origination of North American immigrants in South America, 3) higher extinction of mammals with South American origin, and 4) similar dispersal rate but a larger pool of native taxa in North versus South America. We test among these mechanisms by analyzing ∼20,000 fossil occurrences with Bayesian methods to infer dispersal and diversification rates and taxonomic selectivity of immigrants. We find no differences in the dispersal and origination rates of immigrants. In contrast, native South American mammals show higher extinction. We also find that two clades with North American origin (Carnivora and Artiodactyla) had significantly more immigrants in South America than other clades. Altogether, the asymmetry of the interchange was not due to higher origination of immigrants in South America as previously suggested, but resulted from higher extinction of native taxa in southern South America. These results from one of the greatest biological invasions highlight how biogeographic processes and biotic interactions can shape continental diversity.
•We present a model of platform competition in which two firms provide horizontally differentiated platforms and two sets of complementors offer products that are complementary to each platform ...respectively.•In this model, we characterize the pricing structure when consumers who buy a platform can only consume the complementary goods associated with that platform.•We show that indirect network effects are present in equilibrium: a platform and its complementors benefit when the quality of the platform and the number of complementors in the group increases and when the quality of the platform and the number of complementors in the other group decreases.•We then use this framework to determine the incentives of platforms to subsidize the independent complementors in an equilibrium.•We further analyze the incentives of each platform to form a strategic alliance with complementors through contractual exclusivity or technological compatibility, or to integrate with the complementors, and discuss the welfare consequences of these strategies.
We characterize the pricing structure in a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and two sets of complementors offer products that are exclusive to each platform, respectively. We highlight the presence of indirect network effects: platforms and complementors benefit from the quality and number of firms in their group and suffer from the quality and number of firms in the rival’s group through their effects on prices and market share. We then determine the incentives of platforms to subsidize the independent complementors in an equilibrium. We further analyze the incentives of each platform to form a strategic alliance with complementors through contractual exclusivity or technological compatibility, or to integrate with the complementors. Finally, we discuss the welfare consequences of these strategies.
We study from a developmental viewpoint the ability to perform contingent reasoning and the cognitive abilities that facilitate optimal behavior. Individuals from 11 to 17 years old participate in a ...simplified version of the two-value, deterministic “acquire-a-company” adverse selection game (Charness and Levin, 2009; Martínez-Marquina et al., 2019). We find that even our youngest subjects understand well the basic principles of contingent reasoning (offer the reservation price of one of the sellers), although they do not necessarily choose the optimal price. Performance improves steadily and significantly over the developmental window but it is not facilitated by repeated exposure or feedback. High cognitive ability–measured by a high performance in a working memory task–is necessary to behave optimally in the simplest settings but it is not sufficient to solve the most complex situations.
•Experimental study of behavioral and physiological effects of shaming.•Emotional response at the time of decision strongly correlates with behavior.•Stealing increases “moral stock”, which in turns ...affects the future cost of stealing.
We study experimentally the decision of an individual to steal or pay for an object that is produced at a cost by another individual. We consider two conditions. In the first condition, subjects caught stealing are sanctioned with a nominal fee. In the second condition, the sanction is increased by making the identity of the individual public (shaming). We also collect skin conductance responses to better understand the emotional arousal conducive to choices. Behaviorally, we show that stealing decreases significantly when shaming is introduced. More importantly, the emotional response at the time of decision strongly correlates with behavior. In particular, subjects who are more aroused are more likely to steal in the first condition, and also more likely to stop stealing in the second condition. Based on this physiological evidence, we develop a theoretical model where current decisions contribute to a “moral stock”, which in turns affects the future cost of stealing and therefore the future decisions. The structural estimation of this model provides a good fit while capturing the heterogeneity across individuals.
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