Summary Background Hand, foot, and mouth disease is a common childhood illness caused by enteroviruses. Increasingly, the disease has a substantial burden throughout east and southeast Asia. To ...better inform vaccine and other interventions, we characterised the epidemiology of hand, foot, and mouth disease in China on the basis of enhanced surveillance. Methods We extracted epidemiological, clinical, and laboratory data from cases of hand, foot, and mouth disease reported to the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention between Jan 1, 2008, and Dec 31, 2012. We then compiled climatic, geographical, and demographic information. All analyses were stratified by age, disease severity, laboratory confirmation status, and enterovirus serotype. Findings The surveillance registry included 7 200 092 probable cases of hand, foot, and mouth disease (annual incidence, 1·2 per 1000 person-years from 2010–12), of which 267 942 (3·7%) were laboratory confirmed and 2457 (0·03%) were fatal. Incidence and mortality were highest in children aged 12–23 months (38·2 cases per 1000 person-years and 1·5 deaths per 100 000 person-years in 2012). Median duration from onset to diagnosis was 1·5 days (IQR 0·5–2·5) and median duration from onset to death was 3·5 days (2·5–4·5). The absolute number of patients with cardiopulmonary or neurological complications was 82 486 (case-severity rate 1·1%), and 2457 of 82486 patients with severe disease died (fatality rate 3·0%); 1617 of 1737 laboratory confirmed deaths (93%) were associated with enterovirus 71. Every year in June, hand, foot, and mouth disease peaked in north China, whereas southern China had semiannual outbreaks in May and September–October. Geographical differences in seasonal patterns were weakly associated with climate and demographic factors (variance explained 8–23% and 3–19%, respectively). Interpretation This is the largest population-based study up to now of the epidemiology of hand, foot, and mouth disease. Future mitigation policies should take into account the heterogeneities of disease burden identified. Additional epidemiological and serological studies are warranted to elucidate the dynamics and immunity patterns of local hand, foot, and mouth disease and to optimise interventions. Funding China–US Collaborative Program on Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases, WHO, The Li Ka Shing Oxford Global Health Programme and Wellcome Trust, Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, and Health and Medical Research Fund, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Summary Background Transmission of the novel avian influenza A H7N9 virus seems to be predominantly between poultry and people. In the major Chinese cities of Shanghai, Hangzhou, Huzhou, and ...Nanjing—where most human cases of infection have occurred—live poultry markets (LPMs) were closed in April, 2013, soon after the initial outbreak, as a precautionary public health measure. Our objective was to quantify the effect of LPM closure in these cities on poultry-to-person transmission of avian influenza A H7N9 virus. Methods We obtained information about every laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection reported in the four cities by June 7, 2013, from a database built by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. We used data for age, sex, location, residence type (rural or urban area), and dates of illness onset. We obtained information about LPMs from official sources. We constructed a statistical model to explain the patterns in incidence of cases reported in each city on the basis of the assumption of a constant force of infection before LPM closure, and a different constant force of infection after closure. We fitted the model with Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. Findings 85 human cases of avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection were reported in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Huzhou, and Nanjing by June 7, 2013, of which 60 were included in our main analysis. Closure of LPMs reduced the mean daily number of infections by 99% (95% credibility interval 93–100%) in Shanghai, by 99% (92–100%) in Hangzhou, by 97% (68–100%) in Huzhou, and by 97% (81–100%) in Nanjing. Because LPMs were the predominant source of exposure to avian influenza A H7N9 virus for confirmed cases in these cities, we estimated that the mean incubation period was 3·3 days (1·4–5·7). Interpretation LPM closures were effective in the control of human risk of avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection in the spring of 2013. In the short term, LPM closure should be rapidly implemented in areas where the virus is identified in live poultry or people. In the long term, evidence-based discussions and deliberations about the role of market rest days and central slaughtering of all live poultry should be renewed. Funding Ministry of Science and Technology, China; Research Fund for the Control of Infectious Disease; Hong Kong University Grants Committee; China–US Collaborative Program on Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases; Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics; and the US National Institutes of Health.
Influenza A viruses evolve rapidly to escape host immunity, causing reinfection. The form and duration of protection after each influenza virus infection are poorly understood. We quantify the ...dynamics of protective immunity by fitting individual-level mechanistic models to longitudinal serology from children and adults. We find that most protection in children but not adults correlates with antibody titers to the hemagglutinin surface protein. Protection against circulating strains wanes to half of peak levels 3.5-7 years after infection in both age groups, and wanes faster against influenza A(H3N2) than A(H1N1)pdm09. Protection against H3N2 lasts longer in adults than in children. Our results suggest that influenza antibody responses shift focus with age from the mutable hemagglutinin head to other epitopes, consistent with the theory of original antigenic sin, and might affect protection. Imprinting, or primary infection with a subtype, has modest to no effect on the risk of non-medically attended infections in adults.
Middle East Respiratory syndrome (MERS) first emerged in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and remains a global health concern. The objective of this study was to compare the clinical features and risk factors ...for adverse outcome in patients with RT-PCR confirmed MERS and in those with acute respiratory disease who were MERS-CoV negative, presenting to the King Fahad Medical City (KFMC) in Riyadh between October 2012 and May 2014. The demographics, clinical and laboratory characteristics and clinical outcomes of patients with RT-PCR confirmed MERS-CoV infection was compared with those testing negative MERS-CoV PCR. Health care workers (HCW) with MERS were compared with MERS patients who were not health care workers. One hundred and fifty nine patients were eligible for inclusion. Forty eight tested positive for MERS CoV, 44 (92%) being hospital acquired infections and 23 were HCW. There were 111 MERS-CoV negative patients with acute respiratory illnesses included in this study as "negative controls". Patient with confirmed MERS-CoV infection were not clinically distinguishable from those with negative MERS-CoV RT-PCR results although diarrhoea was commoner in MERS patients. A high level of suspicion in initiating laboratory tests for MERS-CoV is therefore indicated. Variables associated with adverse outcome were older age and diabetes as a co-morbid illness. Interestingly, co-morbid illnesses other than diabetes were not significantly associated with poor outcome. Health care workers with MERS had a markedly better clinical outcome compared to non HCW MERS patients.
Summary Background The avian influenza A H7N9 virus has caused infections in human beings in China since 2013. A large epidemic in 2016–17 prompted concerns that the epidemiology of the virus might ...have changed, increasing the threat of a pandemic. We aimed to describe the epidemiological characteristics, clinical severity, and time-to-event distributions of patients infected with A H7N9 in the 2016–17 epidemic compared with previous epidemics. Methods In this epidemiological study, we obtained information about all laboratory-confirmed human cases of A H7N9 virus infection reported in mainland China as of Feb 23, 2017, from an integrated electronic database managed by the China Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and provincial CDCs. Every identified human case of A H7N9 virus infection was required to be reported to China CDC within 24 h via a national surveillance system for notifiable infectious diseases. We described the epidemiological characteristics across epidemics, and estimated the risk of death, mechanical ventilation, and admission to the intensive care unit for patients admitted to hospital for routine clinical practice rather than for isolation purpose. We estimated the incubation periods, and time delays from illness onset to hospital admission, illness onset to initiation of antiviral treatment, and hospital admission to death or discharge using survival analysis techniques. Findings Between Feb 19, 2013, and Feb 23, 2017, 1220 laboratory-confirmed human infections with A H7N9 virus were reported in mainland China, with 134 cases reported in the spring of 2013, 306 in 2013–14, 219 in 2014–15, 114 in 2015–16, and 447 in 2016–17. The 2016–17 A H7N9 epidemic began earlier, spread to more districts and counties in affected provinces, and had more confirmed cases than previous epidemics. The proportion of cases in middle-aged adults increased steadily from 41% (55 of 134) to 57% (254 of 447) from the first epidemic to the 2016–17 epidemic. Proportions of cases in semi-urban and rural residents in the 2015–16 and 2016–17 epidemics (63% 72 of 114 and 61% 274 of 447, respectively) were higher than those in the first three epidemics (39% 52 of 134, 55% 169 of 306, and 56% 122 of 219, respectively). The clinical severity of individuals admitted to hospital in the 2016–17 epidemic was similar to that in the previous epidemics. Interpretation Age distribution and case sources have changed gradually across epidemics since 2013, while clinical severity has not changed substantially. Continued vigilance and sustained intensive control efforts are needed to minimise the risk of human infection with A H7N9 virus. Funding The National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars.
Influenza A viruses are believed to spread between humans through contact, large respiratory droplets and small particle droplet nuclei (aerosols), but the relative importance of each of these modes ...of transmission is unclear. Volunteer studies suggest that infections via aerosol transmission may have a higher risk of febrile illness. Here we apply a mathematical model to data from randomized controlled trials of hand hygiene and surgical face masks in Hong Kong and Bangkok households. In these particular environments, inferences on the relative importance of modes of transmission are facilitated by information on the timing of secondary infections and apparent differences in clinical presentation of secondary infections resulting from aerosol transmission. We find that aerosol transmission accounts for approximately half of all transmission events. This implies that measures to reduce transmission by contact or large droplets may not be sufficient to control influenza A virus transmission in households.
Background. Volunteer challenge studies have provided detailed data on viral shedding from the respiratory tract before and through the course of experimental influenza virus infection. There are no ...comparable quantitative data to our knowledge on naturally acquired infections. Methods. In a community-based study in Hong Kong in 2008, we followed up initially healthy individuals to quantify trends in viral shedding on the basis of cultures and reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) through the course of illness associated with seasonal influenza A and B virus infection. Results. Trends in symptom scores more closely matched changes in molecular viral loads measured with RT-PCR for influenza A than for influenza B. For influenza A virus infections, the replicating viral loads determined with cultures decreased to undetectable levels earlier after illness onset than did molecular viral loads. Most viral shedding occurred during the first 2–3 days after illness onset, and we estimated that 1%–8% of infectiousness occurs prior to illness onset. Only 14% of infections with detectable shedding at RT-PCR were asymptomatic, and viral shedding was low in these cases. Conclusions. Our results suggest that “silent spreaders” (ie, individuals who are infectious while asymptomatic or presymptomatic) may be less important in the spread of influenza epidemics than previously thought.
In winter 2018, schools in Hong Kong were closed 1 week before the scheduled Chinese New Year holiday to mitigate an influenza B virus epidemic. The intervention occurred after the epidemic peak and ...reduced overall incidence by ≈4.2%. School-based vaccination programs should be implemented to more effectively reduce influenza illnesses.
Background. The relationship between seasonal influenza vaccine and susceptibility to 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 virus infection is not fully understood. Methods. One child 6–15 years of age from each of ...119 households was randomized to receive 1 dose of inactivated trivalent seasonal influenza vaccine (TIV) or saline placebo in November 2008. Serum samples were collected from study subjects and their household contacts before and 1 month after vaccination (December 2008), after winter (April 2009) and summer influenza (September–October 2009) seasons. Seasonal and pandemic influenza were confirmed by serum hemagglutinination inhibition, viral neutralization titers, and reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction performed on nasal and throat swab samples collected during illness episodes. Results. TIV recipients had lower rates of serologically confirmed seasonal A/H1N1 infection (TIV group, 8%; placebo group, 21%; P = .10) and A/H3N2 infection (7% vs 12%; P = .49), but higher rates of pandemic A/H1N1 infection (32% vs 17%; P = .09). In multivariable analysis, those infected with seasonal influenza A during the study had a lower risk of laboratory-confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infection (adjusted odds ratio OR, 0.35; 95% confidence interval CI, 0.14–0.87), and receipt of seasonal TIV was unassociated with risk of pandemic A/H1N1 infection (adjusted OR, 1.11; 95% CI, 0.54–2.26). Conclusions. TIV protected against strain-matched infection in children. Seasonal influenza infection appeared to confer cross-protection against pandemic influenza. Whether prior seasonal influenza vaccination affects the risk of infection with the pandemic strain requires additional study. Clinical trials registration. ClinicalTrials.gov number NCT00792051.
Summary Background The novel influenza A H7N9 virus emerged recently in mainland China, whereas the influenza A H5N1 virus has infected people in China since 2003. Both infections are thought to be ...mainly zoonotic. We aimed to compare the epidemiological characteristics of the complete series of laboratory-confirmed cases of both viruses in mainland China so far. Methods An integrated database was constructed with information about demographic, epidemiological, and clinical variables of laboratory-confirmed cases of H7N9 (130 patients) and H5N1 (43 patients) that were reported to the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention until May 24, 2013. We described disease occurrence by age, sex, and geography, and estimated key epidemiological variables. We used survival analysis techniques to estimate the following distributions: infection to onset, onset to admission, onset to laboratory confirmation, admission to death, and admission to discharge. Findings The median age of the 130 individuals with confirmed infection with H7N9 was 62 years and of the 43 with H5N1 was 26 years. In urban areas, 74% of cases of both viruses were in men, whereas in rural areas the proportions of the viruses in men were 62% for H7N9 and 33% for H5N1. 75% of patients infected with H7N9 and 71% of those with H5N1 reported recent exposure to poultry. The mean incubation period of H7N9 was 3·1 days and of H5N1 was 3·3 days. On average, 21 contacts were traced for each case of H7N9 in urban areas and 18 in rural areas, compared with 90 and 63 for H5N1. The fatality risk on admission to hospital was 36% (95% CI 26–45) for H7N9 and 70% (56–83%) for H5N1. Interpretation The sex ratios in urban compared with rural cases are consistent with exposure to poultry driving the risk of infection—a higher risk in men was only recorded in urban areas but not in rural areas, and the increased risk for men was of a similar magnitude for H7N9 and H5N1. However, the difference in susceptibility to serious illness with the two different viruses remains unexplained, since most cases of H7N9 were in older adults whereas most cases of H5N1 were in younger people. A limitation of our study is that we compared laboratory-confirmed cases of H7N9 and H5N1 infection, and some infections might not have been ascertained. Funding Ministry of Science and Technology, China; Research Fund for the Control of Infectious Disease and University Grants Committee, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China; and the US National Institutes of Health.