This is a book of three philosophical chapters on aspects of terrorism, torture, and war. It relates issues in ethical theory to practical ethics. The chapter on torture considers views about what ...torture is and the various occasions on which it could occur in order to determine why it might be wrong to torture a wrongdoer held captive, even if this were necessary to save his victims. The discussion of terrorism examines whether it is the intention to harm civilians rather than harm to them being “collateral damage” that makes terrorism distinctively wrong, what else might make it wrong, and whether it is always wrong. The third chapter first discusses whether having a right reason, in the sense of a right intention, is necessary in order for starting war to be just. It then examines ways in which the harms of war can be proportional to the achievement of the just cause and other goods war can bring about, so as to make starting war permissible.
This book comprises chapters that discuss aspects of war and other conflicts in the light of both nonconsequentialist ethical theory and the views of such theorists as Barbara Herman, Jeff McMahan, ...Avishai Margalit, and Michael Walzer. The first chapter deals with the relation between states of affairs whose termination justifies war and states of affairs that once achieved should put an end to war. The next few chapters deal with conduct in war. They first consider the implications of general moral principles (including the Doctrine of Double Effect and Principle of Permissible Harm) for the permissibility of harm to combatants and noncombatants, and then whether factors unique to war should alter what is permissible. In particular, if the context of war should affect the relative violability of different combatants and different noncombatants, if terror killing combatants and/or noncombatants should ever be permissible, and if there is liability to harm in virtue of belonging to a group. The fifth chapter examines how recent discussions by nonconsequentialists about redirection of threats (as in the famous Trolley Problem) may illuminate the moral status of collaboration that took place with Nazis during the Holocaust. What justice requires after conflict and how our ability to provide it affects the permissibility of starting war, is the question of the next topic. Truth and reconciliation commissions and retribution post-conflict are discussed, and whether harm to civilians stemming from such procedures (and how the harm arises) bear on the permissibility of instituting the procedures. The three concluding chapters deal with moral aspects of conflicts outside of standard war, including those involving the threat of terrorism, resistance to communal injustice (for example, in the case of the Taliban women), and the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence.
This book collects work on bioethics, which have appeared over the last twenty-five years and which have made the author among the most influential philosophers in this area. The author is known for ...intricate, sophisticated, and painstaking philosophical analyses of moral problems generally and of bioethical issues in particular. This volume showcases this work—revised to eliminate redundancies—as parts of a coherent whole. An introduction identifies important themes than run through the chapters. Sections cover topics such as death and dying; early life (on conception and use of embryos, abortion, and childhood); genetics and other such enhancements (on cloning and other genetic technologies); allocating scarce resources; and methodology (on the relation of moral theory and practical ethics).
This book presents a new argument attacking the view that if the foetus has the moral standing of a person it has a right to life and abortion is impermissible. Most discussion of abortion has ...assumed that this premise is correct, and so has focused on the question of the personhood of the foetus. Frances Kamm, however, argues that abortion can be moral even if the foetus is indeed a person.
This book presents a new argument attacking the view that if the foetus has the moral standing of a person it has a right to life and abortion is impermissible. Most discussion of abortion has ...assumed that this premise is correct, and so has focused on the question of the personhood of the foetus. Frances Kamm, however, argues that abortion can be moral even if the foetus is indeed a person.
Kamm examines the whole brain death criterion (WBC), which is currently the accepted criterion for declaring death in many countries. He suggests that the WBC's supporters would allow that concerted ...functioning that is supported in part artificially can constitute life and so spontaneity is less important than they seem to think.
Gibt es objektive Begriffe von Körperbehinderung und körperlicher Überlegenheit, die in der Diskussion über genetische Veränderungen verwendet werden können? Der Beitrag behauptet, daß es solche ...objektiven Begriffe gibt. Trotzdem arbeitet die Autorin Gesichtspunkte heraus, die auf Unterschiede in der moralischen Beurteilung von gentherapeutischen Maßnahmen gegen Körperbehinderungen einerseits und von Verfahren zu genetischen Verbesserungen andererseits hinweisen. Zu diesen Gesichtspunkten gehören der Gedanke, daß den am schlimmsten Betroffenen zuerst geholfen werden muß, der Gedanke, daß zwischen den gesteckten Zielen und den Risiken, die zu ihrer Erreichung eingegangen werden, eine vernünftige Relation bestehen muß, und die Überlegung, daß bestimmten Arten von Autonomie eine sehr hohe Bedeutung zukommt.
Thesis. 1980. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.
MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND HUMANITIES.
Bibliography: leaves 339-341.
Ph.D.
