ObjectivesIn August 2016, Campylobacter spp contaminated an untreated reticulated water supply resulting in a large-scale gastroenteritis outbreak affecting an estimated 8320 people. We aimed to ...determine the incidence of probable reactive arthritis (ReA) cases in individuals with culture-confirmed campylobacteriosis (CC), self-reported probable campylobacteriosis (PC) and those reporting no diarrhoea (ND).DesignWe conducted a retrospective cohort study to identify incidence of probable ReA cases. We identified cases with new ReA symptoms using an adapted acute ReA (AReA) telephone questionnaire. Those reporting ≥1 symptom underwent a telephone interview with the study rheumatologist. Probable ReA was defined as spontaneous onset of pain suggestive of inflammatory arthritis in ≥1 previously asymptomatic joint for ≥3 days occurring ≤12 weeks after outbreak onset.SettingPopulation-based epidemiological study in Havelock North, New Zealand.ParticipantsWe enrolled notified CC cases with gastroenteritis symptom onsets 5 August 2016–6 September 2016 and conducted a telephone survey of households supplied by the contaminated water source to enrol PC and ND cases.ResultsOne hundred and six (47.3%) CC, 47 (32.6%) PC and 113 (34.3%) ND cases completed the AReA telephone questionnaire. Of those reporting ≥1 new ReA symptom, 45 (75.0%) CC, 13 (68.4%) PC and 14 (82.4%) ND cases completed the rheumatologist telephone interview. Nineteen CC, 4 PC and 2 ND cases developed probable ReA, resulting in minimum incidences of 8.5%, 2.8% and 0.6% and maximum incidences of 23.9%, 12.4% and 2.15%.DiscussionWe describe high probable ReA incidences among gastroenteritis case types during a very large Campylobacter gastroenteritis outbreak using a resource-efficient method that is feasible to employ in future outbreaks.
Smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980, with known seed stock retained in two high security Biosafety Level 4 laboratories in the United States and Russia. Experts agree the likelihood of theft ...from these laboratories is low, and that synthetic creation of smallpox is a theoretical possibility. Until 2017 it was believed that synthetic smallpox was technically too complex a task to be a serious threat. However, in 2017, Canadian scientists synthesised a closely related orthopoxvirus, horsepox, using mail order DNA and $100,000. Simultaneously, terrorist groups have declared intent to conduct biological attacks. In this context an exercise was held on August 16th 2018, with international and cross-sectoral stakeholders to review preparedness for a bioterrorism attack in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. The exercise was conducted by The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Centre for Research Excellence, Integrated Systems for Epidemic Response, with contextual input from the Ministry of Health and Medical Services Fiji. The scenario involved a deliberate release in Fiji, followed by a larger release in a more populous Asian country. Mathematical modelling was used to underpin epidemic projections under different conditions. The exercise alternated between clinical, public health, emergency and societal responses, with participants making real-time decisions on cross-sectoral response across the region and the world. Key weak points which are influential in determining the final size and impact of the epidemic were identified (based on mathematical modelling of transmission in Fiji and globally). We identified potential gaps in preparedness for smallpox and factors which influence the severity of a smallpox epidemic. This included identifying which determinants of epidemic size are potentially within our control, and which are not. Influential factors within our control include: preventing an attack through intelligence, law enforcement and legislation; speed of diagnosis; speed and completeness of case finding and case isolation; speed and security of vaccination response, including stockpiling; speed and completeness of contact tracing; protecting critical infrastructure and business continuity; non-pharmaceutical interventions (social distancing, PPE, border control); protecting first responders; operational support and logistics; social mobilisation and risk communication. Based on discussion at the workshop between diverse stakeholders, recommendations were made to guide improved prevention, mitigation and rapid response, thus providing a holistic, cross-sectoral framework for prevention of a worst-case scenario smallpox pandemic.
Stringent nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as lockdowns and border closures are not currently recommended for pandemic influenza control. New Zealand used these NPIs to eliminate ...coronavirus disease 2019 during its first wave. Using multiple surveillance systems, we observed a parallel and unprecedented reduction of influenza and other respiratory viral infections in 2020. This finding supports the use of these NPIs for controlling pandemic influenza and other severe respiratory viral threats.
In the past decade, pertussis has made a global resurgence, driving reconsideration of national immunisation schedules and vaccine usage. A workshop held by the Ministry of Health in 2015 discussed ...New Zealand's pertussis disease control strategies. Data were presented from current research into vaccine safety during pregnancy and the effectiveness of the immunisation schedule in preventing pertussis throughout childhood. The greatest burden of disease and mortality remains in infants under 1 year of age, especially infants too young to be immunised, those of Māori and Pacific ethnicity, and those living in deprivation. The workshop considered strategies including the timing of the scheduled vaccines, maternal immunisation, improving immunisation coverage, vaccination timeliness and service delivery to reduce inequalities and overall disease burden. It concluded that the current infant schedule appears to be working well to protect older infants from severe pertussis. Significant gains for reducing severe disease in vulnerable young infants could be made with improvements in maternal vaccine uptake. Other strategic directions include attention to schedule adherence and timeliness of vaccine delivery, and more effective communication approaches for healthcare professionals and the public.
Whooping cough—where are we now? A review Kiedrzynski, Tomasz; Bissielo, Ange; Suryaprakash, Mishra ...
New Zealand medical journal,
06/2015, Volume:
128, Issue:
1416
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
This paper describes the recent trends of pertussis and vaccine uptake in New Zealand based on notifications and immunisation registration information since 2011. It highlights the current risk for ...the infant in the first months after birth and the crucial role a pertussis booster in pregnancy could play. It also aims to show that protection of infants by the acellular pertussis vaccine can be improved by timely immunisation even in a situation of improving overall uptake rates that are nearing the national target of 95%.
We analysed New Zealand notification data for pertussis, extracted from EpiSurv between August 2011 and December 2013, which included the period of the last epidemic. Pertussis immunisation coverage data were extracted from the National Immunisation Register (NIR). Population estimates were based on 2006 census data. Deprivation was analysed using the New Zealand Deprivation Index 2006.
Despite immunisation coverage at 12 months having exceeded 90% New Zealand experienced a large epidemic from 2011 to 2014, with several hundred infant hospitalisations and three deaths. Notification data indicated an average annual rate of pertussis in the New Zealand population of 102 per 100,000 with the highest rates in the youngest age groups. While an overall increase in immunisation coverage in New Zealand was evident and the timeliness showed improvement across ethnic groups and deprivation deciles, there was a marked geographical variation within DHBs and between ethnic groups.
Given the recent published evidence, pertussis vaccination should be offered to all mothers between weeks 28 and 38 of pregnancy. Further improvements are still possible in coverage at 6 months, particularly in Māori and but also in Pacific populations, as well as in more deprived populations. DHBs work towards achieving the 95% target can contribute to the improvement in the timeliness of immunisation.
Influenza is a vaccine-preventable disease that can lead to serious acute respiratory illnesses and other complications. Influenza viruses are widespread in wild avian species and infect several ...animal species in addition to humans. Constant evolutionary changes to the influenza virus make the disease challenging to control. In November 2014, the Immunisation Advisory Centre held New Zealand's inaugural Influenza Symposium (NZiS) to focus upon influenza and vaccine strategies in New Zealand. International and local experts discussed advances in vaccine effectiveness, safety and disease prevalence and impact. Disease surveillance and vaccine effectiveness studies are identifying those at greatest risk from influenza to target vaccination campaigns. Influenza vaccine safety is closely monitored in order to improve public confidence. In New Zealand, around 27% of the total population are vaccinated against influenza annually, with 67% coverage for those aged 65 years and over who are eligible to funded vaccine. Seasonal influenza vaccination is vigorously promoted each year to help to improve vaccine uptake. However, there are inequalities in disease impact, with the elderly and very young, socioeconomically deprived and those with Maori and Pacific Island ethnicity remaining at-risk of serious disease and hospitalisation, which may be addressed by further improving access to influenza vaccine.
Background
New Zealand's (NZ) complete absence of community transmission of influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) after May 2020, likely due to COVID‐19 elimination measures, provided a ...rare opportunity to assess the impact of border restrictions on common respiratory viral infections over the ensuing 2 years.
Methods
We collected the data from multiple surveillance systems, including hospital‐based severe acute respiratory infection surveillance, SHIVERS‐II, ‐III and ‐IV community cohorts for acute respiratory infection (ARI) surveillance, HealthStat sentinel general practice (GP) based influenza‐like illness surveillance and SHIVERS‐V sentinel GP‐based ARI surveillance, SHIVERS‐V traveller ARI surveillance and laboratory‐based surveillance. We described the data on influenza, RSV and other respiratory viral infections in NZ before, during and after various stages of the COVID related border restrictions.
Results
We observed that border closure to most people, and mandatory government‐managed isolation and quarantine on arrival for those allowed to enter, appeared to be effective in keeping influenza and RSV infections out of the NZ community. Border restrictions did not affect community transmission of other respiratory viruses such as rhinovirus and parainfluenza virus type‐1. Partial border relaxations through quarantine‐free travel with Australia and other countries were quickly followed by importation of RSV in 2021 and influenza in 2022.
Conclusion
Our findings inform future pandemic preparedness and strategies to model and manage the impact of influenza and other respiratory viral threats.
Global forced displacement has climbed to unprecedented levels due largely to regional conflict. Degraded public health services leave displaced people vulnerable to multiple environmental and ...infectious hazards including vaccine preventable disease. While diphtheria is rarely notified in New Zealand, a 2 person outbreak of cutaneous diphtheria occurred in refugees from Afghanistan in February 2015 at the refugee resettlement centre in Auckland. Both cases had uncertain immunisation status. The index case presented with a scalp lesion during routine health screen and toxigenic Corynebacterium diphtheriae was isolated. A secondary case of cutaneous diphtheria and an asymptomatic carrier were identified from skin and throat swabs. The 2 cases and 1 carrier were placed in consented restriction until antibiotic treatment and 2 clearance swabs were available. A total of 164 contacts were identified from within the same hostel accommodation as well as staff working in the refugee centre. All high risk contacts (n=101) were swabbed (throat, nasopharynx and open skin lesions) to assess C. diphtheriae carriage status. Chemoprophylaxis was administered (1 dose of intramuscular benzathine penicillin or 10 days of oral erythromycin) and diphtheria toxoid-containing vaccine offered regardless of immunisation status. Suspected cases were restricted on daily monitoring until swab clearance. A group of 49 low risk contacts were also offered vaccination. Results suggest a significant public health effort was required for a disease rarely seen in New Zealand. In light of increased worldwide forced displacement, similar outbreaks could occur and require a rigorous public health framework for management.
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