This article presents version 2.0 of the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). It is increasingly clear that it is untenable to assume a unified security sector, as states often rely on militias ...to carry out security tasks. The PGMD 2.0 provides new opportunities for studying questions such as when states rely on militias, how they chose among different types and the consequences for stability and peace. We detail how the PGMD 2.0 provides new information on the characteristics, behaviour, life cycle and organization of 504 pro-government militias across the globe between 1981 and 2014.
Does more media censorship imply more regime stability? We argue that censorship may cause mass disapproval for censoring regimes. In particular, we expect that censorship backfires when citizens can ...falsify media content through alternative sources of information. We empirically test our theoretical argument in an autocratic regime—the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Results demonstrate how exposed state censorship on the country's emigration crisis fueled outrage in the weeks before the 1989 revolution. Combining original weekly approval surveys on GDR state television and daily content data of West German news programs with a quasi-experimental research design, we show that recipients disapproved of censorship if they were able to detect misinformation through conflicting reports on Western television. Our findings have important implications for the study of censoring systems in contemporary autocracies, external democracy promotion, and campaigns aimed at undermining trust in traditional journalism.
Recent research suggests that intimidating voters and electoral clientelism are two strategies on the menu of manipulation, often used in conjunction. We do not know much, however, about who is ...targeted with which of these illicit electoral strategies. This article devises and tests a theoretical argument on the targeting of clientelism and intimidation across different voters. We argue that in contexts where violence can be used to influence elections, parties may choose to demobilize swing and opposition voters, which frees up resources to mobilize their likely supporters with clientelism. While past research on this subject has either been purely theoretical or confined to single country studies, we offer a first systematic cross-national and multilevel analysis of clientelism and voter intimidation in seven African countries. We analyze which voters most fear being intimidated with violence and which get targeted with clientelistic benefits, combining new regional-level election data with Afrobarometer survey data. In a multilevel analysis, we model the likelihood of voters being targeted with either strategy as a function of both past election results of the region they live in and their partisan status. We find that voters living in incumbent strongholds are most likely to report having being bribed in elections, whereas those living in opposition strongholds are most fearful of violent intimidation. We further provide suggestive evidence of a difference between incumbent supporters and other voters. We find support that incumbent supporters are more likely to report being targeted with clientelism, and mixed support for the idea that they are less fearful of intimidation. Our findings allow us to define potential hot spots of intimidation. They also provide an explanation for why parties in young democracies concentrate more positive inducements on their own supporters than the swing voter model of campaigning would lead us to expect.
Incumbents who resort to violence in efforts to secure their hold on power have been a major challenge for sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, opening up domestic markets to international capital ...in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has provided governments with more resources to garner the support of their citizens. How are these developments related? We argue that FDI reduces the likelihood that incumbents use violence in competitive regions. FDI has direct economic benefits for the population. Especially in competitive regions, where violence might reduce turnout even among their potential supporters, incumbents thus adapt their re-election strategies and use fewer violent means. We draw on geo-referenced data on election violence, FDI, and previous election results and match these within subnational regions. Investigating subnational variation in 15 sub-Saharan African countries, we find empirical support for our argument. FDI lowers pre-election violence in competitive regions, but has no effect in both incumbent and opposition strongholds. These findings are robust to using 10×10 km and 25×25 km grid cells and have important implications for democratic countries’ foreign policies: allowing multinational companies to invest in developing countries reduces violence, but might simultaneously bolster incumbent regimes.
Can media have a lasting impact on attitudes in postwar countries? A lingering impact of media could substantially shape peace and security in postwar societies. Our quasi-experimental research ...design and original survey data utilize variation in the reception of an anti-government radio station in Nepal's Terai region, which was shut down after violent clashes. Our results show that individuals with access to anti-government broadcasts were less optimistic about peace, police and civic activism three years after the closure of the station. The study has implications for understanding the longer-term role of media for post-conflict attitudes and state-building.
Die Verschränkung von Technologieentwicklung und nationalstaatlichen Institutionen, bisher nur unzureichend verstanden, wird hier unter einer politökonomischen Perspektive auf die ...Technologieentwicklung in Deutschland und den USA am Beispiel der Saatgutindustrie entwickelt. Es lassen sich drei institutionelle Arrangements zur Organisation des Wissen(schafts)systems erkennen, die entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Art der entwickelten Technologie haben: die Bereitstellung von Wissen als öffentliches oder als privates Gut in liberalen Ökonomien und die Bereitstellung von Wissen als Clubgut in koordinierten Ökonomien. Als Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass unter den institutionellen Bedingungen liberaler Konkurrenzmärkte (USA seit den 1980er Jahren) eine starke Verwissenschaftlichung, eine deutliche Unternehmenskonzentration sowie eine Einengung der Entwicklungsbemühungen auf wenige, kommerziell interessante Kulturarten und agronomische Eigenschaften erfolgt. In koordinierten Ökonomien wie Deutschland sind diese Tendenzen schwächer ausgeprägt, die Wissensentwicklung im Saatgutsektor ist nach wie vor überwiegend mittelständisch und handwerklich geprägt. The significance of the interrelation of technology development and national institutions is insufficiently understood. This paper provides a political-economic perspective on the development of technology in Germany and the USA by using the seed industry as an example. There are three institutional arrangements for organizing the knowledge system in an economy: in liberal economies either as a public or a private commodity and in coordinated economies as a club commodity. These institutional arrangements have a decisive influence on the type of technology which is developed. Our results show that with the institutional conditions of liberal competition markets (such as that in the United States since the 1980 s), a strong scientification, a significant market concentration, as well as a limitation of the development efforts occurred for a few crops and agronomical qualities with commercial interest. In coordinated economies such as in Germany, these tendencies are less pronounced. The development of knowledge in the seed sector takes place continuously and predominately in medium sized and trade-based companies.
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