Background
New Zealand's (NZ) complete absence of community transmission of influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) after May 2020, likely due to COVID‐19 elimination measures, provided a ...rare opportunity to assess the impact of border restrictions on common respiratory viral infections over the ensuing 2 years.
Methods
We collected the data from multiple surveillance systems, including hospital‐based severe acute respiratory infection surveillance, SHIVERS‐II, ‐III and ‐IV community cohorts for acute respiratory infection (ARI) surveillance, HealthStat sentinel general practice (GP) based influenza‐like illness surveillance and SHIVERS‐V sentinel GP‐based ARI surveillance, SHIVERS‐V traveller ARI surveillance and laboratory‐based surveillance. We described the data on influenza, RSV and other respiratory viral infections in NZ before, during and after various stages of the COVID related border restrictions.
Results
We observed that border closure to most people, and mandatory government‐managed isolation and quarantine on arrival for those allowed to enter, appeared to be effective in keeping influenza and RSV infections out of the NZ community. Border restrictions did not affect community transmission of other respiratory viruses such as rhinovirus and parainfluenza virus type‐1. Partial border relaxations through quarantine‐free travel with Australia and other countries were quickly followed by importation of RSV in 2021 and influenza in 2022.
Conclusion
Our findings inform future pandemic preparedness and strategies to model and manage the impact of influenza and other respiratory viral threats.
Abstract By early 2022, the highly transmissible Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 had spread across most of the world. For the first time since the pandemic began, New Zealand was experiencing high ...levels of community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. We enroled a cohort of households to better understand differences in transmission dynamics among subvariants of Omicron. We enroled 71 households, comprising 289 participants, and aimed to use viral genomes to gain a clearer understanding of variant-specific differences in epidemiological parameters affecting transmission dynamics. Approximately 80% of the households enroled experienced transmission of BA.2, while most of the remaining households had infections with BA.1 or BA.5. Using a logistic regression generalised linear mixed model, we found no difference in household secondary infection rate between Omicron subvariants BA.1, BA.2 and BA.5. Of the households recruited, the vast majority (92%) experienced a single chain of transmission with one inferred introduction. Further, we found that in 48% of the households studied, all household participants became infected following an index case. Most household participants tested positive within a week following an introduction, supporting the seven-day isolation requirement for household contacts that was in place in New Zealand at the time. By integrating genomic and epidemiological data, we show that viral transmission dynamics can be investigated with a higher level of granularity than with epidemiological data alone. Overall, households are a high risk setting for viral transmission in New Zealand.
