I discuss available evidence about the evolution of top wealth shares in the United States over the course of the 20th century. The three main approaches--the Survey of Consumer Finances, estate tax ...multiplier, and capitalization methods--generate generally consistent findings until mid-1980s but diverge since then, with the capitalization method showing a dramatic increase in wealth concentration and the other two methods showing at best a small increase. I discuss strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. The increase in capitalization estimates since 2000 is driven by a dramatic and puzzling increase in fixed income assets. There is evidence that estate tax estimates may not be sufficiently accounting for mortality improvements over time. The nonresponse and coverage issues in the SCF are a concern. I conclude that the changing nature of top incomes and the increased importance of self-made wealth may explain difficulties in implementing each of the methods and why the results diverge.
In contrast to former investigations in the growth-poverty literature, this research constructs a panel vector autoregressive model to explore the interactive relationship between income inequality, ...institutional quality, inclusive growth and poverty of 82 low and middle income developing countries from 1996 to 2022. In addition, we employed the impulse response function tool, which is the reaction of any dynamic system in response to some external change, to comprehend the reaction of poverty aftershocks on inclusive growth, income inequality and institutional quality variables. Finally, the study was completed by the variance decomposition of all variables. The empirical results indicate that inclusive growth is negatively significant determinant of poverty, while inequality and institutional quality are positive but insignificant. Meanwhile, income inequality and institutional quality have a significant effect on inclusive growth. From a general perspective, the results reveal that no causal relationship exists between inequality and institutional quality. The results of the variance decomposition confirm the above outcomes.
Abstract
Income distributions are a growing area of interest in the examination of equity impacts brought on by climate change and its responses. Such impacts are especially important at subnational ...levels, but projections of income distributions at these levels are scarce. Here, we project U.S. state-level income distributions for the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). We apply a non-parametric approach, specifically a recently developed principal components algorithm to generate net income distributions for deciles across 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. We produce these projections to 2100 for three SSP scenarios in combination with varying projections of GDP per capita to represent a wide range of possible futures and uncertainties. In the generation of these scenarios, we also generated tax adjusted historical deciles by U.S. states, which we used for validating model performance. Our method thus produces income distributions by decile for each state, reflecting the variability in state income, population, and tax regimes. Our net income projections by decile can be used in both emissions- and impact-related research to understand distributional effects at various income levels and identify economically vulnerable populations.
This paper analyses the distributional effects of eliminating the implicit subsidy on natural gas consumption in Russia. The analysis is based on a computable general equilibrium model with multiple ...households and a detailed power generation sector. It is found that using additional government revenues from higher domestic gas prices to increase the income of low- and middle-income households could improve the welfare of these households and alleviate income inequality in Russia, e.g., total private consumption of the poorest decile could increase by 3%. Nevertheless, the most efficient revenue-recycling policy would be to invest in the energy efficiency of buildings, which have the largest energy savings potential in Russia. In the long term, investing in the energy efficiency of buildings could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 240 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year and increase the welfare of low- and middle-income households, e.g., total private consumption of the poorest decile increases by 1%. It is also found that increasing the regulated domestic gas price could lead to windfall profits for non-Gazprom producers. Hence, to increase government revenues, the gas-price reform could be supplemented by an increase in the capital income tax in the gas sector.
•Increasing the domestic gas price will have an adverse impact on the poor.•Investing in the energy efficiency of buildings could alleviate this adverse impact.•Total private consumption of the poorest decile could increase by 1%.•Russia's GHG emissions could decrease by 240 Mt of CO2eq per year.•Windfall profits of non-Gazprom producers could be captured by a capital income tax.
Technology is widely considered the main source of economic progress, but it has also generated cultural anxiety throughout history. The developed world is now suffering from another bout of such ...angst. Anxieties over technology can take on several forms, and we focus on three of the most prominent concerns. First, there is the concern that technological progress will cause widespread substitution of machines for labor, which in turn could lead to technological unemployment and a further increase in inequality in the short run, even if the long-run effects are beneficial. Second, there has been anxiety over the moral implications of technological process for human welfare, broadly defined. While, during the Industrial Revolution, the worry was about the dehumanizing effects of work, in modern times, perhaps the greater fear is a world where the elimination of work itself is the source of dehumanization. A third concern cuts in the opposite direction, suggesting that the epoch of major technological progress is behind us. Understanding the history of technological anxiety provides perspective on whether this time is truly different. We consider the role of these three anxieties among economists, primarily focusing on the historical period from the late 18th to the early 20th century, and then compare the historical and current manifestations of these three concerns.
This paper estimates the effects of trade liberalization on household income inequality and investigates whether trade liberalization or domestic reforms are the main factors influencing increasing ...inequality in Taiwan, a middle‐income open economy. We construct an empirical model by decomposing the sources of household disposable income in the quintile ratio and separate trade partners into OECD (Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development) and non‐OECD countries. Using time‐series data to estimate the long‐run effect, we find that net exports to OECD countries increase inequality, whereas net exports to non‐OECD countries insignificantly decrease inequality. This finding diverges from the prediction based on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem. Overall, trade liberalization increases income inequality, and the effect is mainly attributed to net exports to OECD countries. Moreover, we provide evidence that domestic reforms, particularly technological progress in favor of skilled labor and industrial structural change, rather than trade liberalization, are the main driving forces of income inequality.
The US tolerates more inequality than Europe and believes its economic mobility is greater than Europe's, though they had roughly equal rates of intergenerational occupational mobility in the late ...twentieth century. We extend this comparison into the nineteenth century using 10,000 nationally-representative British and US fathers and sons. The US was more mobile than Britain through 1900, so in the experience of those who created the US welfare state in the 1930s, the US had indeed been "exceptional." The US mobility lead over Britain was erased by the 1950s, as US mobility fell from its nineteenth century levels.
This paper documents the variation in living standards of the poorest fifth of children in rich (and some middle-income) nations, with a focus on the relative importance and interaction of social ...transfers (net of taxes) and labour market incomes. Overall, the crossnational variation in the disposable income of disadvantaged children is comprised equally of variation in market and transfer income (with the two negatively correlated). The English-speaking countries stand out as all having relatively low market incomes, but substantial variation in transfer income. Their low market incomes reflect low employment hours in Australia and primarily low hours in the UK and Ireland, while in the US and Canada low hours and low pay contribute equally. Comparing incomes prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis, the real disposable incomes of the poorest fifth decreased substantially in Greece, Spain and Ireland, but were relatively stable in other rich nations.
This study examines the effects of work related factors (such as mobbing, job security and job concern) and academic related factors (such as publications, time for research and pressure) and ...relative income effect (social comparison and self-income evaluation) on life satisfaction and overall job satisfaction of young faculty members working at leading universities located in major cities in Turkey. The analysis is based on a unique survey conducted with 1215 research assistants. Separate regressions were run for the whole sample and for gender categories. Findings of the research revealed that life satisfaction and overall job satisfaction were strongly correlated with mobbing, time for research, formal and informal pressure and subjective job security. Separate regression results revealed that the significant predictors for overall job satisfaction differed among male and female respondents. In regard to relative income effect, findings were in line with the existing literature: attaching importance to income comparison has a negative impact on life satisfaction. In addition, downward self-income evaluation for the present has a negative effect on life satisfaction, whereas upward self-income evaluation for the future (expectations) has a positive effect on life satisfaction.
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