This study deals with the political situation in Iran during the Safavid authority and the declaration of Shiism doctrine as the official state religion by Shah Ismael I (1501-1524). It presents how ...the Shiism was formed and strengthened, and also deals with the appearance of Shia religious men in the political and social fields from the declaration of the Safavid state until the end of their authority. Additionally, the religious changes and the relations of the Safavid rulers with religious men are investigated.The religious policy of Shah Tahmasp I (1524-1577) manifested in bringing a great number of scientists and Shia religious men from the Arab homeland to Iran. The Shah used those religious men in writing and publishing Shia jurisprudence books and expanding the Shiism. The fundamentals of Shiism was written during the reign of this Shah, and the authority of religious men reached the top. Besides, a great number of posts and religious titles were created at the reign of Shah Tahmasp. Another part of this study tackled the arrival of Ismael II (1576-1577) and his policy to weaken the authority of Shia religious men, and pay attention to the Sunni doctrine.Moreover, the study presented the religious policy of Shah Abbas the Great (1587-1622), who was the strongest Safavid Shah, and his attempt to remove the Qizal- Bash Sufis. He also reduced the political role of religious men and tried to establish a strong authority away from religious men. The authority of the religious men increased after Shah Abbas the Great, especially at the final reign of the Safavid authority at the reign of Hussein Al-Safawi (1694-1722). During that period, the Safavid state was completely controlled by religious men. At the reign of Shah Hussien, the Safavid authority became under the control of Mala (Mahmoud Baqir Majlisi) , who practiced a great deal of violence against other religions, especially the Sunni and Zaradashti religions.The degree and posts of religious men, their social position, class and their influence on the Iranian society will be investigated. The study also will discuss the role of religious men in the field of education, and how Sharia courts were managed by religious men, because these two important and influential points were the reason behind strengthening the authority of religious men as it was completely supervised by them.
Le chiite imaginaire Vincent Geisser
Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée,
09/2019, Volume:
145
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
The recent rise of anti-Shia discourse in the Islamic field in France seems paradoxical, in a country where Shii Muslims can hardly be seen, let alone at the level of local or national Islamic ...institutions. In this article, I try and unravel the sociological enigma of such an “anti-Shiism without Shias.” Although it is related to the activity of traditional, hanbali-wahhabi preachers and theologians, one cannot solely look at this phenomenon as the expression of an “imported anti-Shiism” that would reflect the religious and political controversies which dominate the Islamic scenes in the Middle East. For these new forms of anti-Shiism also prove largely informed by the very stakes and cleavages of the French Islamic field. No longer simply conveyed by Salafist circles traditionally hostile to Shiism, it is now being reinvented by younger, “reformist” Muslim leaders who grew up in France and use anti-Shiism as a way of asserting their spiritual and communal authority.
Taqiyyah means expressing or concealing one's belief and action against one's heart to avoid religious or worldly harm is one of the jurisprudential issues that has educational consequences. The ...purpose of this study is to investigate Taqiyyah as a behavioral method in Islamic education by applying the pros and cons from both jurisprudential and educational aspects. The method of the present study is a qualitatively comparative with an analytical-inferential approach. Researchers have used the library method to collect data, including the study of primary and secondary sources. To analyze the data, the qualitative analysis method was used based on data recording and categorization of the "subject" unit. Findings of research in the field of jurisprudence show that Shiite jurists were mainly in favor of Taqiyyah and Sunni scholars were against it. From the educational point of view, Taqiyyah means positive in the sense of self-control and tolerance with people whose beliefs are not in line with one's beliefs. The main similarity between the proponents and opponents of Taqiyyah is the recourse of both groups to the verses of the Qur'an and the behavior of the Prophet Mohammad and his companions through the presentation of different interpretations. Another finding of the research shows that according to the proponents, in many matters of life, it is not necessary to refer to Taqiyyah and it cannot be referred to as a permanent behavioral principle. According to the opponents of Taqiyyah, in the contemporary world and due to the new developments based on the prevalence of legal mechanisms in society, resorting to Taqiyyah is not necessary. The similarity between the two groups of proponents and opponents of Taqiyyah is the attention to positive developments such as civil rights and negative developments such as the increase of religious extremism to accept or reject Taqiyyah.
Communism and Shia political Islam in the Arab world do not share the same ideological assumptions ; however, they do bear family resemblances, due to their historical relationship – particularly in ...Iraq and Lebanon – which can be broken down to three time sequences. From the 1950s, communist parties are anchored in marginalized Shia communities : the revolutionary narrative of Marxism and class struggle echoes Shia messianism. In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the dynamic is reversed : the anti-imperialist and eschatological narrative coming from Teheran fascinates the Marxist lefts, and encourages conversions to political Islam. The third sequence opens in the nineties, with the end of the Cold War : since then, Arab communists have displayed a political use of Shiism, that is not religious. By supporting Teheran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, some Arab Marxist activists try to reactivate a neo-thirld-worldist political worldview. Nevertheless, as have the proponents of Shia political Islam, they have abandoned for the moment any revolutionary aspirations.
Résumé : À partir d’une enquête ethnographique conduite auprès de partisans du Hezbollah dans un village du Liban-Sud, cet article questionne le travail de cadrage de la cause palestinienne par le ...Hezbollah libanais. Je montre que l’alignement de cadres autour de la sacralisation de la cause palestinienne a permis de désactiver les oppositions suscitées notamment par l’histoire de la présence palestinienne au Liban, avant d’interroger les transformations des imaginaires politiques suscitées dans la société partisane du Hezbollah par son engagement dans la guerre en Syrie.
Le communisme et l’islam politique chiite dans le monde arabe ne partagent pas les mêmes présupposés idéologiques, mais une série de greffes et d’empreintes successives, notamment en Irak et au ...Liban, leur donne parfois un air de famille. Trois séquences historiques distinctes se dessinent. À partir des années 1950, des partis communistes se greffent sur des communautés chiites marginalisées : l’appel révolutionnaire du marxisme et de la lutte des classes fait pratiquement écho au millénarisme chiite. Avec les effets de la révolution iranienne de 1979 sur le monde arabe, la dynamique s’inverse : la tonalité anti-impérialiste et eschatologique venue de Téhéran fascine les gauches marxisantes. Elle encourage des conversions à l’islam politique. La troisième séquence s’ouvre avec les années 1990 ; depuis, le communisme arabe a un usage politique du chiisme, mais qui n’est pas religieux. En se plaçant du côté de Téhéran et du Hezbollah libanais, les gauches marxisantes tentent de réenchanter une vision tiers-mondiste du politique. Mais, à l’instar de l’islam politique chiite, elles ont pour le moment abandonné tout horizon révolutionnaire.
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