The business judgment rule is a concept of business law to provide protection for the directors and commissioners of the company regarding liability due to decisions or policies that harm the ...company. This concept is important to realize creative and innovative directors in carrying out business practices. This study aims to explore the progressive legal aspects of the business judgment rule concept. This research is a normative legal research oriented to the study of the concept of business judgment rule and the theoretical study of progressive law. The primary legal materials in this study include: the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the PT Law, and the POJK on the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners of Issuers or Public Companies. Secondary legal materials include: the results of studies and research that discusses the concept of business judgment rule and progressive law. Non-legal materials include legal dictionaries. The results of the study confirm that the essence of the concept of business judgment rule is to optimize the effectiveness and efficiency of the company. This includes providing guarantees for protection and legal certainty for directors and commissioners regarding liability for company losses that can be excluded through the concept of a business judgment rule. The implications of the business judgment rule in the perspective of progressive law can be done by revising Article 97 paragraph (5) of the Limited Liability Company Law to guarantee the limits of the business judgment rule more specifically so as to ensure legal certainty, prioritizing human values in progressive law as guiding values in reading the formulation of Article 97 paragraph (5) PT Law, as well as the role of judges in court through their decisions to develop the concept of a business judgment rule in practice.
Business judgment rule considerations were born with a background of problems where they are always blamed for losses suffered by the company, the impression that is built basically does not reflect ...the values in the company’s business operations. This research aims to analyze how is the adoption process Business Judgement Rule in Indonesian law, and how to apply Business Judgement Rule in Indonesian. This research also intended to understand the application of the Business Judgment Rule doctrine in Indonesia. This research is normative juridical research conducted through library research and analyzed by qualitative research methods on the secondary data found. The results of this study indicate that the application of the Business Judgment Rule can provide legal protection for the board of directors for business policies taken even though the business policy results in losses for the company, as long as the business decisions are made with prudence, in good faith, and in the scope of authority and responsibility.
Considering the planned amendments under the Financial Market Integrity Strengthening Act, the author first analyzes to what degree IFRS and reporting standards under the German Commercial Code grant ...managers discretion when preparing the annual and consolidated financial statements of a company. She then examines how to exercise such discretion in accordance with § 93 subsection 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act and to what extent accounting decisions are protected by the business judgment rule.
The liability of the insolvency administrator pursuant to sec. 60 InsO is a continuous subject of legal discourse. There are repeated calls for a limitation of the liability risk. This work pursues a ...new approach: the fundamentals and function of the insolvency administrator's liability are examined and, for the first time, compared with the liability of the bankruptcy trustee under U.S. bankruptcy law. Among other things, it is revealed that the bankruptcy trustee is subject to far greater court and creditor control than his German counterpart and that the principle of "concurrence of control and liability," which is essential for the comparatively strict liability under sec. 60 InsO, is not universally implemented.
Tujuan: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji dan menganalisis perlindungan hukum terhadap keputusan bisnis Direksi BUMN yang dikriminalisasi akibat keputusan bisnis tersebut merugikan keuangan ...negara. Metodologi: Penelitian yang bersifat deskriptif ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif yang mengedepankan pada data sekunder. Pendekatan yang digunakan pada penelitian ini adalah pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konseptual.Temuan: Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan perlindungan hukum yang diberikan kepada Direksi BUMN dalam mengambil keputusan bisnisnya dapat berupa hak imunitas, yang mana dengan hak ini seorang Direksi BUMN dapat terlepas dari pertanggungjawaban pidana apabila Direksi tersebut dapat membuktikan bahwa keputusan bisnis yang telah diambil dan dijalankan telah sesuai dengan prinsip-prinsip bisnis yang layak (business judgement rule) sesuai ketentuan yang termuat dalam Undang-Undang Perseroan Terbatas.Kegunaan: Hasil penelitian ini dimaksudkan agar dapat berkontribusi dalam literatur mengenai perlindungan hukum bagi keputusan bisnis Direksi BUMN yang telah dikriminalisasi.Kebaruan/Orisinalitas: Berbeda dengan penelitian terdahulu, pada penelitian ini menunjukkan business judgment rule doctrine dapat dipergunakan untuk menlindungi keputusan bisnis Direksi BUMN yang merugikan negara dan penelitian ini berfokus pada perlindungan hukum keputusan bisnis Direksi BUMN setelah adanya Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor No. 48/PUU-XI/2013 dan 62/PUU-XI/2013.
Rad sustavno obraðuje odgovornost članova nadzornog odbora. Iako članovi nadzornog odbora ne vode poslove društva, njihova je uloga važna jer oni paze na to da se poslovi vode na način koji je ...prihvatljiv svim interesnim skupinama u društvu i oko njega. Pritom je njihova odgovornost ureðena po istom načelu kao i odgovornost članova uprave koji vode poslove društva. Takva odgovornost polazi od njihove temeljne obveze da djeluju u interesu društva. U radu se ponajprije obraðuje standard pažnje koji se traži od članova nadzornog odbora u obavljanju njihovih poslova, pri čemu se daje poseban osvrt na ulogu članova u nadzornom odboru vladajućeg društva i u nadzornim odborima ovisnih društava u koncernu. Potom se obraðuje učinak primjene pravila poslovne prosudbe kojom se štiti slobodna poduzetnička prosudba članova nadzornog odbora, a zatim i sukob interesa članova nadzornog odbora i povreda obveze čuvanja poslovne tajne. Rad se u nastavku pobliže bavi zahtjevom za naknadu štete prema članovima nadzornog odbora. Pritom se obraðuje pitanje prema kojim se članovima nadzornog odbora može postaviti takav zahtjev, pretpostavke odgovornosti za štetu i ostvarenje tog zahtjeva, a potom odricanja društva od tog zahtjeva i mogućnost sklapanja nagodbe izmeðu društva i člana nadzornog odbora. Zaključno se obraðuje odgovornost zbog iskorištavanja utjecaja u društvu.
ABSTRACT
The current audit environment encourages auditors to conduct defensive auditing procedures in lieu of using new, innovative, and potentially more effective audit procedures, due to concerns ...these procedures may be second‐guessed in litigation or by audit inspectors such as the PCAOB. As a result, auditors may prefer traditional “generally accepted” procedures over innovative procedures that are potentially more effective. We test recent proposals that an Audit Judgment Rule (AJR) encourages the use of innovative, and potentially more effective, audit procedures analogous to the similar Business Judgment Rule that affords legal protections to corporate directors. Under an AJR, litigators or audit inspectors could not second‐guess auditor judgments, even if they perceive that alternate judgments would have ordinarily been reached, provided the auditor's judgment was made in good faith and in a rigorous manner. However, the AJR's requirements that auditors must defend the rigor of their innovative judgments could potentially backfire and lead auditors to select more traditional procedures. Under the framework of goal activation theory, we conduct an experiment with audit managers and seniors and find that an AJR makes auditors less likely to select innovative audit procedures, particularly when audit risk is high. They do so despite believing the innovative procedures to be more effective than the traditional procedures. Findings from a supplementary experiment with experienced auditors further suggest that national office affirmation of the reasonableness of the procedures does not help overcome this effect. Overall, our findings suggest that an AJR may have the unintended consequence of further increasing auditors' focus on more traditional, and potentially less effective, audit procedures.
RÉSUMÉ
Une règle d'appréciation de l'audit aurait‐elle pour conséquence d'accroître ou de réduire le recours des auditeurs à des procédures d'audit novatrices?
L'environnement d'audit actuel incite les auditeurs à mettre en œuvre des procédures d'audit défensives plutôt que de recourir à des procédures d'audit novatrices et potentiellement plus efficaces, dans la crainte que ces procédures puissent être remises en cause dans un litige ou par les inspecteurs des audits, comme le PCAOB. Il est donc possible que les auditeurs préfèrent les procédures traditionnelles « généralement reconnues » aux procédures novatrices potentiellement plus efficaces. Les auteurs testent les allégations récentes selon lesquelles une règle d'appréciation de l'audit (Audit Judgment Rule), apparentée à la règle d'appréciation commerciale (Business Judgment Rule) accordant une protection juridique aux dirigeants d'entreprises, favoriserait le recours à des procédures d'audit novatrices, et potentiellement plus efficaces. En vertu d'une telle règle, il serait impossible pour les avocats en litige ou les inspecteurs des audits de remettre en cause les jugements d'un auditeur, même s'ils estiment qu'un jugement différent aurait normalement dû être porté, du moment que l'auditeur a porté ce jugement de bonne foi et avec rigueur. Toutefois, les exigences de la règle d'appréciation de l'audit selon lesquelles l'auditeur doit faire valoir la rigueur de son jugement novateur risquent d’être une arme à deux tranchants et d'amener les auditeurs à opter pour des procédures plus traditionnelles. Dans le cadre de la théorie de l'activation des objectifs, les auteurs procèdent à une expérience faisant intervenir des directeurs en audit et des chefs de mission et constatent qu'une règle d'appréciation de l'audit rend les auditeurs moins enclins à opter pour des procédures d'audit novatrices, en particulier lorsque le risque d'audit est élevé. Les auditeurs agissent ainsi même s'ils croient que les procédures d'audit novatrices sont plus efficaces que les procédures d'audit traditionnelles. Les résultats d'une expérience complémentaire réalisée auprès d'auditeurs expérimentés semblent indiquer au surplus que la confirmation du bien‐fondé des procédures mises en œuvre par le bureau national ne parvient pas à contrer cet effet. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats de l’étude portent à conclure qu'une règle d'appréciation de l'audit pourrait avoir pour conséquence non souhaitée d'accroître la préférence des auditeurs pour les procédures d'audit plus traditionnelles et potentiellement moins efficaces.