We conduct a field experiment in which highly-ranked chess players play the centipede game in a natural setting. This game represents one of the main paradoxes of backward induction. In the ...experiment two players alternately are faced with the decision of either taking an exponentially growing pile of money and ending the game, or letting the other player make the decision. The player who decides to stop the game takes the larger portion of the pile, and the other player gets the remaining amount. All standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. Contrary to this evidence our results show that 69% of chess players stop the game immediately. When we restrict attention to chess Grandmasters this percentage escalates to 100%. We also conduct standard laboratory experiments where college students and chess players play ten repetitions of the game. We find that chess players playing versus other chess players rapidly converge to the equilibrium outcome, whereas students playing versus other students systematically depart from it. However, when students play against chess players the occurrence of the backward induction outcome increases tenfold.
Centipedes are a common household arthropod whose bite usually causes only local reactions. Ingestion of centipedes has not been previously reported. This article reports the case of a six-month-old ...infant who ingested a centipede of the Scutigera morpha species and had systemic side effects probably due to systemic absorption of its venom. The child recovered spontaneously after 48 hours. This case illustrates that toxic effects may be noted after ingestion of arthropods and that in this type of centipede no active intervention may be necessary.
In this paper, we re-examine various previous experimental studies of the Centipede Game in the literature. These experiments found that players rarely follow the subgame-perfect equilibrium ...strategies of the game, and various modifications to the game were proposed to explain the outcomes of the experiments. We here offer yet another modification. Players have a choice of whether or not to believe that their opponents use subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. We define a ‘behavioral equilibrium’ for this game. This equilibrium concept can reproduce the outcomes of those experiments.
In this paper, we re-examine various previous experimental studies of the Centipede Game in the literature. These experiments found that players rarely follow the subgame-perfect equilibrium ...strategies of the game, and various modifications to the game were proposed to explain the outcomes of the experiments. We here offer yet another modification. Players have a choice of whether or not to believe that their opponents use subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. We define a `behavioral equilibrium' for this game. This equilibrium concept can reproduce the outcomes of those experiments.
In their paper on Best-Reply Matching (BRM), Droste, Kosfeld & Voorneveld (2003) obtained quite intuitive results for the centipede game. In this short paper we first show that these results derive ...from the application of their criterion to the reduced normal form of the game. Then we prove that applying their criterion to the normal form of the game leads to different results. Third we propose an extension of Droste, Kosfeld & Voorneveld’s criterion, which leads to the same results in both the reduced normal form and the normal form of a game. This extension leads to a larger set of behaviors, including the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium but also a limited rationality behavior that strongly sustains the continuation of the game.
The evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in generic finite extensive-form games with perfect information is examined. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic ...in combination with rare mutations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each strategy. The criterion for our judgement is whether this dynamic stabilizes over time at the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. We find that the backwards induction solution is fully justified by this process only in simple games; simple meaning two players, two actions at each node and at most three consecutive decisions in the game. Examples of more complex games are given in which this process does not select between the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and alternative Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Several specimens of a small geophilomorph centipede were collected by the author from the Isles of Scilly between 1984 and 1987. The last legs bear a tuberculate pretarsus which is a diagnostic ...character of the North American genus Arenophilus but this species is not among those listed in Crabill's (1969) review of that genus.
A new genus and species of geophilomorph centipede, Nothogeophilus turki is described from the Scilly Isles and the Isle of Wight. The precise relationships of this new genus are not clear. The ...species is, presumably, an introduction.
