Kada zakon postane »zatvor Rudan, Dražen; Berdica, Josip
Filozofska istraživanja,
12/2023, Volume:
43, Issue:
3
Journal Article, Web Resource
Peer reviewed
Open access
Povodom dvadesete godišnjice smrti jednog od najznačajnijih suvremenih političkih i socijalnih filozofa, Johna B. Rawlsa (1921. – 2002.), autori se u ovome radu bave njegovim razumijevanjem odnosa ...između građanskog neposluha i slobode u okvirima liberalne ustavne demokracije utemeljene na vladavini prava. Temeljno polazište Rawlsove teorije građanskog neposluha, a samim time i ovoga rada, jest da je riječ o obliku izražavanja neposluha zakonu unutar granica privrženosti pravu, premda na njegovom vanjskom rubu. Ukoliko je sloboda mišljenja kojom se izražava neposluh nepravednim zakonima jedna od temeljnih sloboda, utoliko je građanski neposluh moguće shvatiti ne samo kao korektiv liberalne ustavne demokracije već i kao realni pokušaj njezina »spašavanja«. Riječ je o bitnoj temi suvremene političke filozofije s obzirom na sve prisutniji diskurs o suvremenoj krizi liberalizma uopće i utjecaju te krize na institucije liberalne ustavne demokracije, među kojima se osobito ističe država, a zapravo pravo i pravni sustav u cjelini.
On the twentieth anniversary of the death of one of the most important contemporary political and social philosophers, John B. Rawls (1921–2002), in this paper the authors deal with his understanding of the relationship between civil disobedience and freedom within the framework of a liberal constitutional democracy based on the rule of law. The fundamental starting point of Rawls’s theory, and thus of this work, is that civil disobedience expresses disobedience to the law within the limits of fidelity to the law, although it is at the outer edge thereof. If the freedom of thought expressing disobedience to unjust laws is one of the fundamental freedoms, then civil disobedience can be understood not only as a corrective to liberal constitutional democracy but also as a realistic attempt to “save” it. This is an important topic of contemporary political philosophy, considering the increasingly widespread discourse about the crisis of liberalism in general today, and the impact of that crisis on the institutions of liberal constitutional democracy, among which the state stands out, but in fact law and the legal system as a whole.
The central question of Transition 2.0 is this: what (and how) may a new government do to re-establish constitutional democracy, as well as repair membership within the European Union, without ...breaching the European rule of law? This volume demonstrates that EU law and international commitments impose constraints but also offer tools and assistance for facilitating the way back after rule of law and democratic backsliding. The various contributions explore the constitutional, legal, and social framework of ‘Transition 2.0’.
American elites’ continuing descent into polarization and the ongoing disintegration of civic culture and institutions highlight the need for educational leaders to learn from national consensus ...efforts in civics reform that have been forged by experts from the center left and center right. From a conservative perspective, this requires center-left colleagues to recognize the drawbacks of prioritizing civic engagement over civic education, the latter encompassing fundamental knowledge and civic virtues. The recent study Educating for American Democracy provides a balanced view of a national consensus framework for improvements that can be undertaken by states and localities, emphasizes civic knowledge and civic virtues as the foundation of informed participation, and features Tocqueville’s concept of “reflective patriotism” as indispensable to a healthy American constitutional democracy. I argue that if American elites do not invest in such preparation for informed, committed citizenship, we risk the kind of self-inflicted crisis that Lincoln addressed in 1838 when he warned of an impending national “suicide.”
Organization design seeks to balance potentially conflicting objectives while achieving a broader mission. EO13769 created a challenge for the president of the Academy of Management in leading ...through these conflicts, as President Anita McGahan describes: how to be true to her own moral values while leading an organization with well-established design constraints, and members with diverse opinions. This article shares the perspectives of 12 scholars on the lessons we can learn from Professor McGahan’s leadership of a constraining organization through a challenging time.
In recent times the idea of popular sovereignty has figured prominently in the rhetoric of neo-populist thinkers and activists who argue that legal and political authority must be concentrated in one ...single body or individual elected by the people to act in its name. The thesis of this article is that, while the notion of popular sovereignty may seem to offer some support to the neo-populist image of democracy, it serves more persuasively to support the idea of a polycentric, constitutional democracy. The constitutional state can be polycentric and yet feature a sovereign. And if this constitutional state is democratic in the sense of distributing power relatively equally amongst individual citizens, thus empowering the people-several, then it will establish the people-corporate in the role of sovereign.
Knowledge institutions-understood as ongoing entities with a central purpose of creating or disseminating knowledge according to disciplinary standards-are central to the workings of a constitutional ...democracy. The press is made up of knowledge institutions that should be recognized as such. Moreover, and contrary to the suggestions of some jurists, the press can be reasonably defined, without suspect content discrimination, in light of its special role in seeking and reporting knowledge; different definitions may be appropriate for different purposes, such as limited access to physical press briefings as compared to privileges for confidential sources. Finally, knowledge institutions, including the press, are interdependent on each other, which means that all knowledge institutions have stakes in the well-being of others.
Abstract
Perhaps there are never too many different theories about the organization of society, ideas about the normative framework of life in a political community and suggestions on how to ...institutionalize the political system. Perhaps they go out in public too early. This could also apply to those reflections on society and to those political philosophies that bear the label of utopia. There is no doubt about the importance of such human investigations of what is and what should be. And there is no doubt about the usefulness of constantly imagining what it should be. However, analytical and explanatory caution is required when the word utopia is used to suggest the utopian nature of an idea. In other words, what looks like a utopia can already be presented to us as a provable and tangible fact, only that too many people do not perceive it for too long, and therefore it remains unfulfilled in social practice. Is this really a utopia? On the other hand, what may seem completely understandable, feasible or even self-evident can appear extremely utopian when it comes to the normative approaches to social regulation and the conditions for achieving a “better society.” The deviation of political practice and legal practice from what should be understandable or even self-evident according to the text of the constitution and international law, the findings of jurisprudence, philosophical insights and common sense in political decision-making and in the drafting and implementation of the applicable law is so great that, paradoxically, precisely that which is understandable, feasible or even self-evident appears utopian. And how can utopianism be combined with the realization that so many major and persistent social problems can be solved so easily and quickly - even if only by rethinking the legal system and social realm? How can a human being efficiently oppose neoliberal politics and unbridled capitalist practice, the poor functioning of the rule of law, the low quality of the welfare state, the excessive threat to fundamental human rights and freedoms, the inadequate protection of social rights, the insufficient commitment to the value of solidarity and the inadequate role and weakness of morality in social practice? Can the answers to fundamental social questions and solutions to the greatest problems only be found in a real and literal utopia? I do not believe so. I believe that communitarianism can be a good political alternative. Understood as social liberalism and as a social democracy based on the rule of law, morally founded on social solidarity as a fundamental value. I am convinced that the constitutions of the EU Member States and the EU legal order enable it. A strong and interventionist state is needed to realize the constitutional possibilities of a high-quality welfare state, effectively protected social rights, the realized social function of property and a society based on solidarity. Ideas are needed. Even if they seem so crazy, even if they seem utopian. In these times when the devil has taken the joke away, when people are again protesting massively in the streets, when they protest (unsuccessfully, of course), when it is difficult to know exactly what is happening and why, when more and more people are increasingly confused and frightened, when systemic violence increasingly turns into physical violence, when it is difficult to remain calm and thoughtful, when it is difficult to tame anger and rage..., it is necessary to step out of the existing coordinate system, out of the cube, to form and communicate ideas that seem crazy, utopian... Now, right now, ideas are needed, crazy ideas. We need a utopia. And faith and hope in it. Faith and hope, which will be the driving force of active action, of striving for realization – of a utopia.
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