Based on voter survey from European election study 2009, we examine the impact of one individual-level motivational factor, i.e. interest in politics, and its interactions with institutional and ...contextual factors such as compulsory voting, electoral competition and the number of parties on participation in 2009 EP elections and previous national elections. The results show that political interest is more closely connected to turnout in second-order elections which are usually considered less salient. Correspondingly, also the contingent effect of compulsory voting and competition is more evident in EP elections. While compulsory voting substantially decreases the turnout gap between the most and least politically attentive voters in both types of elections, the moderating effect of competitiveness is found only in EP elections.
► The impact of political interest on participation in European and national elections. ► Interactions with compulsory voting, closeness of elections and number of parties. ► Political interest is more strongly connected to turnout in European elections. ► Compulsory voting decreases the turnout gap between the most and least interested. ► Closeness of elections decreases the turnout gap only in European elections.
Blais (2006) and Blais and Aarts (2006) in their review essays on voter turnout call attention to a striking puzzle about the link between electoral systems and turnout, namely that, ceteris paribus, ...proportional representation (PR) systems with many parties appear to have higher national-level turnout than single-member district (SMD) plurality systems with few parties, yet turnout does not increase with the (effective) number of parties (ENP) at the national level. To address this puzzle we turn to district-specific within-nation panel data from Switzerland and Spain. Our country-specific findings allow us to explain the national-level puzzle as essentially an ecological artefact, in that the multi-member districts found in proportional systems, on average, do exhibit higher turnout than SMDs, but turnout does not rise with district magnitude, m, once we move beyond the contrast between m = 1 and m > 1. Using a more sophisticated approach to measuring political competition that does not treat all PR systems as generating identical turnout incentives (Grofman and Selb, 2009), we seek to explain this puzzle by showing both empirically and theoretically that (1) proportionality does not necessarily increase with district magnitude, and (2) competition does not necessarily increase with district magnitude.
Populism and Muslim democracies Mohamad Shukri, Syaza Farhana; Smajljaj, Avdi
Asian politics & policy,
October 2020, 2020-10-00, 20201001, Volume:
12, Issue:
4
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Populism has been on the rise from the United States to India. Populist leaders have used the veneer of a national crisis to legitimize a leadership that dignifies a section of the population over ...another. The strategy of cultural populists could lead to terrible consequences to those who may not subscribe to the political beliefs of the leaders. This article examines cultural populists in several Muslim democracies. Applying the method of agreement and method of difference together with calculation of the effective number of parties, this article analyzes the phenomenon of cultural populism in Indonesia, Malaysia and Tunisia. It is argued that political diversity in a democratic system encourages the rise of cultural populism. This paper adds to the growing literature on populism through a comparative analysis of Muslim democracies in Asia and elsewhere.
民粹主义与穆斯林民主国家
从美国到印度，民粹主义不断兴起。民粹主义领导者以国家危机为掩饰，对一种将部分人群加以神圣化的领导力进行合法化。文化民粹主义者的策略能对那些不支持领导者政治信仰的人产生恶劣结果。本文分析了几个穆斯林民主国家中的文化民粹主义者。通过应用契合法和差异法，加上计算现存党派数量，本文分析了印度尼西亚、马来西亚和突尼斯的文化民粹主义现象。论证认为，一个民主系统中的政治多样性有助于文化民粹主义的兴起。本文通过对亚洲和其他地区的穆斯林民主国家进行比较分析，进而对不断增加的民粹主义文献作出贡献。
El populismo y las democracias musulmanas
El populismo ha ido en aumento desde los Estados Unidos a la India. Los líderes populistas han utilizado el barniz de una crisis nacional para legitimar un liderazgo que dignifica a un sector de la población sobre otro. La estrategia de los populistas culturales podría tener consecuencias terribles para quienes no se adhieran a las creencias políticas de los líderes. Este artículo examina a los populistas culturales en varias democracias musulmanas. Aplicando el método de acuerdo y el método de diferencia junto con el cálculo del número efectivo de partidos, este artículo analiza el fenómeno del populismo cultural en Indonesia, Malasia y Túnez. Se argumenta que la diversidad política en un sistema democrático fomenta el surgimiento del populismo cultural. Este artículo se suma a la creciente literatura sobre populismo a través de un análisis comparativo de las democracias musulmanas en Asia y en otros lugares.
Much of the current literature on compulsory voting (CV) examines its effects by simulating complete turnout. We argue that these studies do not capture the full effects of CV, as there is something ...qualitatively different about compulsory voting rules as compared to only increasing turnout. Furthermore, CV and turnout have important, yet unexplored, interactive effects. To test this argument, we look at governments in 43 countries over the 1990–2006 period. Nine of these countries have some form of CV. We examine the effect of CV on the ideological position and range of governments, left party seat share, and the effective number of parties. We find that high turnout in the presence of CV laws spreads out the distribution of voters and leads to an increase in the effective number of parliamentary parties and a larger ideological range of governments. These results have important implications for how we study CV and its consequences for party strategy.
► Compulsory voting is qualitatively different than complete voter turnout. ► Compulsory voting and turnout have important interactive effects. ► The interaction of compulsory voting and voter turnout increases ENPP. ► The interaction of compulsory voting and voter turnout increases government range.
This article examines the effects exerted by different seat allocation methods upon legislative fragmentation, conventionally operationalized as the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP), ...in proportional representation systems. A real-life data set of 191 sub-national elections held in Russia in 2001-13 is used to assess relatively restrictive methods, Imperiali and d'Hondt highest averages, against a more permissive method, Hare largest remainders. Statistical analysis demonstrates that if fragmentation in the electorate and the amount of wasted votes are properly controlled for, the effects of proportional seat allocation rules can be assessed with a high degree of precision. The Imperiali method reduces the ENPP by 0.34 in comparison with the Hare method, while the d'Hondt method makes it smaller by 0.12. Restrictive seat allocation rules suppress legislative fragmentation primarily because they lead to the over-representation of major parties.
O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o processo de implementação e desenvolvimento do sistema partidário. Para tanto, analisamos a oferta partidária no Brasil, nas diferentes unidades da federação, no ...período 1982-2006. Para essa análise serão consideradas as seguintes variáveis: idade dos partidos, número de partidos efetivos e a evolução da votação recebida pelos partidos nas eleições para Câmara Federal, Senado e Governador e Assembléias Legislativas Estaduais. Desse modo, será possível uma análise mais abrangente e comparada do desenvolvimento do sistema partidário brasileiro.
Despite its conceptual centrality to research in comparative politics and the fact that a single measure—the Laakso–Taagepera index (
N
s)—is widely employed in empirical research, the question of ...what is the
best way to “count” parties is still an open one. Among other alleged shortcomings,
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s has been criticized for over-weighting small parties, especially in the case of a one-party majority. Using seat shares data from over 300 elections, I have—for the first time—calculated
N
s as well as an alternative measure (
N
Bz) which employs Banzhaf scores, rather than seat shares, as weights. The Banzhaf index is a voting power index which calculates a party's voting power as a function of its coalitional potential. Though the two measures are highly correlated, I identify three particular party constellations in which the differences between
N
s and
N
Bz are significant and systematic.
This article examines changes in patterns of party competition in Japan and Taiwan following the introduction of mixed parallel electoral systems. National and district level election results ...demonstrate the consolidation of a two-party system in both countries. Differences in the speed and extent of this development are analyzed.
Der Beitrag untersucht das – disproportionale – Verhältnis zwischen den Anteilen an Erststimmen und an Direktmandaten der CDU/CSU und der SPD für alle Bundestagswahlen seit 1953. Im Mittelpunkt der ...Analyse stehen zwei Fragen: Wie hat sich die Disproportionalität in der Mehrheitswahlkomponente des bundesdeutschen Wahlsystems im Zeitverlauf entwickelt? Und: Welche Faktoren haben die Disproportionalität hauptsächlich beeinflusst? Zur systematischen Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird anhand einer modifizierten Kubusregel untersucht, wie sich Erststimmen in Direktmandate übersetzt haben. Als bedeutsamste Determinante der Disproportionalität erweist sich die effektive Zahl der Wahlkreisparteien – je höher die Zahl der Wahlkreisparteien, desto höher die Disproportionalität der Mehrheitswahl. This article looks at how candidate votes have been translated into district mandates in the plurality tier of Germany's mixed electoral system in all Bundestags-elections since 1953. Two questions in particular are addressed: How has disproportionality changed over time? And: What are the main determinants of disproportionality? To answer these two questions the article employs a modified version of the cube rule that accounts for the fact that the number of district parties in a mixed electoral system is higher than in a pure majoritarian system. The article identifies the effective number of district parties as the most important determinant of the disproportional translation of candidate votes into district mandates, i.e., the higher the number of district parties, the less proportional the translation.
Streaming 360° videos over the Internet to Head Mounted Displays (HMDs) requires high bandwidth owing to their high resolution. Viewers, limited by the Field of View (FoV) of the HMD, can only watch ...a small portion of the scene at a time. Therefore, predicting the future FoV of viewers and caching popular content in the mobile edge cloud can reduce both downloading latency and traffic over the core network. The primary contributions of this work are: (i) a new strategy for generation of viewing heatmap which significantly improves our understanding of regions of viewer interest, and (ii) demonstrating the relevance of some indices used in economics and election analysis to further narrow down the viewing hot spots that can be most useful in making caching decisions and FoV prediction. We demonstrate how these indices and the improved heatmap can improve caching and FoV prediction for a number of videos drawn from two independent datasets. Most of the computation needed to implement these concepts can be performed offline by video content servers using previous viewers' FoV traces. Hence, the computation load on viewer devices is also low.
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