Using loan-level data, we analyze the quality of subprime mortgage loans by adjusting their performance for differences in borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic ...conditions. We find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it. We provide evidence that the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. Problems could have been detected long before the crisis, but they were masked by high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005.
LONGLISTED FOR THE 2019 NATIONAL BOOK AWARD By the late 1960s and early 1970s, reeling from a wave of urban uprisings, politicians finally worked to end the practice of redlining. Reasoning that the ...turbulence could be calmed by turning Black city-dwellers into homeowners, they passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, and set about establishing policies to induce mortgage lenders and the real estate industry to treat Black homebuyers equally. The disaster that ensued revealed that racist exclusion had not been eradicated, but rather transmuted into a new phenomenon ofpredatory inclusion. Race for Profit uncovers how exploitative real estate practices continued well after housing discrimination was banned. The same racist structures and individuals remained intact after redlining's end, and close relationships between regulators and the industry created incentives to ignore improprieties. Meanwhile, new policies meant to encourage low-income homeownership created new methods to exploit Black homeowners. The federal government guaranteed urban mortgages in an attempt to overcome resistance to lending to Black buyers - as if unprofitability, rather than racism, was the cause of housing segregation. Bankers, investors, and real estate agents took advantage of the perverse incentives, targeting the Black women most likely to fail to keep up their home payments and slip into foreclosure, multiplying their profits. As a result, by the end of the 1970s, the nation's first programs to encourage Black homeownership ended with tens of thousands of foreclosures in Black communities across the country. The push to uplift Black homeownership had descended into a goldmine for realtors and mortgage lenders, and a ready-made cudgel for the champions of deregulation to wield against government intervention of any kind. Narrating the story of a sea-change in housing policy and its dire impact on African Americans,Race for Profit reveals how the urban core was transformed into a new frontier of cynical extraction.
Mortgages loans are vital for the acquisition of housing property and mortgage lending rates play an important role in mortgage market trends, borrowers, and lenders’ decisions. Objective: the aim of ...this paper is to evaluate the combined effect of current and previous mortgage rates on mortgage refinancing. Prior work: the paper inclines on the ontology of a single reality of the interaction between mortgage rates and mortgage refinancing with attendant epistemology that their interaction is measurable. Method: the paper adopts the positivist paradigm and a quantitative technique. It used data on the U.S. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) retrieved from the economic and financial database of Fusion Media. Data were analysed using the OLS technique. Novel Findings show that current-actual and previous mortgage rates have a significant positive effect on mortgage refinancing at p=0.05 and p=0.04 respectively. Significance: the findings have implication for mortgage lending and refinancing decisions for mortgage bankers (lenders), mortgage borrowers and policy makers. It also provides current academic study material for university business schools and for future researchers to apply the model used in this research for related expanded research. Value: The paper contributes a new model with two genres of mortgage rate (current mortgage rate and previous mortgage rate) and how these two types of mortgage rates influence mortgage refinancing.
This paper highlights the importance of middle-class and high-FICO borrowers for the mortgage crisis. Contrary to popular belief, which focuses on subprime and poor borrowers, we show that mortgage ...originations increased for borrowers across all income levels and FICO scores. The relation between mortgage growth and income growth at the individual level remained positive throughout the pre-2007 period. Finally, middle-income, highincome, and prime borrowers all sharply increased their share of delinquencies in the crisis. These results are consistent with a demand-side view, where homebuyers and lenders bought into increasing house values and borrowers defaulted after prices dropped.
An exogenous expansion in mortgage credit has significant effects on house prices. This finding is established using US branching deregulations between 1994 and 2005 as instruments for credit. Credit ...increases for deregulated banks, but not in placebo samples. Such differential responses rule out demand-based explanations, and identify an exogenous credit supply shock. Because of geographic diversification, treated banks expand credit: housing demand increases, house prices rise, but to a lesser extent in areas with elastic housing supply, where the housing stock increases instead. In an instrumental variable sense, house prices are well explained by the credit expansion induced by deregulation.
An originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of lending, where the originator of a loan sells it to various third parties, was a popular method of mortgage lending before the onset of the subprime mortgage ...crisis. We show that banks with high involvement in the OTD market during the pre-crisis period originated excessively poor-quality mortgages. This result is not explained away by differences in observable borrower quality, geographical location of the property, or the cost of capital of high- and low-OTD banks. Instead, our evidence supports the view that the originating banks did not expend resources in screening their borrowers. The effect of OTD lending on poor mortgage quality is stronger for capital-constrained banks. Overall, we provide evidence that lack of screening incentives coupled with leverage-induced risk-taking behavior significantly contributed to the current subprime mortgage crisis.
We conduct a within-county analysis using detailed ZIP code-level data to document new findings regarding the origins of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. The sharp increase in ...mortgage defaults in 2007 is significantly amplified in subprime ZIP codes, or ZIP codes with a disproportionately large share of subprime borrowers as of 1996. Prior to the default crisis, these subprime ZIP codes experience an unprecedented relative growth in mortgage credit. The expansion in mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 to subprime ZIP codes occurs despite sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income growth in these neighborhoods. In fact, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the past eighteen years in which income and mortgage credit growth are negatively correlated. We show that the expansion in mortgage credit to subprime ZIP codes and its dissociation from income growth is closely correlated with the increase in securitization of subprime mortgages.
Shadow bank market share in residential mortgage origination nearly doubled from 2007 to 2015, with particularly dramatic growth among online “fintech” lenders. We study how two forces, regulatory ...differences and technological advantages, contributed to this growth. Difference in difference tests exploiting geographical heterogeneity induced by four specific increases in regulatory burden–capital requirements, mortgage servicing rights, mortgage-related lawsuits, and the movement of supervision to Office of Comptroller and Currency following closure of the Office of Thrift Supervision–all reveal that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps. Relative to other shadow banks, fintech lenders serve more creditworthy borrowers and are more active in the refinancing market. Fintech lenders charge a premium of 14–16 basis points and appear to provide convenience rather than cost savings to borrowers. They seem to use different information to set interest rates relative to other lenders. A quantitative model of mortgage lending suggests that regulation accounts for roughly 60% of shadow bank growth, while technology accounts for roughly 30%.
Low-cost deposits and increased balance sheet liquidity raise banks' supply of illiquid loans more than loans easily sold or securitized. We exploit the inability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ...purchase jumbo mortgages to identify an exogenous change in liquidity. The volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to nonjumbo originations increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender's financial condition on credit supply.
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