It is often said that there are two types of psychological processes: one that is intentional, controllable, conscious, and inefficient, and another that is unintentional, uncontrollable, unconscious, and efficient. Yet, there have been persistent and increasing objections to this widely influential dual-process typology. Critics point out that the ‘two types’ framework lacks empirical support, contradicts well-established findings, and is internally incoherent. Moreover, the untested and untenable assumption that psychological phenomena can be partitioned into two types, we argue, has the consequence of systematically thwarting scientific progress. It is time that we as a field come to terms with these issues. In short, the dual-process typology is a convenient and seductive myth, and we think cognitive science can do better. The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processing has grown more popular each decade. The World Bank and Institute of Medicine issued reports in 2015 endorsing the Type 1/Type 2 distinction, and urging decision makers and medical practitioners around the globe to rely on Type 2 thinking. A consensus is emerging among the critics and top proponents of the dual-process typology that the classic distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processing is flawed. Since the Type 1/Type 2 distinction first emerged, researchers have discovered that very few processes fit into either category, most possess some mixture of Type 1 and Type 2 features.