Significant recent scholarship has addressed the apparently accelerating proliferation of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons in the international system by proposing the development of new institutions or instruments for arms control in space. However, the historical record is not encouraging for this approach, as the last 40 years have seen repeated, failed attempts to do just that. How might it be possible to surmount this evident resistance to developing an arms-control regime for space? This article advances the argument that rather than attempting to create new mechanisms for controlling ASATs, the most profitable path forward may be to reframe kinetic space weapons as strategic weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It presents a typological framework for the classification of WMDs, and situates kinetic ASATs within this rubric. It then discusses how reframing kinetic ASATs as WMDs could provide for the effective control of such weapons by rendering them subject to existing treaty and normative frameworks, thus avoiding the need for new agreements or institutions. Finally, it discusses some of the limitations and potential consequences of this approach.