GlideinWMS is a distributed workload manager that has been used in production for many years to provision resources for experiments like CERN’s CMS, many Neutrino experiments, and the OSG. Its security model was based mainly on GSI (Grid Security Infrastructure), using X.509 certificate proxies and VOMS (Virtual Organization Membership Service) extensions. Even when other credentials, like SSH keys, were used to authenticate with resources, proxies were also added all the time, to establish the identity of the requestor and the associated memberships or privileges. This single credential was used for everything and was, often implicitly, forwarded wherever needed. The addition of identity and access tokens and the phase-out of GSI forced us to reconsider the security model of GlideinWMS, to handle multiple credentials which can differ in type, technology, and functionality. Both identity tokens and access tokens are supported. GSI proxies even if no more mandatory, are still used, together with various JWT (JSON Web Token) based tokens and other certificates. The functionality of the credentials, defined by issuer, audience, and scope, also differ: a credential can allow access to a computing resource, or can protect the GlideinWMS framework from tampering, or can grant read or write access to storage, can provide an identity for accounting or auditing, or can provide a combination of any the formers. Furthermore, the tools in use do not include automatic forwarding and renewal of the new credentials so credential lifetime and renewal requirements became part of the discussion as well. In this paper, we will present how GlideinWMS was able to change its design and code to respond to all these changes.