This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial ...incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find strong evidence of outperformance during the first two to three years of existence. Each additional year of age decreases performance by 42 basis points, on average. Cross-sectionally, early performance by individual funds is quite persistent, with early strong performance lasting for up to five years.
Abstract We demonstrate a novel link between skilled immigration restrictions, corporate innovation, and industry consolidation. Binding restrictions on H1B visas are a shock to firms’ R&D labor ...supply, leading firms to shift R&D expenditures and employees overseas. Organizationally and financially constrained firms are less able to adjust to the restrictions. They reduce basic research and patenting, are less able to acquire other firms for intellectual property, and are more likely to exit. Industry concentration and firm-level markups increase when firms are better able to adjust. This increase in market power is an unintended consequence of skilled immigration restrictions.
We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of ...programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes.
► Examines relations between nonprofit board size, managerial incentives and performance. ► Finds that number of programs is positively related to board size. ► Board size is negatively associated with managerial incentives. ► Board size is positively related to program spending and fundraising performance. ► Board size and programs are negatively related to commercial revenue and positively to donations.
Purpose
To evaluate visual and refractive outcomes, contrast sensitivity, and quality of vision after cataract surgery with the implantation of a new modality of trifocal intraocular lens (IOL).
...Methods
This case series comprised 30 patients who had bilateral implantation of the AT LISA tri 839 MP trifocal IOL after phacoemulsification for either cataract or refractive lens exchange surgery. Uncorrected (UDVA) and corrected monocular distance visual acuity (CDVA) using a logMAR chart, binocular uncorrected (UNVA) and corrected near visual acuity (CNVA) (40 cm and patients' preferred distance) using the Radner Reading Charts, distance-corrected intermediate visual acuity (DCIVA) (70 cm), a binocular defocus curve, contrast sensitivity (CS) with the Pelli-Robson test, and subjective quality of vision by a short questionnaire were evaluated at 1, 3, and 6 months postoperatively.
Results
At 6 months, mean values of 0.05 ± 0.07 and −0.02 ± 0.05 logMAR were obtained for monocular UDVA and CDVA, respectively. Mean values of 0.16 ± 0.07, 0.12 ± 0.07, and 0.16 ± 0.07 logRAD were obtained for binocular UNVA, CNVA, and DCIVA, respectively. Significant changes were only detected in monocular CDVA (p<0.01) and UDVA that improved between 3 and 6 months postoperatively (p = 0.01). A visual acuity level of 0.2 logRAD could be seen in binocular defocus curves between +1.00 and −3.00 D. At 6 months, mean photopic and mesopic CS were 1.52 ± 0.11 and 1.54 ± 0.11. Regarding the questionnaire, almost all patients were satisfied with their distance, intermediate, and near vision. Difficulties associated with photic phenomena decreased significantly over time.
Conclusions
The AT LISA trifocal IOL provides excellent uncorrected distance, intermediate, and near visual outcomes.
Historically the elderly have been under-represented in non-ST-elevation myocardial infarction (NSTEMI) management trials.
The aim of this trial was to demonstrate that an intervention-guided ...strategy is superior to optimal medical therapy (OMT) alone for treating NSTEMI in elderly individuals.
Patients (≥80 years, chest pain, ischaemic ECG, and elevated troponin) were randomised 1:1 to an intervention-guided strategy plus OMT versus OMT alone. The primary endpoint was a composite of all-cause mortality and non-fatal myocardial reinfarction at 1 year. Ethics approval was obtained by the institutional review board of every recruiting centre.
From May 2014 to September 2018, 251 patients (n=125 invasive vs n=126 conservative) were enrolled. Almost 50% of participants were female. The trial was terminated prematurely due to slow recruitment. A Kaplan-Meier estimate of event-free survival revealed no difference in the primary endpoint at 1 year (invasive 18.5% 23/124 vs conservative 22.2% 28/126; p=0.39). No significant difference persisted after Cox proportional hazards regression analysis (hazard ratio 0.79, 95% confidence interval 0.45-1.35; p=0.39). There was greater freedom from angina at 3 months (p<0.001) after early intervention but this was similar at 1 year. Both non-fatal reinfarction (invasive 9.7% 12/124 vs conservative 14.3% 18/126; p=0.22) and unplanned revascularisation (invasive 1.6% 2/124 vs conservative 6.4% 8/126; p=0.10) occurred more frequently in the OMT alone cohort.
An intervention-guided strategy was not superior to OMT alone to treat very elderly NSTEMI patients. The trial was underpowered to demonstrate this definitively. Early intervention resulted in fewer cases of reinfarction and unplanned revascularisation but did not improve survival.
The principal‐agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance, yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite weak. ...The key prediction of the model is that the executive's pay‐performance. We demonstrate strong empirical confirmation of this prediction using a comprehensive sample of executives at large corporations. In general, the pay‐performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the least volatile stock prices is an order of magnitude greater than the pay‐performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the least volatile stock prices. This result holds for both chief executive officers and other highly compensated executives. We further show that estimates of the pay‐performance sensitivity that do not explicity account for the effect of the variance of firm performance are baised toward zero. We also test for relative performance evaluation of executives against the performance evaluation model. Our findings suggest that executive compensation contracts incorporate the benefits of risk sharing but do not incorporate the potential informational advantages of relative performance evaluation.
Managers usually do not sell any of their own shares in an initial public offering but instead wait until the end of the lockup period. We develop a model in which managers strategically underprice ...IPOs to maximize personal wealth from selling shares at lockup expiration. First-day underpricing generates information momentum by attracting attention to the stock and thereby shifting the demand curve for the stock outwards. This allows managers to sell shares at the lockup expiration at prices higher than they would otherwise obtain. We test the model on a sample of IPOs in the 1990s. We find that higher ownership by managers is positively correlated with first-day underpricing, underpricing is positively correlated with research coverage, and research coverage is positively correlated with stock returns and insider selling at the lockup expiration. These results are consistent with the model.
We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based ...incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.
We consider the equilibrium relationships between incentives from compensation, investment, and firm performance. In an optimal contracting model, we show that the relationship between firm ...performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits of investment, as in theories of managerial entrenchment. We estimate the joint relationships between incentives and firm performance
and between incentives and investment. We provide new results showing that investment is increasing in incentives. Further, in contrast to previous studies, we find that firm performance is increasing in incentives at all levels of incentives. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with theories of overinvestment based on managers having private benefits of investment. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment and, more generally, models of underinvestment.
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