Vaccination can sufficiently ameliorate the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19). Investigating what factors influence vaccine uptake may benefit ongoing vaccination efforts (e.g. booster injections, ...annual vaccination). The present study expanded Protection Motivation Theory with possible factors including perceived knowledge, adaptive responses, and maladaptive responses to develop a proposed model investigating vaccine uptake among United Kingdom (UK) and Taiwan (TW) populations. An online survey collected responses from UK (n = 751) and TW (n = 1052) participants (August to September, 2022). The results of structural equation modeling (SEM) showed that perceived knowledge was significantly associated with coping appraisal in both samples (standardized coefficient β = 0.941 and 0.898; p < .001). Coping appraisal was correlated with vaccine uptake only in the TW sample (β = 0.319, p < .05). Multigroup analysis showed there were significant differences between the path coefficients of perceived knowledge to coping and threat appraisals (p < .001), coping appraisal to adaptive and maladaptive responses (p < .001), as well as threat appraisal to adaptive response (p < .001). Such knowledge may improve vaccine uptake in Taiwan. The potential factors for the UK population require further investigation.
Abstract
Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by ...appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (2):
More of P!Less of U!
If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!
In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, ...or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.
► We studied the ability to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions in adults with high functioning autism. ► Difficulties were found in evaluating the seriousness of ...transgressions and in providing appropriate moral justifications. ► The seriousness rating was related to ToM impairment. ► Information about the agent’s intentions and affective states is not competently used in conscious moral reasoning.
The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent’s intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning.
Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the ...Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. More precisely, while I defend Goldman's (2006) thesis that the ability to attribute disgust based on observing disgusted facial expressions stems from a mirror-based simulation process, I argue that ST is unable to account for the ability to attribute disgust based on non-facial visual stimuli; I propose, rather, that this latter ability is theory-based. My model is grounded in evidence from individuals suffering from Huntington's Disease.
Affective experiences such as pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenology: they feel (un)pleasant. This type of phenomenology has a loopy regulatory profile: it often motivates us to ...act a certain way, and these actions typically end up regulating our affective experiences back. For example, the pleasure you get by tasting your morning coffee motivates you to drink more of it, and this in turn results in you obtaining another pleasant gustatory experience. In this article, we argue that reflexive imperativism is the only intentionalist account of affective phenomenology—probably, the only account at all—that is able to make sense of its loopy regulatory profile.
“Must” implies “can” Kürthy, Miklós; Del Prete, Fabio; Barlassina, Luca
Mind & language,
June 2023, Letnik:
38, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
We consider the thorny issue of whether ascribing to an agent the obligation to φ implies that it is possible for the agent to φ. Traditionally, this issue has been interpreted as whether “ought” ...implies “can”. But another linguistic interpretation is available, namely, whether “must” implies “can” (MIC). We show that “must” does imply “can” via a convergent argument. First, we prove MIC from a well‐established theory of modality in natural language, namely, that proposed by Kratzer. Second, we present novel acceptability judgement studies showing that MIC predicts and explains the linguistic behaviour of native English speakers.
The puzzle of the changing past Barlassina, Luca; Del Prete, Fabio
Analysis,
01/2015, Letnik:
75, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
If you utter sentence (1) 'Obama was born in 1961' now, you say something true about the past. Since the past will always be such that the year 1961 has the property of being a time in which Obama ...was born, it seems impossible that (1) could ever be false in a future context of utterance. We shall consider the case of a sentence about the past exactly like (1), but which was true when uttered a few years ago and is no longer true now. On this basis, we shall conclude that the past has changed.
Causal selection is the cognitive process through which one or more elements in a complex causal structure are singled out as actual causes of a certain effect. In this paper, we report on an ...experiment in which we investigated the role of moral and temporal factors in causal selection. Our results are as follows. First, when presented with a temporal chain in which two human agents perform the same action one after the other, subjects tend to judge the later agent to be the actual cause. Second, the impact of temporal location on causal selection is almost canceled out if the later agent did not violate a norm while the former did. We argue that this is due to the impact that judgments of norm violation have on causal selection-even if the violated norm has nothing to do with the obtaining effect. Third, moral judgments about the effect influence causal selection even in the case in which agents could not have foreseen the effect and did not intend to bring it about. We discuss our findings in connection to recent theories of the role of moral judgment in causal reasoning, on the one hand, and to probabilistic models of temporal location, on the other.
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