•Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming.•We compare a market in which one side singlehomes and the other multihomes to one in which both sides ...singlehome.•Platforms sometimes benefit from imposing exclusivity on multihomers.•The initially multihoming side sometimes loses from such exclusivity.•The singlehoming side sometimes benefits from such exclusivity.
Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming (i.e., some users joining both platforms). If initially both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on one side exclusive access to its users on the other side. If then one side multihomes, platforms compete on the singlehoming side and exert monopoly power on the multihoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This in not always true, as the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.
Organización industrial fue revisado exhaustivamente gracias a las observaciones recibidas en clases, ofrece una presentación actualizada y rigurosa de la organización industrial moderna que conjuga ...teoría con aplicaciones en el mundo real y extrae implicaciones para las estrategias empresariales y la política de la competencia. Este exhaustivo libro de texto familiariza a los lectores con los modelos más relevantes para entender las estrategias de las empresas con poder de mercado y muestra cómo estas empresas se adaptan a las distintas condiciones del mercado. Esta segunda edición incluye modelos formales y estudios de caso nuevos y revisados. Los modelos formales se presentan detalladamente y los análisis se resumen en “lecciones" que destacan los puntos principales. Las teorías se complementan mediante numerosos estudios de caso reales que involucran a los estudiantes y les permiten conectar las teorías con las situaciones del mundo real. Los capítulos incluyen preguntas de repaso, ejercicios y sugerencias de lecturas adicionales para ampliar la experiencia educativa. Una página de internet sirve de acompañamiento y cuenta con ejercicios adicionales para los estudiantes, así como con diapositivas de enseñanza
In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high ...quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of product quality) before purchase, they can infer the probability distribution of high and low quality that may be put on the market. We uncover two effects that may lead the firm to overinvest in quality compared to a market with full information: first, an adverse selection effect according to which a sufficiently large investment can avoid adverse selection and, second, an efficiency effect according to which a larger investment reduces the probability of having in the market low quality products that are not socially valuable.
•A higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely.•Consumers observe the investment but not the realization of quality.•Two reasons for which firm may overinvest in making high quality more likely.•A sufficiently large investment can avoid adverse selection and reduce the probability of not socially valuable products in the market.
On many two‐sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same ...side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.
Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd Belleflamme, Paul; Lambert, Thomas; Schwienbacher, Armin
Journal of business venturing,
09/2014, Letnik:
29, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
With crowdfunding, an entrepreneur raises external financing from a large audience (the “crowd”), in which each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of ...sophisticated investors. This article compares two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity). In either case, we assume that “crowdfunders” enjoy “community benefits” that increase their utility. Using a unified model, we show that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared with market size and prefers profit sharing otherwise. Our conclusions have implications for managerial decisions in the early development stage of firms, when the entrepreneur needs to build a community of individuals with whom he or she must interact. We also offer extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry.
•Two forms of crowdfunding are compared: pre-ordering vs. profit sharing.•Profit sharing is optimal for entrepreneurs with large capital requirements.•Building a community that supports the entrepreneur is crucial for crowdfunding to be a viable funding mechanism.
Many products and services are not sold on open platforms but on competing for-profit platforms, which charge buyers and sellers for access. What is the effect of for-profit intermediation on seller ...investment incentives? Since for-profit intermediaries reduce the available rents in the market, one might naively suspect that sellers have weaker investment incentives with competing for-profit platforms. However, we show that for-profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment when free access would lead to underinvestment because investment decisions affect the strength of indirect network effects and, thus, access prices. We characterize the effect of for-profit intermediation on investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment and on which side of the market singlehomes.
We analyze, in a game-theoretic model, the strategic interaction between competing firms that source their inputs from either primary or recycled material. Because the manufacturers’ primary ...production today serves as input for the recyclers’ production tomorrow, manufacturers can limit the recyclers’ scale of operation by reducing their output. Improving the recycling process generates then two opposite effects: it reduces primary production tomorrow by exposing manufacturers to stronger competition from recyclers, but it also lowers the manufacturers’ incentives to reduce their primary production today. If primary production exerts a negative externality on the environment, then making the recycling process too efficient might be counterproductive. This intuition equally applies to remanufacturing.
The economics of crowdfunding platforms Belleflamme, Paul; Omrani, Nessrine; Peitz, Martin
Information economics and policy,
12/2015, Letnik:
33
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
•Survey of the economics of crowdfunding platforms.•Covers theory and empirics.•Particular focus on cross-group and within-group external effects.•Also addresses asymmetric information problems on ...crowdfunding platforms.
This paper provides a description of the crowdfunding sector, considering investment-based crowdfunding platforms as well as platforms in which funders do not obtain monetary payments. It lays out key features of this quickly developing sector and explores the economic forces at play that can explain the design of these platforms. In particular, it elaborates on cross-group and within-group external effects and asymmetric information on crowdfunding platforms.
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