LAST-PLACE AVERSION Kuziemko, Ilyana; Buell, Ryan W.; Reich, Taly ...
The Quarterly journal of economics,
02/2014, Letnik:
129, Številka:
1
Journal Article
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We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are “last-place averse.” Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when ...randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In modified dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them. Using survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict.
We investigate whether organizations can create value by introducing visual transparency between consumers and producers. Although operational transparency has been shown to improve consumer ...perceptions of service value, existing theory posits that increased contact between consumers and producers may diminish work performance. Two field and two laboratory experiments in food service settings suggest that transparency that (1) allows customers to observe operational processes (process transparency) and (2) allows employees to observe customers (customer transparency) not only improves customer perceptions but also increases service quality and efficiency. The introduction of this transparency contributed to a 22.2% increase in customer-reported quality and reduced throughput times by 19.2%. Laboratory studies revealed that customers who observed process transparency perceived greater employee effort and thus were more appreciative of the employees and valued the service more. Employees who observed customer transparency felt that their work was more appreciated and more impactful and thus were more satisfied with their work and more willing to exert effort. We find that transparency, by visually revealing operating processes to consumers and beneficiaries to producers, generates a positive feedback loop through which value is created for both parties.
Data, as supplemental material, are available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2411
.
This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management
.
People often feel malicious envy, a destructive interpersonal emotion, when they compare themselves to successful peers. Across 3 online experiments and a field experiment of entrepreneurs, we ...identify an interpersonal strategy that can mitigate feelings of malicious envy in observers: revealing one's failures. Despite a general reluctance to reveal one's failures-as they are happening and after they have occurred-across four experiments, we find that revealing both successes and failures encountered on the path to success (compared to revealing only successes) decreases observers' malicious envy. This effect holds regardless of the discloser's status and cannot be explained by a decrease in perceived status of the individual. Then, in a field experiment at an entrepreneurial pitch competition, where pride displays are common and stakes are high, we find suggestive evidence that learning about the failures of a successful entrepreneur decreases observers' malicious envy while increasing their benign envy and decreasing their perceptions of the entrepreneur's hubristic pride (i.e., arrogance) while increasing their perceptions of the entrepreneur's authentic pride (i.e., confidence). These findings align with previous work on the social-functional relation of envy and pride. Taken together, our results highlight how revealing failures encountered on the way to success can be a counterintuitive yet effective interpersonal emotion regulation strategy.
Aubiquitous feature of even the fastest self-service technology transactions is the wait. Conventional wisdom and operations theory suggest that the longer people wait, the less satisfied they ...become; we demonstrate that because of what we term the
labor illusion
, when websites engage in operational transparency by signaling that they are exerting effort, people can actually prefer websites with longer waits to those that return instantaneous results-even when those results are identical. In five experiments that simulate service experiences in the domains of online travel and online dating, we demonstrate the impact of the labor illusion on service value perceptions, demonstrate that perceptions of service provider effort induce feelings of reciprocity that together mediate the link between operational transparency and increased valuation, and explore boundary conditions and alternative explanations.
This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors.
This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors.
Operational decisions under information asymmetry can signal a firm’s prospects to less informed parties, such as investors, customers, competitors, and regulators. Consequently, managers in these ...settings often face a trade-off between making an optimal decision and sending a favorable signal. We provide experimental evidence on the choices made by decision makers in such settings. Equilibrium assumptions that are commonly applied to analyze these situations yield the least cost separating outcome as the unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the more informed party undertakes a costly signal to resolve the information asymmetry that exists. We provide evidence, however, that participants are much more likely to pursue a pooling outcome when such an outcome is available. This result is important for research and practice because pooling and separating outcomes can yield dramatically different results and have divergent implications. We find evidence that the choice to pool is influenced by changes in the underlying newsvendor model parameters in our setting. In robustness tests, we show that choosing a pooling outcome is especially pronounced among participants who report a high level of understanding of the setting and that participants who pool are rewarded by the less informed party with higher payoffs. Finally, we demonstrate through a reexamination of two previous studies how pooling outcomes can substantively extend the implications of other extant signaling game models in the operations management literature.
Data, as supplemental material, are available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2407
.
This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management
.
In Shared Medical Appointments (SMAs), patients with similar conditions meet the physician together and each receives one-on-one attention. SMAs can improve outcomes and physician productivity. Yet ...privacy concerns have stymied adoption. In physician-deprived nations, patients' utility from improved access may outweigh their disutility from loss of privacy. Ours is to our knowledge the first SMA trial for any disease, in India, where doctors are scarce. In a 1,000-patient, single-site, randomized controlled trial at Aravind Eye Hospital, Pondicherry, we compared SMAs and one-on-one appointments, over four successive visits, for patients with glaucoma. We examined patients' satisfaction, knowledge, intention-to-follow-up, follow-up rates, and medication compliance rates (primary outcomes) using intention-to-treat analysis. Of 1,034 patients invited between July 12, 2016 -July 19, 2018, 1,000 (96.7%) consented to participate, and were randomly assigned to either SMAs (NSMA = 500) or one-on-one appointments (N1-1 = 500). Patients who received SMAs showed higher satisfaction (MeanSMA = 4.955 (SD 0.241), Mean1-1 = 4.920 (SD 0.326); difference in means 0.035; 95% CI, 0.017-0.054, p = 0.0002) and knowledge (MeanSMA = 3.416 (SD 1.340), Mean1-1 = 3.267 (SD 1.492); difference in means 0.149; 95% CI, 0.057-0.241, p = 0.002) than patients who received one-on-one appointments. Across conditions, there was no difference in patients' intention-to-follow-up (MeanSMA = 4.989 (SD 0.118), Mean1-1 = 4.986 (SD 0.149); difference in means 0.003; 95% CI, -0.006-0.012, p = 0.481) and actual follow-up rates (MeanSMA = 87.5% (SD 0.372), Mean1-1 = 88.7% (SD 0.338); difference in means -0.012; 95% CI, -0.039-0.015, p = 0.377). Patients who received SMAs exhibited higher medication compliance rates (MeanSMA = 97.0% (SD 0.180), Mean1-1 = 94.9% (SD 0.238); difference in means 0.020; 95% CI, 0.004-0.036, p = 0.013). SMAs improved satisfaction, learning, and medication compliance, without compromising follow-up rates or measured clinical outcomes. Peer interruptions were negatively correlated with patient satisfaction in early-trial SMAs and positively correlated with patient satisfaction in later-trial SMAs. Trial registration: The trial was registered with Clinical Trials Registry of India (https://ctri.nic.in/) with reference no. REF/2016/11/012659 and registration no. CTRI/2018/02/011998.
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