Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western-oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, ...Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistan's role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the country's policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.
This article presents a rudimentary theoretical framework identifying which qualities of autonomy solutions for ethnic minority groups increase the likelihood of conflict. It discusses how autonomy ...relates to other factors conducive to conflict by studying minorities in the South Caucasus & examines the case of Georgia. In Georgia, there were five ethnic minority populations, two of whom -- the Abkhaz & the South Ossetians -- enjoyed autonomous status & were the only minorities to engage in armed conflict with the Georgian government. This article shows how autonomy, by empowering ethnic elites with control of statelike institutions & by enhancing factors such as leadership, economic viability, & external support, played a crucial role in the escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia & South Ossetia. Conversely, the absence of autonomy mitigated separatist & secessionist sentiments among two of Georgia's other minority groups -- Javakheti's Armenian & Kvemo Kartli's Azeri populations. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.
The awakening of assumed primordial identities such as tribe, ethnicity or religion has been a major source of conflict in the post-Second World War era. The very fact that this can be termed an ...awakening, however, implies that these identities are neither static nor innate. They are very much tied to social and political circumstances; in particular, they are mobilized and shaped by political processes.
This ethnic mobilization usually takes place in an atmosphere of conflict with another communal group; in this sense we can often speak of mirroring nationalisms: people rally against a common enemy, which increases their sense of common belonging to a certain group. Within the boundaries of a state, then, we can roughly say that communal conflict arises when one or more of its component communities cease to identify with the state due to perceived discrimination against it, political mobilization of group identity, or a combination of these factors, which often catalyze each other.
11 September 2001 elevated the importance of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in US global strategy. The Central Asia republics proved crucial bases for military and intelligence operations. The ...South Caucasus, in turn, provided the only realistic air corridor for the deployment of Europe-based US forces to Afghan territory. As its Central Asian footprint grows, Washington must consider the interests of key Eurasian powers and demonstrate a sustained economic and political commitment to the region. Reprinted by permission of Carfax Publishing, Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Azerbaijan and the West Cornell, Svante E
Azerbaijan Since Independence,
2011, 2010
Book Chapter
This chapter explains on Azerbaijan's commitment to a pro-Western foreign policy which is based not on whims but on rational calculations deriving from the long-standing perceptions of threats and ...interests. Azerbaijan's political reform agenda had ground to a halt, further slowing the pace of integration with the West. When Azerbaijan became independent, relations with the West have developed and broadened greatly in all fields. These relations can be grouped into three baskets of issues: governance and democratization, energy and trade, and security cooperation. Over time, these three areas have been accorded varying degrees of importance. Azerbaijan is in the process of building its distinct national identity, and does not have the Kemalist heritage. As such, Azerbaijan's identity could survive without the West much better than Turkey's could. But that prospect should be of no comfort to Azerbaijan or to the West.
Less than twenty years ago, Azerbaijan faced war, the fragmentation of the newborn country, a collapsed economy and political chaos. In the intervening years, much has happened in Azerbaijan's neighborhood. One of the greatest challenges for Azerbaijan and a prerequisite for its political development is whether the strength of informal power structures can be tamed and subjugated to formal and accountable institutions. The future of the Karabakh issue will have a decisive effect: should Azerbaijan get the chance to begin redeveloping the large Western areas of the country currently under occupation that may generate a substantial push for rural and regional development. In Azerbaijani society, the rise of the Azerbaijani language and the cultural affirmation of Azerbaijani identity is one of the most noteworthy developments of the period since independence. There is a growing tendency for Azerbaijan's leaders to lean toward a balanced or "multi-vectoral" foreign policy akin to the model that Kazakhstan pioneered a decade ago.
Azerbaijan is marked by major routes of migration, conquest, and trade that transit the country from east to west and north to south. This circumstance has shaped Azerbaijan's history and demography, ...not least its complicated and contested ethnographic history. While Turkic tribes certainly ventured south of the Caucasus Mountains long before, it was really in the ninth and tenth centuries that a significant Turkic element established itself in Azerbaijan. The Safavid dynasty which was based on a mystical Sufi order was founded by Shah Ismail Khatai, who is best known for establishing Shia Islam as the state religion of Iran. From 1912 to 1917, Azerbaijani loyalty to the Russian Empire would be further tested, as the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and, subsequently, the First World War brought Russia into direct conflict with Turkey. The collapse of the Russian Empire that resulted from the two revolutions of 1917 left the Caucasus practically ungoverned.
After the fall of the First Republic, Azerbaijan was technically an independent Soviet state. In the first years of sovietization, Azerbaijan in several respects had fared well. The country's borders were largely resolved, with Nakhichevan, Ka-rabakh, and Zaqatala confirmed as parts of Azerbaijan. An onslaught on the literary and cultural intelligentsia of the country was launched, which in fact amounted to an attempt to eradicate the collective memory of the Azerbaijani people. After World War II investment and assistance from the center consequently dwindled, and Azerbaijan dropped to last place among Soviet republics in terms of industrial growth. Heydar Aliyev acceded to the post of first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, marking the beginning of one man's remarkable domination of the republic's political scene, which would last for more than three decades. Aliyev in his official proclamations was steadfast in his proclamations of loyalty to Leninist nationality policy and to the importance of the Russian language.
