Contestation over land, resource access and rents has long underpinned both sub-national conflicts and centre-periphery tensions in Indonesia. This paper explores resource conflict management in ...Indonesia, with a particular focus on the political economy of Riau province. It argues a centre-periphery bargain was struck at the onset of democratisation to redistribute a larger proportion of oil and gas rents to Riau, de-escalating support for the emergent Free Riau Movement. Through a combination of national and sub-national political settlements between narrow but adaptive coalitions of political-private sector elite interests, these coalitions have maintained their power and control over resource rents in three key sectors: oil and gas, timber, and palm oil. Brokers have been instrumental in maintaining the influence of these coalitions over time - helping to co-opt households into industry supply chains, who then support aligned political elites. This has produced relative stability in the political order in Riau, but one which displays the tenets of illiberalism in which the space for contestation is limited and social interests tend to acquiesce for small gains.
The impact of decentralization on conflict dynamics is as important as its impact on service delivery and growth, as violent conflict can undo development gains. This paper argues that the impact of ...decentralization has been twofold. It has relieved centre-periphery tensions around long-standing grievances towards nationalist agendas in Indonesia. The evidence suggests, through examining the case of conflict-affected Central Sulawesi, that decentralization has also to some extent addressed long-standing inter-group tensions and horizontal inequalities at the local level, particularly where geographically concentrated ethnoreligious groups have previously been marginalized from government. It has also reduced grievances by increasing local autonomy and participation in decision-making through direct elections of district heads, now a hotly contested arena of local politics. However, significant structural and institutional change can result in new tensions, particularly when poorly planned for or monitored. Decentralization has stimulated changes in population demographics in some areas in Indonesia, resulting in ethnoreligious segregation through splitting of subnational administrative units into increasing numbers of regions. Groups with previous minority status have found a safe-haven as majorities, setting the scene for how future rights of access and representation play out. Tensions run high when high-stakes local elections are contested along sensitive identity lines, or when district governments are not inclusive of minorities in their regions. This is not to say that the demographic, structural and institutional changes with decentralization will necessarily lead to violent conflict, but rather due attention should be given to ensuring appropriate conflict management mechanisms are in place.
Violence impedes human freedom to live safely and securely, and can sustain poverty traps in many communities. A key challenge for academics, policy-makers and practitioners working broadly in ...programmes aimed at poverty alleviation, including violence prevention, is the lack of reliable and comparable data on the incidence and nature of violence. This paper proposes a household survey module for a multidimensional poverty questionnaire that can be used to complement the available data on the incidence of violence against property and the person, as well as perceptions of security and safety. Violence and poverty are inextricably linked, although the direction of causality is contested if not circular. The module uses standardized definitions that are clear, can be translated cross-culturally and clearly disaggregate different types of interpersonal violence, thereby bridging the crime-conflict nexus.
Using the case of conflict-affected Central Sulawesi in democratising Indonesia, this paper argues that decentralisation has had both positive and negative indirect impacts on conflict dynamics. ...First, it has allowed for the direct election of regional heads. This has changed the nature of local politics, which has heightened local tensions through competition for power at the district level. However, this has so far been peacefully managed. Second, decentralisation has to some extent achieved its aim of greater involvement of the local populace in decision making, alleviating the long-standing grievances they have had with authoritarian rule, resource extraction, and regent appointments from outside the region and the island. Third, it has changed population demographics by redrawing administrative boundaries. In the research districts, this has resulted in greater ethno-religious segregation. It has also changed the boundaries around the voting populace, which tends to play into conflict tensions wherever such boundaries reinforce sensitive identity cleavages. Fourth, carving out new regions with decentralisation has created new district legislatures and executives, further fuelling competition for these fiercely sought-after positions and the associated political power in the new districts, as well as inter-group competition for the resources in the 'new' regions. However, this has simultaneously reduced competitive pressures in the 'mother' regions, in particular in Poso, one of the regions severely affected by communal violence, which was partially linked to elite politics. While the demographic, structural, and institutional changes stimulated by decentralisation will not necessarily lead to violent conflict, they do interact with or potentially stimulate local tensions. Felt grievances, perceptions of inequalities, elite competition and claims to minority rights are just some of the contentious issues, which can interact with decentralisation policies, as they do with national level politics. Managing these tensions is imperative for ensuring that the benefits of decentralisation reach local communities.
This mixed-methods study compares the processes of violent conflict escalation and de-escalation in two pairs of neighbouring, sub-national regions in Indonesia (Poso and Donggala districts) and ...Nigeria (Zangon Kataf and Kachia Local Government Areas). Despite similar contextual features, this thesis demonstrates that inter-group tensions have only escalated into repeated episodes of widespread violence in one of the two research sites examined in each country. This thesis argues that the onset of, or escalation in, violent communal conflict involves complex processes that shift inter- group relations back and forth along a continuum, from more peaceful interaction between groups at one extreme, towards repeated episodes of collective violence at the other extreme. In the presence of inter-group tensions, interventions and constraints at different points in the conflict trajectory may prevent tensions culminating in violence, or prevent repeated episodes of collective violence from occurring. Analysis of the evidence suggests that violence at the sub-national level is more likely to occur during periods of political-institutional change that are accompanied by economic decline. At such times, the opportunity for groups to re-negotiate their access to the state is enlarged, as there are higher stakes that encourage groups to participate in both violent and non-violent forms of contestation. Furthermore, at such times, this thesis argues that the risk of violent communal conflict increases when the heterogeneous interests and grievances of group members converge under politically salient identity frames, in opposition to other such groups. This is particularly the case if the convergence of motivations is underpinned by a local history of political or socio- economic inequalities between groups, or the unequal recognition of cultural groups by the state. Furthermore, inequalities between the elites of politically salient groups (for example, in terms of access to power and resources) drive their own interests in mobilising the wider group in collective action. However, power- and resource- sharing, as well as efforts to redress inequalities, can help to de-escalate tensions. Underpinning the shifts of inter-group tensions along the peace-violence continuum towards collective violence are those processes that focus public attention on inter- group differences rather than similarities. Such shifts are also underscored by constellations of actions and events that link past and present, and facilitate the mounting and staging of violence along salient identity group lines (such as the use of emotive group symbols, derogatory slurs, strategically targeted violence and other acts that invite violent reprisals). However, shifts towards more peaceful interaction tend to be driven by events and actions that focus public attention on group similarities and seek to redress inter-group tensions. The overarching argument of this thesis is that in the presence of inter-group tensions, sub-national outbreaks of violence are not always inevitable in plural societies. Supra-local tensions can stimulate communal violence, but repeated episodes of violence tend to occur when there are local roots, particularly those pertaining to inequalities.
To most observers, the village of Wates in the district of Ponorogo, East Java, appears much like hundreds of thousands of others in the developing world. In many respects, to echo James Scott, Wates ...is “a village of no particular significance.” It is not in the crossfire of a raging civil war or sectarian violence; it is not besieged by HIV/AIDS; it is not suffering from drought, pestilence, or floods—it is, rather, the quintessential rural village in a steadily growing developing country. Absent such major problems, “doing development” in Wates should be relatively straightforward.¹ It is regularly selected to
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