Three American missiles hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and what Americans view as an appalling and tragic mistake, many Chinese see as a "barbaric" and intentional "criminal act," the latest in ...a long series of Western aggressions against China. In this book, Peter Hays Gries explores the roles of perception and sentiment in the growth of popular nationalism in China. At a time when the direction of China's foreign and domestic policies have profound ramifications worldwide, Gries offers a rare, in-depth look at the nature of China's new nationalism, particularly as it involves Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations—two bilateral relations that carry extraordinary implications for peace and stability in the twenty-first century. Through recent Chinese books and magazines, movies, television shows, posters, and cartoons, Gries traces the emergence of this new nationalism. Anti-Western sentiment, once created and encouraged by China's ruling PRC, has been taken up independently by a new generation of Chinese. Deeply rooted in narratives about past "humiliations" at the hands of the West and impassioned notions of Chinese identity, popular nationalism is now undermining the Communist Party's monopoly on political discourse, threatening the regime's stability. As readable as it is closely researched and reasoned, this timely book analyzes the impact that popular nationalism will have on twenty-first century China and the world.
In this provocative book, Peter Gries directly challenges the widely held view that partisan elites on Capitol Hill are out of touch with a moderate American public. Dissecting a new national survey, ...Gries shows how ideology powerfully divides Main Street over both domestic and foreign policy and reveals how and why, with the exception of attitudes toward Israel, liberals consistently feel warmer toward foreign countries and international organizations, and desire friendlier policies toward them, than conservatives do. And because most Congressional districts have become hyper-partisan, many politicians today cater not to the "median voter" in their districts, but to the primary voters who elect them. The perverse incentives of the U.S. electoral system, therefore, are empowering the ideological extremes, contributing to elite partisanship over American foreign policy. The Politics of American Foreign Policy weaves seamlessly together in-depth examinations of the psychological roots and foreign policy consequences of the liberal-conservative divide, the cultural, socio-racial, economic, and political dimensions of American ideology, and the moral values and foreign policy orientations that divide Democrats and Republicans. Within this context, the book explores in detail why American liberals and conservatives disagree over US policy relating to Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and international organizations such as the UN.
Based on a 2011 national survey, I argue that while US conservatives feel somewhat cooler toward the East Asian democracies than US liberals do, they feel much cooler toward China. Greater average ...conservative than liberal prejudice lingers, cooling attitudes toward the “Yellow Peril” of all Asian countries, but communism is a larger source of ideological differences over China. For cultural, social, economic, and political reasons, conservatives feel substantially cooler than liberals toward both communist countries in general and “Red China” in particular. I conclude by suggesting that with gerrymandering and ongoing ideological sorting, these ideological differences over China on Main Street may come to play a greater role in the making of US China policy.
What is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, how does it differ from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the ...structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, three surveys were conducted in China and the US in the spring and summer of 2009. While patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar in the US, they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign internationalism and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism/internationalism, furthermore, had no impact on perceived US threats or US policy preferences, while nationalism did. The role of nationalist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of US military and humiliation threats.
Does Ideology Matter? Gries, Peter Hays
Social science quarterly,
03/2017, Letnik:
98, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Objective. This study revisits the idea that the American public is moderate or nonideological. In this longstanding view, only informed elites maintain consistent ideologies that constrain their ...political attitudes and behaviors; the mass public is driven instead by partisan identities that they are socialized into. The study explores whether the public’s liberal-to-conservative self-placement is temporally stable, and whether it is predictive of political attitudes when pit against partisanship. Methods. The study examines data from the 2010 American National Election Survey and the 2008–2012 General Social Survey longitudinal panel. Results. The American public today maintains coherent and consistent ideologies that systematically divide them in their sociopolitical attitudes and policy preferences. Conclusion. While partisanship is a powerful top-down driver of the American public’s attitudes and policy preferences toward overtly partisan issues and behaviors like Obamacare and voting, on broader sociopolitical issues like abortion, ideology is a powerful bottom-up driver of attitudes.
Are the relations among nations inevitably conflictual? Neorealism and neoliberalism
share the rationalist assumption that states are self-regarding, but debate over
whether states pursue relative or ...absolute gains. Scholars focusing on identity have
recently joined the controversy. Wendt (1992) has argued against the realists that
conflict is not the inevitable product of anarchy. Drawing on social psychology to
defend realism, Mercer (1995) has countered that conflict is ‘an
inescapable feature of... interstate relations’. This paper argues that
international identity dynamics do not inexorably lead to competition, let alone
conflict. Mercer’s pessimism is unwarranted. Drawing on social identity
theory (SIT), it argues that intergroup conflict is a highly contingent outcome, and
that social psychology provides insights into when the realists are right, and when
the liberals are. Utilizing examples from Sino-American relations, the paper also
seeks to contribute to the stalemated debate in the China field between optimists
and pessimists over the existence of a ‘China threat’.
2012-2013 witnessed a renewed flare-up of anti-Japanese sentiment in Mainland China, followed by a toughening of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Diaoyu Islands policy. Did popular nationalism ...influence the PRC's military escalation? A lack of transparency in elite Chinese decision-making puts a definitive answer to this question beyond our reach. However, this article utilizes qualitative and quantitative analyses of anti-Japanese discourse and deeds in both cyberspace and on the streets of urban China to argue that the circumstantial evidence is compelling: nationalist opinion is a powerful driver of China's Japan policy. The demands of nationalist legitimation appear to pressure the elite to respond to popular nationalism. Should one or more Chinese die at the hands of the Japanese navy or air force, therefore, the popular pressure for escalation and war will likely be more than China's leaders can manage.
Do history wars shape international affairs? If so, how and for whom? Taking the historical dispute between China and South Korea over the ancient Gaogouli/Goguryeo Kingdom as a case study, this ...article explores the individual-level psychological micro-foundations of history wars. A 2020 survey experiment in South Korea pit “ours” vs “theirs” Goguryeo imitation Wikipedia entries to explore their downstream consequences. It revealed direct, indirect, and conditional effects. Exposure to China's claim to the Kingdom undermined Korean pride, increasing dislike of China, and lessening desires to cooperate with it. Pre-existing levels of nationalism divided South Koreans in how angry they became after exposure the Wikipedia primes. That anger, however, only shaped the China policy preferences of those South Koreans who viewed the balance of military power with China favorably. Implications for ownership disputes over kimchi and other national possessions are also discussed, as are the implications of history wars for war and peace in twenty-first-century East Asia.
In July 2004, a Chinese claim that the ancient Kingdom of Koguryo (37 BC-AD 668) was China's vassal state ignited a firestorm of protest in South Korea. The decade-long South Korean love affair with ...China appears to have ended, as increasing numbers of South Koreans have begun to view their colossal neighbor with new suspicion. What were the causes and consequences of this controversy? Rather than forwarding the usual political, economic, and security explanations, this paper interrogates the deeper identity politics at stake, arguing that the Koguryo controversy implicates the very meaning of being Korean or Chinese in the 21st century. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT
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