Complementing the existing partisanship and income distribution literature that focuses on the earnings of all employees, this paper examines the effect of left government partisanship on top ...managers. Drawing on firm-level top executive compensation data across thirteen advanced industrialized countries, the paper shows that left government partisanship principally leads to lower CEO compensation, either through laws that enhance workers’ collective bargaining power vis-à-vis management or laws that allow shareholders to cast proxy votes on executive compensation (i.e., say-on-pay laws). Furthermore, I show that left government partisanship reduces CEO pay more heavily in those firms that more strongly favor labor’s competing stakeholders. In particular, left partisanship reduces executive compensation more heavily in firms that set aside more revenue for shareholders, managers, or creditors, that is, firms with higher asset return, stock return, or debt. These findings highlight how the macro-politics of rising top income inequality at the national level interacts with the micro-distributive conflicts at the firm level. In particular, financialization, such as the rise of the shareholder value revolution, may accentuate the impact of partisan politics against top income inequality.
Abstract While the progress of the knowledge economy is inexorable, this paper argues that partisan politics and labor market institutions can affect the direction in which the knowledge economy ...progresses. In particular, a combination of corporatist industrial relations systems and left partisanship tends to foster greater wage restraint, and such a wage outcome tends to encourage the greater adoption of communications technology than information-processing technology in the economy. This reorientation of the knowledge economy toward communications technology, in turn, has egalitarian distributive implications. In particular, the greater adoption of communications technology reduces wage inequality across the board in lower 90–10, 50–10, as well as 90–50 wage ratios. These arguments are tested using data across 15–21 OECD countries (1970–2015).
Based on the ‘three highs and one low’ geological conditions of high gas pressure, high gas content, high ground stress, and low permeability in deep coal seams, this study proposes a dual method of ...hydraulic fracturing of key layers of overlying rock layers combined with pre-extraction of gas via large-diameter caving boreholes. The aim is to unload and dissipate the coal seam by fracturing the overlying key strata, allowing the stress and energy from the excavation working face to be transmitted and transferred to the deep coal seam. Additionally, large-diameter drilling effectively increases the effective drainage radius of the coal seam, resulting in a shorter extraction time. To validate this approach, a fracturing model and a gas extraction model were established for the key layers of the overlying rock layer using the engineering background of the 15,111 excavation working face of a mine in Shanxi. FLAC3D software v.6.0 was utilized to simulate the stress and energy changes of the coal seam before and after fracturing of the key layers, while COMSOL software v.6.0 was used to analyze the gas migration conditions, permeability, and effective drainage radius changes before and after drilling and caving drilling. The findings, combined with the engineering test results, conclude that key strata fracturing combined with large-diameter caving can effectively increase the permeability of coal seams and improve gas extraction. This study serves as a theoretical basis for guiding the design of gas drainage technology under the effects of coal seam pressure relief and permeability enhancement.
Let
G
be a simple graph with no isolated edges. The neighbor-distinguishing edge coloring of
G
is a proper edge coloring of
G
such that any pair of adjacent vertices have different sets consisting of ...colors assigned on their incident edges. The neighbor-distinguishing index of
G
, denoted by
χ
a
′
(
G
)
, is the minimum number of colors in such an edge coloring of
G
. In this paper, we show that if
G
is a connected planar graph with maximum degree
Δ
≥
14
, then
Δ
≤
χ
a
′
(
G
)
≤
Δ
+
1
, and
χ
a
′
(
G
)
=
Δ
+
1
if and only if
G
contains a pair of adjacent vertices of maximum degree. This improves a result in W. Wang, D. Huang, A characterization on the adjacent vertex distinguishing index of planar graphs with large maximum degree, SIAM J. Discrete Math. 29(2015), 2412–2431, which says that every connected planar graph
G
with
Δ
≥
16
has
Δ
≤
χ
a
′
(
G
)
≤
Δ
+
1
, and
χ
a
′
(
G
)
=
Δ
+
1
if and only if
G
contains a pair of adjacent vertices of maximum degree.
Symmetry, such as structural symmetry, color symmetry and so on, plays an important role in graph coloring. In this paper, we use structural symmetry and color symmetry to study the characterization ...for the neighbor-distinguishing index of planar graphs. Let G be a simple graph with no isolated edges. The neighbor-distinguishing edge coloring of G is a proper edge coloring of G such that any two adjacent vertices admit different sets consisting of the colors of their incident edges. The neighbor-distinguishing index χa′(G) of G is the smallest number of colors in such an edge coloring of G. It was conjectured that if G is a connected graph with at least three vertices and G≠C5, then χa′(G)≤Δ+2. In this paper, we show that if G is a planar graph with maximum degree Δ≥13, then Δ≤χa′(G)≤Δ+1, and, further, χa′(G)=Δ+1 if and only if G contains two adjacent vertices of maximum degree.
Neighbor distinguishing colorings of graphs represent powerful tools for solving the channel assignment problem in wireless communication networks. They consist of two forms of coloring: neighbor ...distinguishing edge coloring, and neighbor distinguishing total coloring. The neighbor distinguishing edge (total) coloring of a graph G is an edge (total) coloring with the requirement that each pair of adjacent vertices contains different color sets. The neighbor distinguishing edge (total) chromatic number of G is the smallest integer k in cases where a neighbor distinguishing edge (total) coloring exists through the use of k colors in G. The maximum average degree of G is the maximum of the average degree of its non-empty subgraphs. In this paper, we characterize the neighbor distinguishing edge (total) chromatic numbers of graphs with a maximum average degree less than four by means of the discharging method.
Abstract Recent scholarship on the evolution of neoliberalism points out that, despite free market discourse, right-wing rule has often resulted in re-regulation and further market concentration, to ...the advantage of large corporations. This article argues that such an outcome is not an inevitable result of right-wing incumbency. Instead, I identify an exogenous, demographic, change that prompts right-wing governments to increasingly embrace market concentration: the aging of the workforce, which has intensified the substitution of capital for labor, and as a result, somewhat paradoxically, reduced the amount of pure profits that can be distributed to wealthy households. In response, right-wing governments restrict competition to shore up pure profits. Drawing on data from 14 to 20 OECD countries, I show that as workforce aging intensifies, right partisanship becomes increasingly associated with more regulatory restrictions on competition, greater market concentration, and a greater pure profit share of income.
This book examines the transformation of contemporary social democracy through the concept of 'third way' reforms. It proposes a set of theories about the possibility for continuing social democratic ...ideological adaptation, for ideologies to overcome institutional constraints in triggering path-breaking innovations, and for social democracy to bridge the insider-outsider divide. Empirically, the book utilizes these theories to account for social democratic welfare state and labor market reforms in nine OECD countries after the end of the Golden Age. Based on the logic of 'public evils', the book proposes that the ideologically contested nature of institutions provides incentives for institutional innovation. Social democratic ideology shapes the fundamental characteristics and content of the third way policy paradigm, and the paradigm's practical implementation continues to be path-dependent on historical institutional settings.
In Esping-Andersen's influential work decommodification appears as the central characteristic of the welfare state, and efforts to decommodify labour are posited to be the main goal of social ...democracy. Since decommodification is defined as exit from the labour market with little or no loss of income, social democrats' emphasis on decommodification clashes with another purported goal of social democracy, high labour force participation. Drawing on research demonstrating the divergent employment effects of various decommodifying social policies, we resolve the existing paradox by showing that social democratic parties are supportive of decommodifying social policies insofar as these policies do not reduce aggregate levels of employment. Pooled time series analysis of employment-impeding policies (long-term unemployment replacement rate, social security and payroll taxes, and employment protection) suggests that they are associated with Christian democracy rather than social democracy. Instead, we find that social democracy is a key determinant of employment-friendly policies, such as active labour market spending and short-term unemployment replacement rate. Given the radically divergent employment effects of different types of decommodifying social policies and the importance of employment-friendly policies for the viability of generous welfare states, our analysis further underlines the future viability of the social democratic model.
Abstract
While indirect taxes can fall on both consumption and investment spending, there has been little discussion on how governments may tax these two types of expenditure differentially. This ...article shows that the choice between taxing consumption and investment spending has important distributive implications for left governments as the traditional defenders of redistribution. In particular, when left governments increase taxes on investment relative to consumption expenditure, the higher price of investment relative to consumption goods drives up the labor share of corporate income, lowers corporate saving and reduces corporate net lending. Because this labor share strategy of redistribution is likely to antagonize capital, left governments tend to pursue it more intensely when corporatism has declined. I test these arguments using data across 12–14 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from the 1970s to 2010.
