Examines how Israel was caught by surprise in the opening stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 'Based on many formerly undisclosed intelligence and military documents, the secret protocols of ...discussions on the eve of the war, and interviews with relevant figures, The Watchman Fell Asleep is a compelling account of Israel’s intelligence failure before the 1973 Arab attack known as the Yom Kippur War. The Hebrew version of this book was awarded the Tshetshik Prize for Strategic Studies on Israel’s Security in 2001, and the Israeli Political Science Association’s Best Book Award in 2002. Available here in English for the first time, Uri Bar-Joseph has crafted an authoritative explanation of the most traumatic event in Israel’s stormy history and one of the biggest strategic military surprises of the twentieth century.
The surprising 'Arab Spring' raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new ...sources of evidence to trace and explain Israel's success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977-79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate acquaintance of Israel's representatives in Iran with the local language, history and culture, as well as the ability to communicate with locals - tools which the Americans completely lacked.
Ashraf Marwan, President Nasser's son-in-law and President Sadat's close aide, was the most important spy in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, even today, six years after his ...mysterious murder in London, the question of whether Marwan genuinely worked for the Israeli Mossad or misled it is at the center of a heated debate. Following a brief description of Marwan's espionage career, this article lays out the main arguments advanced by the 'double-agent' school, before showing them to be groundless. I conclude that Marwan had genuinely spied for Israel and was, indeed, 'the best source the Mossad had ever had'.
Two Minutes Over Baghdad Perlmutter, Amos; Handel, Michael I.; Bar-Joseph, Uri ...
2003, 20041123, 2003-05-02, 2004-11-23, 20030101, Letnik:
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eBook
A detailed account of the way Israel dealt with the Iraqi nuclear buildup between its launch in 1974 and the destruction of the Tamuz I reactor on 7 June 1981. This updated account includes formerly ...classified information and photographs taken during the mission and from US spy satellites.
Bar-Joseph and Levy shed some light on the neglected subject of the role of conscious, politically motivated behavior in the study of intelligence failure--including "intelligence to please," ...organizational restructuring, and insubordination. They also look at the different ways in which the conscious distortion of information and the politicization of intelligence can lead to intelligence failure. They apply their categories to the Soviet failure to anticipate the German attack in 1941 and to the Israeli failure to anticipate the Arab attack in 1973.
Based on many formerly undisclosed intelligence and military documents, the secret protocols of discussions on the eve of the war, and interviews with relevant figures, The Watchman Fell Asleep is a ...compelling account of Israel's intelligence failure before the 1973 Arab attack known as the Yom Kippur War. The Hebrew version of this book was awarded the Tshetshik Prize for Strategic Studies on Israel's Security in 2001, and the Israeli Political Science Association's Best Book Award in 2002. Available here in English for the first time, Uri Bar-Joseph has crafted an authoritative explanation of the most traumatic event in Israel's stormy history and one of the biggest strategic military surprises of the twentieth century.
This paper uses newly available evidence to shed light on the circumstances and causes of the 6 October 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli positions at the Suez ...Canal and the Golan Heights. The evidence suggests that an important circumstance that accounts for the surprise effect these actions managed to produce, despite ample warning signs, is traceable to a high need for cognitive closure among major figures in the Israeli intelligence establishment. Such a need may have prompted leading intelligence analysts to "freeze" on the conventional wisdom that an attack was unlikely and to become impervious to information suggesting that it was imminent. The discussion considers the psychological forces affecting intelligence operations in predicting the initiation of hostile enemy activities, and it describes possible avenues of dealing with the psychological impediments to open-mindedness that may pervasively characterize such circumstances.
Israeli narratives of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War highlight the army's lack of preparedness in the wake of a successful surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, despite ...assumptions of Israel's intelligence gathering capabilities. Using recently declassified
government documents, this article reveals a communication breakdown among Israel's leadership over the operational status of a top secret means of surveillance. This intelligence failure provides the missing link between Israel's wealth of information and the decision to avoid mobilizing
the country's reserve army until it was too late.
Bar-Joseph talks about politicization of intelligence. Top-down politicization is usually defined as "the manipulation of intelligence to reflect policy preferences." In contrast, intelligence ...organizations in democratic states, where providing accurate information and estimates to national security decisionmakers is their prime task, are guided by the Central Intelligence Agency's motto: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."
Beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the war in the Pacific was a largely losing campaign for the Americans until the Battle of Midway, on 4-5 June 1942. The American ability to predict this ...Japanese attack the second time around served as the turning point for the war in the Pacific. And the story of how the Americans turned a catastrophic failure into an impressive cryptological achievement involved the story of one man, Joe Rochefort, convincing another man, Admiral Chester Nimitz who commanded the Pacific Fleet, that he could trust his analysis of the intelligence he compiled and analyzed.
