This paper examines the relationship between film and philosophy, especially in the light of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his claim that a (motion) picture represents the world better than the ...language itself and that, in that sense, it has philosophical relevance. It starts with an often made comparison of film illustrating philosophy, film about philosophy or philosophers, and film as philosophy. While the first two types are not particularly philosophically relevant or theoretically challenging and therefore not considered to be problematic, the third concept shows the opposite, and it is approached within Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Namely, it is necessary to show why film as motion picture would even be possible for Wittgenstein as philosophy, or more precisely, what it is exactly that enables the film to be like philosophy. To illustrate this, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is analysed, with an emphasis on the difference between the early and late phase of his work. Yet his two philosophical studies, paradigmatic for these phases, show a certain continuity in consideration of images. Foremostly, they supply the primary argument that image, and by extension film as a series of images, best represents the world, that is, that for Wittgenstein it stands as a two-dimensional model. Since it is possible to show that image for Wittgenstein does not depend on linguistic interpretation, it can be shown that film as philosophy is possible precisely but not exclusively from the angle of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work. This treats the image as an independent bearer of meaning, which ultimately results in understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy as directly opposed to the Western philosophical tradition. Thus, one of the possible interpretations of film’s philosophical relevance is possible to find in Wittgenstein’s understanding of pictures.
In this paper, we explore the possibility of applying traditional and modern aesthetical theories to logical and mathematical proofs, with the goal of better understanding the intuitive concept of ...mathematical beauty. This informal concept takes a central role in the work of logicians and mathematicians and can be thought of as their main motivation. In the present paper, we try to define concepts connected to mathematical beauty or beauty in mathematical proofs, so that we may lay the foundations for a more precise definition of mathematical beauty which would be obtained through a detailed survey among logicians and mathematicians, presented in a future paper. The present paper brings crucial results to be used for constructing the survey.
Je li matematika humanistička znanost? Šekrst, Kristina; Kardum, Marko; Skansi, Sandro
Filozofska istraživanja,
08/2023, Letnik:
43, Številka:
2
Journal Article, Web Resource
Recenzirano
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U ovome se radu kroz analizu podjele različitih znanstvenih područja bavimo prirodom matematike kao znanstvene discipline. Povijesnom analizom podjele znanosti, ali i analizom same prirode ...matematike, kao i kroz ontološki status objekata kojima se matematika bavi pokazujemo da su sada već uvriježene podjele među znanstvenim područjima rezultat društvenih okolnosti, kao i da je sama matematika bliža humanističkim negoli prirodnim znanostima.
In this paper, through the analysis of the division of different scientific fields, we deal with the nature of mathematics as a scientific discipline. Through the historical analysis of the division of science, but also the analysis of the nature of mathematics and the ontological status of the objects that mathematics deals with, we show that the now-established divisions among scientific fields are the result of social circumstances and that mathematics itself is closer to the humanities than the natural sciences.
The development of artistic practices and the creation of a new category of artistic artefacts have led, as was expected, to the problem of the intuitive and theoretical definition of the said ...artefacts and practices as (non)artistic. The introduction of the so far non-artistic or utilitarian objects of everyday life into the world of art has caused a rift in the definition of the predicate as a work of art. The ensuing response and theoretical challenge was evident in the often disputed need and the sheer possibility to define art in the first place. It would seem that, in the context of the said issue, the need is beyond debate, but the possibility of definition has been firmly determined methodologically speaking – the desired definition must not crumble under the new development of artistic practices, especially given the fact that it is derived from art as a completed system. Furthermore, despite its state of completeness, it has to be able to encompass new artistic objects and thus retain its democratic quality, innovativeness and imagination as characteristics that traditionally constitute the field of the artistic. Such a challenging task, which without a more in-depth theoretical analysis seems almost contradictory, is feasible if we were to combine Danto’s and Hegel’s theories. We should attempt to define art on the basis of itself, its historical development, while at the same time justly abandoning aesthetics as a philosophical discipline proving insufficient in the task of self-problematizing art as the philosophy of art. Thus art becomes the object of its own scrutiny and its own philosophy, which enables the desired duplicity of defining it.
This paper examines the philosophical foundations of deep learning. By pointing to the beginnings of deep learning and artificial neuron as a logical model of a human neuron, it is possible to claim ...that artificial
intelligence was developed even before its official creation and that it was strongly connected to propositional logic. Bearing in mind some major setbacks in the development of neural networks, we show that deep learning can be treated as the theory of artificial intelligence and that it falls under artificial intelligence paradigm by claiming that everything can be done with learning alone and that all intelligent behavior is learnable. Thus, deep learning is a philosophical or an epistemological approach in which a form of radical empiricism must be advocated. Therefore, there is nothing in the mind that was not in the senses, and there cannot be anything in the mind that is not learnable.
U radu se ispituju filozofski temelji dubokog učenja. Ukazivanjem na početke dubokog učenja i umjetnog neurona kao formalnog modela ljudskog neurona moguće je tvrditi da je umjetna inteligencija razvijena i prije njezinog službenog imenovanja te da je bila snažno povezana s propozicionalnom logikom. Imajući na umu neke velike zastoje u razvoju neuronskih mreža, pokazujemo da se dubinsko učenje može tretirati kao teorija umjetne inteligencije te da potpada pod paradigmu umjetne inteligencije jer je za nju dovoljno samo učenje jer se inteligentno ponašanje uči. Dakle, duboko učenje je filozofski ili epistemološki pristup u kojem se mora zagovarati radikalni empirizam. Prema tome, ne samo da ne postoji ništa u umu što nije bilo u osjetilima, već u umu ne postoji ništa što se ne može naučiti.
Filozofski život Škerbić, Matija Mato; Kos, Marko; Martić, David ...
Filozofska istraživanja,
2018, Letnik:
38, Številka:
4/152
Journal Article
Recenzirano
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Izvješće s Konstitutivne sjednice Varaždinskog filozofskog kruga Hrvatskog filozofskog društva
Godišnji simpozij Hrvatskog filozofskog društva »Reformacije i revolucije«
Predstavljanje zbornika Rat i ...mir i Filozofija je djelo u Varaždinu
Predavanje Vladimira Nemeta »Narcizam, život u ogledalu«
XII. Mediteranski korijeni filozofije
17. Lošinjski dani bioetike
Predstavljanje knjige Sandra Skansija Introduction to Deep Learning: From Logical Calculus to Artificial Intelligence
In this paper, the possibility of private language argument in Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus is analyzed. The concept of ‘language that only I could understand” is connected to solipsism, or the ...impossibility to understand other people’s way of seeing the world. But all members of the same community are able to communicate using the same language, so this language is a general language, and there is no private language, just a private perception of the world. Contemporary linguistic theories of Chomsky and de Saussure are close to this interpretation of private language.
U radu se propituje odnos filma i filozofije, naročito u svjetlu Wittgensteinove filozofije i tvrdnje da (pokretna) slika predočuje svijet čak i bolje od jezika te da je u tom smislu posebno ...filozofski relevantna. Polazi se od čestog razlikovanja filma kao ilustracije filozofije, filma o filozofiji ili filozofima te filma kao filozofije. I dok se prva dva načina njihova odnošenja ne smatraju problematičnima, ali ni filozofski posebno relevantnima ili teorijski izazovnima, za treći se koncept pokazuje suprotno te mu se pristupa unutar Wittgensteinove filozofije. Naime, valja pokazati zašto je film kao pokretna slika za Wittgensteina uopće moguć kao filozofija, odnosno što točno omogućuje filmu da bude kao ta specifična ljudska aktivnost. Da bi se to pokazalo, analizira se Wittgensteinova filozofija s jasno naglašenom razlikom u njegovu ranom i kasnom filozofskom radu. No dva njegova djela, koja paradigmatski stoje iza dviju faza, pokazuju i određeni kontinuitet u razmatranju slika. Prije svega, tiče se to ideje o mogućnosti da upravo slika, a onda ekstenzijom i film kao nizanje slika, najbolje predočava svijet, odnosno da za njega stoji kao dvodimenzionalni model. Budući da je moguće utvrditi kako za Wittgensteina slika ne ovisi o jezičnoj interpretaciji, pokazuje se da je film kao filozofija moguć upravo, premda ne i isključivo, iz kuta Wittgensteinova filozofskog rada koji sliku tretira kao samostalnog nositelja značenja, a što u konačnici rezultira i shvaćanjem Wittgensteinove filozofije kao izravno suprotstavljene filozofskoj tradiciji Zapada. Stoga je jedno od tumačenja relevantnosti filma za filozofiju moguće utemeljiti upravo u Wittgensteinovu razumijevanju slike.
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