Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective provides an account of long-run institutional development in Latin America that emphasizes the social and political foundations of ...state-building processes. The study argues that societal dynamics have path-dependent consequences at two critical points: the initial consolidation of national institutions in the wake of independence, and at the time when the 'social question' of mass political incorporation forced its way into the national political agenda across the region during the Great Depression. Dynamics set into motion at these points in time have produced widely varying and stable distributions of state capacity in the region. Marcus J. Kurtz tests this argument using structured comparisons of the post-independence political development of Chile, Peru, Argentina and Uruguay.
This book examines the relationship between free markets and democracy. It demonstrates how the implementation of even very painful free-market economic reforms in Chile and Mexico have helped to ...consolidate democratic politics without engendering a backlash against either reform or democratization. This national-level compatibility between free markets and democracy, however, is founded on their rural incompatibility. In the countryside, free-market reforms socially isolate peasants to such a degree that they become unable to organize independently, and are vulnerable to the pressures of local economic elites. This helps to create an electoral coalition behind free-market reforms that is critically based in some of the market's biggest victims: the peasantry. The book concludes that the comparatively stable free-market democracy in Latin America hinges critically on its defects in the countryside; conservative, free-market elites may consent to open politics only if they have a rural electoral redoubt.
The regnant scholarly consensus linking good governance—the quality of public administration—to economic development has undergone surprisingly little empirical scrutiny. We examine the relationship ...by asking two questions: How confident are we in our cross-national measures of good governance? How solid are the empirical foundations of the growth-governance causal linkage? Our results suggest that the dominant measures of governance are problematic, suffering from perceptual biases, adverse selection in sampling, and conceptual conflation with economic policy choices. Within the limits of somewhat problematic measures, the evidence suggests that there is far more reason to believe that growth and development spur improvements in governance than vice versa. The policy implications are profound, for international organizations and governments are beginning to condition developmental aid on problematic measures of administrative performance.
Research on the political implications of oil wealth is now over two decades old, and yet still unresolved. Despite many advances in this literature, a core concept—resource rents—remains ...under-theorized, and even less well measured. This mis-measurement, we contend, has direct and significant consequences for theoretical findings on the resource curse. Although rents refer to excessive profits, analyses to date have not directly or indirectly focused on the profitability of oil extraction; instead they rely more often on estimates of gross receipts or exports of natural resources. The largely untested assumption that oil sales consistently produce enormous profits has been the bridge used to treat these as measures of rents, even as the empirical foundations for this claim are shaky. In contrast, we measure the difficulty of oil production using data from over 3800 major oil fields around the globe between 1980 and 2012 to more accurately estimate the income generated by oil production and to calibrate its rent-generating potential using important correlates of its cost of production. The results show that where oil’s cost of production is low, and its profitability high, pernicious regime outcomes are observed in keeping with resource curse claims. However, as production shifts to more challenging sources, oil production loses this association and may well at the extremes be associated with modestly more democratic outcomes. In other words, it is only “easy oil” that may be a curse for democratic development.
By the end of the twentieth century, a scholarly consensus emerged around the idea that oil fuels authoritarianism and slow growth. The natural abundance once thought to be a blessing was ...unconditionally, and then later only conditionally, a curse for political and economic development. We re-examine the relationship between oil wealth and political regimes, challenging the conventional wisdom that such natural resource rents lead to authoritarian outcomes. We contend that most efforts to examine the causal linkages between natural resource abundance and political regime have been complicated by the likelihood that both democracy and oil revenue are endogenous to the industrialization processes itself, particularly in its developmentalist form. Our quantitative results, based on an analysis of global data from 1970 to 2006, show that both resource endogeneity and several mechanisms of intraregional regime diffusion are powerful determinants of democratic outcomes. Qualitative evidence from the history of industrialization in Latin America yields support for our proposed causal claim. Oil wealth is not necessarily a curse and may even be a blessing with respect to democratic development.
Since the 1990s it has become conventional wisdom that an abundance of natural resources, most notably oil, is very likely to become a developmental “curse.” Recent scholarship, however, has begun to ...call into question this apparent consensus, drawing attention to the situations in which quite the opposite result appears to hold, namely, where resources become a developmental “blessing.” Research in this vein focuses predominantly on the domestic political and economic institutions that condition the growth effects of natural resource wealth. Less attention, however, has been paid to whether or how the context of economic integration has conditioned the domestic political economy of natural resource development. This article specifically addresses this theoretical disjuncture by arguing first that the developmental consequences of oil wealth are strongly conditioned by domestic human capital resources, which, where sizeable, make possible the management of resources in ways that encourage the absorption of technology and development of valuable new economic sectors. In the absence of robust human capital formation, however, the archetypal “resource curse” is likely to result. The authors argue moreover that international economic integration further amplifies the divergence between these outcomes by simultaneously raising the growth-enhancing effects of large stocks of human capital and by directly facilitating economic growth. Analysis of global data on growth and oil abundance (1979-2007) supports their main hypotheses that natural resource wealth can be either a “curse” or a “blessing” and that the distinction is conditioned by domestic and international factors, both amenable to change through public policy, namely, human capital formation and economic openness.
Scholars have usually understood the problem of democratic consolidation in terms of the creation of mechanisms that make possible the avoidance of populist excesses, polarized conflicts, or ...authoritarian corporatist inclusion that undermined free politics in much of postwar Latin America. This article makes the case that, under contemporary liberal economic conditions, the nature of the challenge for democratization has changed in important ways. Earlier problems of polarization had their roots in the long-present statist patterns of economic organization. By contrast, under free-market conditions, democratic consolidation faces a largely distinct set of challenges: the underarticulation of societal interests, pervasive social atomization, and socially uneven political quiescence founded in collective action problems. These can combine to undermine the efficacy of democratic representation and, consequently, regime legitimacy. The article utilizes data from the Latin American region since the 1970s on development, economic reform, and individual and collective political participation to show the effects of a changing state-economy relationship on the consolidation of democratic politics.
This manuscript departs strongly from conventional accounts that ascribe a central role to war and the threat of war in Third World state building. Similarly, it challenges the conventional wisdom ...that abundant exportable natural resource wealth is likely to provoke institutional atrophy. Instead, it argues that a set of logically prior conditions—the social relations that govern the principal economic sectors and the pattern or intraelite conflict or compromise—launch path-dependent processes that help determine when, and if, either strategic conflict or resource wealth contribute to, or impede, institutional development. The argument is tested in the comparative analysis of the state-building process in two Andean neighbors (Chile and Peru), both of which are situated in similar strategic and natural resource environments but which produced qualitatively different outcomes in terms of state capacity or “strength.”
The dominant approaches to the study of capital account liberalization have highlighted institutional barriers to reform and have also demonstrated an important role for interdependence, or the ...diffusion of a policy innovation from one country to another, as a causal force. Our approach contrasts with the institutional approach and seeks to clarify the political mechanisms of international policy diffusion. Specifically, we develop and test hypotheses that posit that structural economic legacies of the pre–reform era both condition the way in which international diffusion operates, and create the societal and economic interests that help produce varying capital account policy outcomes in the domestic political sphere. Analysis of capital account liberalization strategies in post–debt-crisis Latin America (1983–2007) reveals that capital account opening and the channels through which this innovation diffuses are conditioned by the legacy of a country's pre–debt crisis economic development model. Specifically, the degree to which advanced import-substituting industrialization was pursued prior to the reform era affects capital account policy by shaping both the relevant international peer groups through which policy models diffuse, and the sorts of domestic interests that are likely to influence the liberalization process. International diffusion also varies in its impact depending on domestic political and economic conditions.
Existing approaches to the study of economic reform have focused on the mobilization of special interests that oppose liberalization and have tended to assume that reform dynamics follow a similar ...logic across distinct policy arenas. Analysis of the dynamics of capital account and trade liberalization in 19 Latin American countries between 1985 and 1999 demonstrates otherwise. Movement toward liberalization is shaped systematically by the timing and salience of each reform's distributional costs and partisan political dynamics. In turn, the timing and magnitude of costs are mediated by the economic context, while salience depends on the informational environment. Our findings thus differ from the conventional wisdom on several scores, particularly by emphasizing the ways in which good rather than bad economic conditions can facilitate reforms, the conditionality of legislative politics of reform enactment on whether reforms are characterized by ex ante conflict or fears of ex post blame, and how the type of reform shapes its political dynamics.