Social cognitive neuroscience examines social phenomena and processes using cognitive neuroscience research tools such as neuroimaging and neuropsychology. This review examines four broad areas of ...research within social cognitive neuroscience: (a) understanding others, (b) understanding oneself, (c) controlling oneself, and (d) the processes that occur at the interface of self and others. In addition, this review highlights two core-processing distinctions that can be neurocognitively identified across all of these domains. The distinction between automatic versus controlled processes has long been important to social psychological theory and can be dissociated in the neural regions contributing to social cognition. Alternatively, the differentiation between internally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's mental interior and externally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's visible features and actions is a new distinction. This latter distinction emerges from social cognitive neuroscience investigations rather than from existing psychological theories demonstrating that social cognitive neuroscience can both draw on and contribute to social psychological theory.
Although subjective construal (i.e., our personal understanding of situations and the people and objects within them) has been an enduring topic in social psychology, its underlying mechanisms have ...never been fully explored. This review presents subjective construals as a kind of seeing (i.e., pre-reflective processes associated with effortless meaning-making). Three distinct forms of "seeing" (visual, semantic, and psychological) are discussed to highlight the breadth of these construals. The CEEing model characterizes these distinct domains of pre-reflective construals as all being Coherent Effortless Experiences associated with lateral posterior parietal cortex, lateral posterior temporal cortex, tempororoparietal junction, and ventral temporal cortex in an area dubbed gestalt cortex. The link between subjective construals and gestalt cortex is further strengthened by evidence showing that when people have similar subjective construals (i.e., they see things similarly) they show greater neural synchrony (i.e., correlated neural fluctuations over time) with each other in gestalt cortex. The fact that the act of CEEing tends to inhibit alternative construals is discussed as one of the multiple reasons why we fail to appreciate the idiosyncratic nature of our pre-reflective construals, leading to naïve realism and other conflict-inducing outcomes.
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) activation is commonly observed in studies of pain, executive control, conflict monitoring, and salience processing, making it difficult to interpret the ...dACC’s specific psychological function. Using Neurosynth, an automated brainmapping database of over 10,000 functional MRI (fMRI) studies, we performed quantitative reverse inference analyses to explore the best general psychological account of the dACC function P(Ψ process|dACC activity). Results clearly indicated that the best psychological description of dACC function was related to pain processing—not executive, conflict, or salience processing. We conclude by considering that physical pain may be an instance of a broader class of survival-relevant goals monitored by the dACC, in contrast to more arbitrary temporary goals, which may be monitored by the supplementary motor area.
•We consider four methods that have reverse inference or causal inference value to assessing the function of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC).•Significant clusters within MPFC were each associated ...more strongly with social cognition, self, value, or emotional experience processes. A ventral MPFC cluster for social cognition was unexpected.•We identified a relatively non-selective region of ventral MPFC that may support situational processing, a process key to each domain, but also independent of each.
The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) has been posited to serve a variety of social, affective, and cognitive functions. These conclusions have largely been driven by forward inference analyses (e.g. GLM fMRI studies and meta-analyses) that indicate where domain-specific tasks tend to produce activity but tell us little about what those regions do. Here, we take a multi-method, multi-domain approach to the functionality of MPFC subdivisions within Brodmann areas 9-11. We consider four methods that each have reverse inference or causal inference value: lesion work, transcranial magnetic stimulation, multivariate pattern analysis, and Neurosynth analyses. The Neurosynth analyses include multi-term reverse inference analyses that compare several domains of interest to one another at once. We examine the evidence supporting structure-function links in five domains: social cognition, self, value, emotional experience, and mental time travel. The evidence is considered for each of three MPFC subdivisions: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), anteromedial prefrontal cortex (AMPFC), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). Although there is evidentiary variability across methods, the results suggest that social processes are functionally linked to DMPFC (and somewhat surprisingly in VMPFC), self processes are linked to AMPFC, and affective processes are linked to AMPFC and VMPFC. There is also a relatively non-selective region of VMPFC that may support situational processing, a process key to each domain, but also independent of each.
Statistical thresholding (i.e. P-values) in fMRI research has become increasingly conservative over the past decade in an attempt to diminish Type I errors (i.e. false alarms) to a level ...traditionally allowed in behavioral science research. In this article, we examine the unintended negative consequences of this single-minded devotion to Type I errors: increased Type II errors (i.e. missing true effects), a bias toward studying large rather than small effects, a bias toward observing sensory and motor processes rather than complex cognitive and affective processes and deficient meta-analyses. Power analyses indicate that the reductions in acceptable P-values over time are producing dramatic increases in the Type II error rate. Moreover, the push for a mapwide false discovery rate (FDR) of 0.05 is based on the assumption that this is the FDR in most behavioral research; however, this is an inaccurate assessment of the conventions in actual behavioral research. We report simulations demonstrating that combined intensity and cluster size thresholds such as P < 0.005 with a 10 voxel extent produce a desirable balance between Types I and II error rates. This joint threshold produces high but acceptable Type II error rates and produces a FDR that is comparable to the effective FDR in typical behavioral science articles (while a 20 voxel extent threshold produces an actual FDR of 0.05 with relatively common imaging parameters). We recommend a greater focus on replication and meta-analysis rather than emphasizing single studies as the unit of analysis for establishing scientific truth. From this perspective, Type I errors are self-erasing because they will not replicate, thus allowing for more lenient thresholding to avoid Type II errors.
While Social and Affective Neuroscience (SAN) has been a successful enterprise thus far, its future currently depends on the goodwill and interest of those not directly involved. The formation of ...independent SAN areas within psychology departments is the best way to protect our current faculty positions and ensure additional positions for future generations of SAN researchers. This article examines the hurdles we had to jump over at UCLA in order to start a SAN area. This examination will hopefully encourage others to do the same in their departments and allow them to have an easier time gaining departmental support.
Previous neuroimaging studies on empathy have not clearly identified neural systems that support the three components of empathy: affective congruence, perspective-taking, and prosocial motivation. ...These limitations stem from a focus on a single emotion per study, minimal variation in amount of social context provided, and lack of prosocial motivation assessment. In the current investigation, 32 participants completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging session assessing empathic responses to individuals experiencing painful, anxious, and happy events that varied in valence and amount of social context provided. They also completed a 14-day experience sampling survey that assessed real-world helping behaviors. The results demonstrate that empathy for positive and negative emotions selectively activates regions associated with positive and negative affect, respectively. In addition, the mirror system was more active during empathy for context-independent events (pain), whereas the mentalizing system was more active during empathy for context-dependent events (anxiety, happiness). Finally, the septal area, previously linked to prosocial motivation, was the only region that was commonly activated across empathy for pain, anxiety, and happiness. Septal activity during each of these empathic experiences was predictive of daily helping. These findings suggest that empathy has multiple input pathways, produces affect-congruent activations, and results in septally mediated prosocial motivation.
This paper will examine the conscious aspects of emotion (i.e. emotional experience), arguably the defining features of emotion. I will argue that emotion IS emotional experience and, consequently, ...that emotion researchers rarely study emotion itself. I will suggest a research agenda for examining the conscious aspects of emotion and end with a consideration of appraisal theory and how it can be made more relevant to the study of emotion by treating appraisals as components of a pre-reflective perceptual process rather than as causal antecedents of a cognitive process that can be self-reported on.
Humans have a tendency to think about themselves. What generates this self-focus? One clue may come from the observation that the same part of the brain that supports self-reflection—the medial pFC ...(MPFC/Brodmann's area 10 BA 10)—also spontaneously engages by default whenever the brain is free from external demands to attention. Here, we test the possibility that the default tendency to engage MPFC/BA 10 primes self-referential thinking. Participants underwent fMRI while alternating between brief periods of rest and experimental tasks in which they thought about their own traits, another person's traits, or another location's traits. Greater default engagement in MPFC/BA 10 during momentary breaks preferentially facilitated task performance on subsequent self-reflection trials on a moment-to-moment basis. These results suggest that reflexively engaging MPFC/BA 10 by default may nudge self-referential thinking, perhaps explaining why humans think about themselves so readily.
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