We empirically show the dynamics of information production and information sensitivity of bank debt around the Great Recession. As more precise information is produced at the onset of the crisis, ...bank debt becomes informationally sensitive, along two separate dimensions. First, precise information amplifies the effect of market expectations on default risk; second, for banks that are already expected to perform poorly, more precise information further increases default risk. Both effects are muted in good times. Overall, our findings are consistent with information-based models of financial crises.
The liquidity-coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand a 30-day run. We study the effects of the LCR on broker-dealers, the financial intermediaries at the epicenter ...of the 2007–2009 crisis. The LCR brings some financial-stability benefits, including a significant maturity extension of triparty repos backed by lower-quality collateral, as well as the accumulation of larger liquidity pools. However, it also leads to less liquidity transformation by broker-dealers. We also discuss the liquidity risks not addressed by the LCR. Finally, we show that a major source of fire-sale risk was self-corrected before the introduction of postcrisis regulations.
During the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve established two emergency facilities for broker-dealers: one provided collateralized loans; the other, collateral upgrades. These facilities ...alleviated dealers’ funding pressures when access to repos backed by illiquid collateral deteriorated. The ability to upgrade collateral allowed dealers to continue funding their own illiquid inventories (avoiding potential firesales) and to provide better bond market liquidity. It also helped sustain dealers’ credit to hedge fund clients, which in turn posted relatively better returns.
Abstract
We show that international portfolios reflect the underlying heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs. Using data on the foreign sovereign debt holdings of European banks matched with their ...forecasts on future bond yields, we find that expecting higher returns and having more accurate forecasts are associated with larger bond holdings. Crucially, the elasticity of portfolio holdings to expected returns is increasing in the precision of the forecast, implying that investors optimally exploit comparative advantages in information production. We rationalize the results in a model in which partial information specialization arises endogenously by introducing a degree of unlearnable uncertainty about asset payoffs.
Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
We empirically study the nature of rollover risk and show how banks manage it. Having to roll over debt does not lead to higher default risk per se. Only banks that lose significant access to new ...funding while having to roll over debt display higher default risk. We identify a factor that determines this buildup of risk: specifically, debt maturity shortening (forcing debt to be more frequently rolled over) and reduced access to new funding are both driven by market pessimism about banks' future performance. We also provide evidence consistent with dynamic coordination risk.
This paper examines the supply chain effects of the most damaging cyberattack in history so far. The attack propagated from the directly hit firms to their customers, causing a four-fold ...amplification of the initial drop in profits. These losses were larger for affected customers with fewer alternative suppliers. Internal liquidity buffers and increased borrowing, mainly through bank credit lines, helped firms navigate the shock. Nonetheless, the cyberattack led to persistent adjustments to the supply chain network, with affected customers terminating trading relations with directly hit firms and forming new ones with alternative suppliers with a stronger cybersecurity posture.
Abstract
Liquidity restrictions on investors, like the redemption gates and liquidity fees introduced in the 2016 money market fund (MMF) reform, are meant to improve financial stability. However, we ...find evidence that such liquidity restrictions exacerbated the run on prime MMFs during the COVID-19 crisis. Our results indicate that gates and fees could generate strategic complementarities among investors in crisis times. Severe outflows from prime MMFs led the Federal Reserve to intervene with the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF). Using MMLF microdata, we show how the provision of “liquidity of last resort” stabilized prime funds.
Private Supply of Safe Assets Gissler, Stefan; Macchiavelli, Marco; Narajabad, Borghan
AEA papers and proceedings,
05/2020, Letnik:
110
Journal Article
Recenzirano
We show that the creation of private safe assets by shadow banks can decrease traditional banks’ supply of safe assets. The 2014–2016 money fund reform created a large demand shock for safe assets, ...to which Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) responded, expanding their balance sheets and increasing their issuance of short-term debt. To reduce the resulting interest rate risk, FHLBs shortened the repricing of their loans to banks. Focusing on small banks for which the reform was exogenous, we use a novel instrumental variable strategy to show that shadow banks create safe assets at the expense of banks’ deposits.
We study how syndicated lending networks propagate natural disasters. Natural disasters lead to an increase in corporate credit demand in affected regions. Banks meet the increase in credit demand in ...part by reducing credit to distant regions, unaffected by disasters. Capital constraints play a key role in this effect as lower‐capital banks propagate disasters to unaffected regions to a greater extent. While shadow banks offset the reduction in bank credit supply on term loan syndicates, they do not offset the loss in credit line financing. As a result, corporate credit in unaffected regions falls by approximately 3%.
The goal of this dissertation is to shed some light on three separate aspects of the financial system that can lead to greater instability in the banking sector and greater macroeconomic volatility. ...The starting point of the Great Recession was the collapse of the banking sector in late 2007; in the subsequent months, liquidity evaporated in many markets for short term funding. The process of creating liquidity carried out by the banking system involves the transformation of long term illiquid assets into short term liquid liabilities. This engine functions properly as long as cash lenders continue to roll over short term funding to banks; whenever these lenders fear that banks will not be able to pay back these obligations, they immediately stop funding banks' short term liabilities. This makes banks unable to repay maturing short term debt, which leads to large spikes in default risk. This is often referred to as a modern bank run. Virtually all the theories of bank runs suggest that the severity of a run depends on how well lenders can coordinate their beliefs: whenever a lender expects many others to run, he becomes more likely to run as well. In a joint work with Emanuele Brancati, the first chapter of my dissertation, we empirically document the role of coordination in explaining bank runs and default risk. We establish two new results. First, when information is more precise and agents can better coordinate their actions, a change in market expectations has a larger impact on default risk; this implies that more precise information increases the vulnerability or instability of the banking system. This result has a clear policy implication: if policymakers want to stabilize the banking system they should promote opacity instead of transparency, especially during periods of financial turmoil. Second, we show that when a bank is expected to perform poorly, lower dispersion of beliefs actually increases default risk; this result is in contrast with standard theories in finance and can be rationalized by thinking about the impact that more precise information has on the ability of creditors to coordinate on a bank run. Another aspect of the banking system that is creating a lot of instability in Europe is the so called "disastrous banks-sovereign nexus": many banks in troubled countries owned a disproportionately large amount of domestic sovereign bonds; therefore, in case of a default of the sovereign country, the whole domestic banking sector would incur insurmountable losses. This behavior is puzzling because these banks in troubled countries would greatly benefit from having a more diversified asset portfolio, but instead decide to load up with domestic sovereign debt only. In a joint work with Filippo De Marco, the second chapter of my dissertation, we show that banks receive political pressures from their respective governments to load up on domestic sovereigns. First, we show that banks with a larger fraction of politicians as shareholders display greater home bias. More importantly, we exploit the fact that low-performing banks received liquidity injections by their domestic governments to show that, among those banks, only the "political banks" drastically increased their home bias upon receiving government help. Furthermore, it appears that the extent of political pressure on banks is much stronger on those "political banks" belonging to troubled countries. These findings suggest that troubled countries that would need to pay a high premium to issue new debt force their "political banks" to purchase part of the debt issuance. This greater risk-synchronization can create a dangerous loop of higher sovereign default risk leading to insolvency of the domestic banking system, which in turn would require a bail-out from the local government, further exacerbating the sovereign de- fault risk. Finally, the third chapter of my dissertation, a joint work with Susanto Basu, investigates the sources of excess consumption volatility in emerging markets. It is a well documented fact that, in emerging markets, consumption is more volatile than output whereas the opposite is true in developed economies. We propose an explanation for this phenomenon that relies on a specific form of financial markets incompleteness: we assume that households would always want to front-load consumption and they can borrow from abroad up to a fraction of the value of posted collateral. With the value of collateral being procyclical, households are able to increase borrowing during an expansion and ultimately consume more than they produce; this mechanism is then able to generate a ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility greater than one. Most importantly, the model delivers the implication that a better ability to borrow vis-a-vis the same value of collateral generates greater relative consumption volatility. We then bring this model's implication to the data and find empirical support for it. We proxy the ability to borrow with various measures of effectiveness of lending regulation and more standard indicators of financial development. Consistent with the model's implication, more lending friendly regulation leads to greater relative consumption volatility in emerging markets; moreover, this link breaks down among developed countries. In addition, among emerging countries, it appears that deeper domestic capital markets have a destabilizing effect in terms of greater relative consumption volatility while a more developed domestic banking system does not exerts any such detrimental effect.
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