Kategorije 10, 13b27-35 Martinjak, Igor
Nova prisutnost,
07/2021, Letnik:
XIX, Številka:
2
Journal Article, Paper
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
U radu se ispituje mogućnost reprezentiranja Aristotelove rasprave o singularnoj predikaciji iz Kategorija 10, 13b27-35 u trima simboličkim idiomima – u jeziku logike prvog reda s identitetom, s i ...bez određenih opisa, te jezicima slobodnih logika – te se pokazuje zašto nijedna reprezentacija nije u potpunosti odgovarajuća. Prema prvoj opciji, obvezujemo Aristotela na (meta)logičke implikacije koje on ne prihvaća. Prema drugoj opciji, pripisujemo Aristotelu Russellovu teoriju imena. U konačnici, treća nas opcija ostavlja s pretpostavkom da se ‘postoji’ može reprezentirati predikatom. Takvu pretpostavku, međutim, Aristotel izričito odbija.
The possibility of formal representation of Aristotle’s discussion about singular predication in Categories 10, 13b27-35 is investigated through three symbolic idioms: the first-order language with identity, with and without definitive description, and through the languages of free logics. I show that such representations are not fully adequate. According to the first option, we are committing Aristotle with some (meta)logical implications he is not willing to accept. According to the second option, we are burdening Aristotle with Russell’s theory of names. Finally, the third option leaves us with the assumption that ‘exist(s)’ could be represented with a predicate. This assumption, however, Aristotle emphatically rejects.
Analysis in Prior Analytics I.45 Martinjak, Igor
History and philosophy of logic,
07/2022, Letnik:
43, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
I reconstruct Aristotle's analytical procedure in Prior Analytics I.45 and its metalogical implications. Aristotle's analysis unfolds three groups of syllogisms: symmetrically analysable, ...asymmetrically analysable, and non-analysable syllogisms. From the first and the third group could be extracted 27 combinations of the two mutually non-derivable deductive rules. Aristotle's reduced deductive system in APr. I.7 with the two moods in the first figure (traditionally called Barbara and Celarent) follows this pattern. I demonstrate that the deductive system with Barbara and Celarent is just one of 27 possible complete deductive systems with the two mutually non-derivable syllogistic rules. On top of that, given the fact that there are two combinations of mutually non-derivable conversion rules, I conclude that Prior Analytics hides in itself 54 complete deductive systems with a minimal number of mutually non-derivable rules. Finally, it is commented what might be the role of analysis; to what extent Aristotle could be aware of possibilities presented here; why he still prefers only one deductive system to many others with the same deductive power.
U ovom tekstu argumentiram da συλλογισμός ne treba shvaćati (prevoditi)
kao dedukciju ili valjani argument. Takva praksa ignorira višestruko slojeviti Aristotelov logički poduhvat u Prvoj Analitici. ...U vrlo uskom smislu συλλογισμοί su samo podklase valjanih argumenata, dok se dedukcija može također konstruirati i pomoću nesilogističkih pravila. Aristotelov je primarni cilj uspostaviti pouzdani i potpuni deduktivni sustav za znanstvene demonstracije. Suprotno tendencijama u klasičnoj logici, Aristotel nije zainteresiran samo za određivanje valjanosti, već za pronalazak takvih formalnih obrazaca koji osiguravaju valjanost uz snagu uvjeravanja – a takvi su obrasci upravo συλλογισμοί. Prema tome, poznavanje je silogistike korisno za širi kontekst uvjeravanja.
In this paper, I investigate Aristotle’s psychological conception of meaning. I will show that in Aristotle’s De interpretatione we can find a conception of meaning that enables a response to typical ...objections such psychological accounts are facing with. According to my interpretation, it is required that thoughts are significata of our terms rather than mental images. Mental images could occur as subjective features of a particular mind in particular portion of time, whereas thoughts as an isomorphic likeness of the universal and necessary aspect of extramental reality provide ground for intersubjectivity required for an adequate account of meaning. In my interpretation, however reference is not fixed via likening relation because a mental content of nonreferring terms is also provided via likening relation between thought and two or many extramental things.
U ovom radu argumentiram da se prihvaćajući tradicionalnu koncepciju egzistencije i predikacije ne obvezujemo na zloglasni paradoks nebića. Negativne egzistencijalne rečenice jednostavno nisu ...subjektno–predikatne rečenice kojima se izdvajaju neka bića da bismo o njima rekli da ne postoje. Aristotelovo insistiranje da biće nije rod, tj. da biće nije predikat nekoga subjekta ključno je za takvu tvrdnju. Ipak, unutar konceptualnoga okvira Aristotelove filozofije izvire drugačiji problem nebića. Rekonstruiram Aristotelovo rješenje kao zadovoljavajuće s obzirom na njegovo razumijevanje predikacije i egzistencije. Štoviše, sugeriram kako slična zagonetka vodi mnoge suvremene filozofe prema napuštanju quineovske koncepcije egzistencije i predikacije u korist tradicionalnijih pristupa.
According to the well–known argument, a traditional conception of existence and predication leads to the infamous paradox of non–existence. For instance, the sentence ‘Pegasus does not exist’ commits us to accept that there is something that does not exist. The easy way out is to analyze existence as a second–order concept expressing that there is at least one instance of some first–order concept. In this article, I argue that the traditional conception of existence and predication does not lead to the paradox of non–existence. Negative existentials simply are not subject–predicate sentences that select existing beings only to deny them the property of existence. Aristotle’s insistence that being is not a genus, i.e. that being is not a predicate of some subject, is pivotal. Furthermore, Aristotle does not have a uniform conception of existence and predication. According to Aristotle, to be is to be an item in the categorical scheme, and consequently, every predication of some being should be analyzable as one of the most general types of predication according to the categorical scheme. However, in the conceptual framework of Aristotle’s philosophy, there arises a different problem of non–existence. For instance, ‘Pegasus is thought–about’ might commits us to accept that Pegasus is a being of some kind. I reconstruct Aristotle’s solution as being satisfactory in the light of his understanding of predication and existence. Moreover, I suggest that a similar puzzle leads many contemporary philosophers to an abandonment of the Quinean concept of existence and predication in favour of a more traditional approach.
U ovom tekstu razmatram Aristotelovu psihologijsku koncepciju značenja. Pokazat ću da u spisu O tumačenju možemo pronaći takvu koncepciju značenja koja omogućuje odgovor na tipične prigovore ...psihologijskim koncepcijama značenja. Sukladno mojoj interpretaciji zahtijeva se da su misli, a ne mentalne slike, significata naših termina. Naime, mentalne slike mogu biti subjektivna svojstva pojedinog uma u pojedinom vremenskom periodu, međutim, misli kao izomorfne nalike univerzalnog i nužnog aspekta izvanmentalne zbilje pružaju osnovu za intersubjektivnost koja se zahtijeva u adekvatnom objašnjenju značenja. U takvoj interpretaciji referencija nije fiksirana kroz relaciju nalikovanja jer se mentalni sadržaj nereferirajućeg termina također osigurava kroz relaciju nalikovanja između neke misli i dva ili više izvanmentalnih entiteta.
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