Thomas Christiano claims that one of the fundamental challenges democracy is faced with is the appropriate division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts. In this article I try to present ...and analyze Christiano’s solution from the perspective of social epistemology while utilizing the concepts and tools provided by this discipline. Despite fundamentally agreeing with his position, I attempt to propose a certain addition which might enrich this solution with additional epistemic and political responsibility. In the first part, I briefly elaborate on the relevance of social epistemology in discussions regarding the epistemic justification of deliberative democracy. In the second part, I contextualize Christiano’s view within discourses regarding social epistemology and identify his approach as reliability democracy due to his belief that truth-sensitive decision-making processes are ensured through the usage of reliable mechanisms (which allow for expertise to generate the epistemically best decisions possible). In the third part I attempt to provide arguments that support further elaboration of Christiano’s proposals in the direction of ensuring additional epistemic and democratic quality of decisions.
U članku argumentiram u prilog stavu da kritičko mišljenje ne isključuje povjerenje u epistemičke autoritete ili stručnjake i da je u kulturi neznanja opasno ustrajavati na ovoj opreci. Ovaj stav ...zahtijeva istraživanje što znači misliti kritički ili, preciznije, što kritičko mišljenje čini epistemičkom vrlinom. U prvom dijelu bavim se istraživanjem zašto se kritičko mišljenje smatra intelektualno odgovornim epistemičkim djelovanjem, oslanjajući se pritom na teorijski okvir i pretpostavke epistemologije vrlina. U drugom dijelu istražujem tradicionalnu opreku između kritičkog mišljenja i povjerenja u epistemičke autoritete u čijim je korijenima konceptualna veza kritičkog mišljenja i epistemičke autonomije. U trećem dijelu pokušavam pokazati da povjerenje u epistemičke autoritete (stručnjake) nije u suprotnosti s epistemičkom autonomijom i epistemičkom kvalitetom, već je, što- više, u opreci s epistemičkim porocima epistemičkog egoizma i neodgovornosti. Također pokušavam istražiti epistemičke i izvanepistemičke razloge zbog kojih je kritičko mišljenje suprotstavljeno povjerenju u stručnjake. Članak zaključujem ukazujući na porazne epistemičke posljedice koje u kulturi neznanja ima pogrešno izjednačavanje kritičkog mišljenja sa samostalnim formiranjem vjerovanja. Naime, tvrdim da unutar raširene kulture neznanja, kritičko mišljenje shvaćeno u opreci prema epistemičkim autoritetima ne samo što dobiva neprihvatljivo značenje već rezultira ozbiljnom krizom prosvijećenosti.
In the article, I am concerned with the epistemic justification of democracy: what does the epistemic justification of democracy consist of, and how can we assure that democracy indeed generates ...decisions of the highest epistemic quality? However, since it is impossible to speak about the epistemic justification of democracy without considering its relation to political justification, and their tension, this article will also question the relationship between epistemic and political justification. I endorse a position called the hybrid stance, not only because I think that, when justifying democracy, we need to consider both the political value of fairness and the epistemic values of truth-sensitivity and truth-conduciveness, but because I believe we should appropriately harmonize them. While the advocates of epistemic proceduralism hold that it best harmonizes the political and epistemic values of democracy, I argue that they do not separate epistemic values as intrinsically different from the political. On the other hand, even if we accept that epistemic justification is tied to intrinsically truth-respecting practices, the question remains which decision-making processes best satisfy this demand. In simpler terms, we must inquire how to divide epistemic labor between citizens and experts. I will try to show that the optimal model needs to preserve both the epistemic potential of the diversity present in the collective intelligence of citizens, and the epistemic potential of the factual knowledge embodied by the individual intelligence of experts.
Thomas Christiano claims that one of the fundamental challenges democracy is faced with is the appropriate division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts. In this article I try to present ...and analyze Christiano’s solution from the perspective of social epistemology while utilizing the concepts and tools provided by this discipline. Despite fundamentally agreeing with his position, I attempt to propose a certain addition which might enrich this solution with additional epistemic and political responsibility. In the first part, I briefly elaborate on the relevance of social epistemology in discussions regarding the epistemic justification of deliberative democracy. In the second part, I contextualize Christiano’s view within discourses regarding social epistemology and identify his approach as reliability democracy due to his belief that truth-sensitive decision-making processes are ensured through the usage of reliable mechanisms (which allow for expertise to generate the epistemically best decisions possible). In the third part I attempt to provide arguments that support further elaboration of Christiano’s proposals in the direction of ensuring additional epistemic and democratic quality of decisions.
In the past decade, the Croatian higher education system has been under intensive transformation, one mostly driven by an increased demand for postsecondary education and by the process of Croatia's ...accession to the European Union. Although there had already been a constant need and pressure for the transformation of tertiary education institutions (TEIs), the Bologna process has been a major reform initiative in the last decade. We review the implementation of the Bologna process action lines in Croatian higher education and present their impact on overall policy in the higher education sector. During the three phases of the implementation process, the major themes of reform have been degree recognition, qualification framework, quality assurance, and the accreditation system. There have been significant changes in the Croatian higher education system, mostly inspired by these main concerns of the Bologna process. However, it must be noted that in the Croatian higher education system, there are a variety of coexisting Bolognas, conflicting interpretations regarding the duration and content of programs, learning outcomes, flexible learning paths, the significance of lifelong learning for employability goals, and a number of other important issues. The idea of improving employability skills through a three-cycle degree structure is still unrecognized by the overall system. There are also motivational and institutional barriers and a number of negative attitudes toward mobility. Generally speaking, in spite of significant changes and crucial reforms, we suggest that there is still a certain resistance to comprehensive and systematic Bologna reforms; its causes are varied, ranging from subjective to institutional and overall sociocultural reasons. Moreover, due to the current economic recession in Croatia, one can expect even more resistance to the implementation as there is a tendency to equate the Bologna process with financial cuts.
Thomas Christiano claims that one of the fundamental challenges democracy is faced with is the appropriate division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts. In this article I try to present ...and analyze Christiano’s solution from the perspective of social epistemology while utilizing the concepts and tools provided by this discipline. Despite fundamentally agreeing with his position, I attempt to propose a certain addition which might enrich this solution with additional epistemic and political responsibility. In the first part, I briefly elaborate on the relevance of social epistemology in discussions regarding the epistemic justification of deliberative democracy. In the second part, I contextualize Christiano’s view within discourses regarding social epistemology and identify his approach as reliability democracy due to his belief that truth-sensitive decision-making processes are ensured through the usage of reliable mechanisms (which allow for expertise to generate the epistemically best decisions possible). In the third part I attempt to provide arguments that support further elaboration of Christiano’s proposals in the direction of ensuring additional epistemic and democratic quality of decisions.
In debates about trust and testimony, epistemologists have traditionally been divided into two groups: those who hold that accepting the testimony of other people should be a kind of credulity ...without evidence (anti-reductivism) and those who assert that we shouldn't recognize any testimony as true or justified without appropriate evidence (reductivism). I will argue in favour of the evidentialist position about trust, or the stance that epistemically responsible trust is a matter of evidence, but also in favour of the thesis that the position assumed by anti-reductivists is not necessarily an anti-evidentialist position. The crucial difference between anti-reductivism and reductivism does not pertain to the question of evidence, but to epistemic agency. Finally, I will argue against anti-reductivism and in favour of agency evidentialism, wherein it is assumed that accepting testimony is a kind of agency where our (reflective) control is strong enough to ensure that our trust is responsible. The version of agency evidentialism which I here support presumes: (i) doxastic voluntarism, or the existence of intellectual freedom in the sense that we have to be capable of certain intellectual choices or decisions, and (ii) virtue epistemology, or the normative approach according to which the target of epistemic evaluation is an epistemic agent to whom we ascribe epistemic or intellectual virtues or vices (epistemic responsibility, epistemic conscientiousness or like.)
The value turn in epistemology generates a particularly influential position titled as virtue epistemology. It is a popular and influential epistemological project that postulates intellectual ...virtues of knower, not a truth of propositions, as central epistemic values. In the first part of the article, we explain briefly on what value turn we refer to and the main thesis of virtue epistemology, pointing to the diversity of attitudes of epistemologists who are inclined to this approach. We would like to stress the significant role of this project in the spreading of horizons, i.e.epistemological scopes and themes. The second part focusses on the virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate for evaluation of social epistemic processes such as testimony and communication, or conversation in general. In the third part, we will show how specific epistemic activity – communication act in psychiatry and psychotherapy – can be more appropriately analysed and evaluated rather from the perspective of epistemic virtues of justice, than from the epistemic approach built on the value monism of the truth.
The prevalence and characteristics of research misconduct have mainly been studied in highly developed countries. In moderately or poorly developed countries such as Croatia, data on research ...misconduct are scarce. The primary aim of this study was to determine the rates at which scientists report committing or observing the most serious forms of research misconduct, such as falsification , fabrication, plagiarism, and violation of authorship rules in the Croatian scientific community. Additionally, we sought to determine the degree of development and the extent of implementation of the system for defining and regulating research misconduct in a typical scientific community in Croatia. An anonymous questionnaire was distributed among 1232 Croatian scientists at the University of Rijeka in 2012/2013 and 237 (19.2 %) returned the survey. Based on the respondents who admitted having committed research misconduct, 9 (3.8 %) admitted to plagiarism, 22 (9.3 %) to data falsification, 9 (3.8 %) to data fabrication, and 60 (25.3 %) respondents admitted to violation of authorship rules. Based on the respondents who admitted having observed research misconduct of fellow scientists, 72 (30.4 %) observed plagiarism, 69 (29.1 %) observed data falsification, 46 (19.4 %) observed data fabrication, and 132 (55.7 %) respondents admitted having observed violation of authorship rules. The results of our study indicate that the efficacy of the system for managing research misconduct in Croatia is poor. At the University of Rijeka there is no document dedicated exclusively to research integrity, describing the values that should be fostered by a scientist and clarifying the forms of research misconduct and what constitutes a questionable research practice. Scientists do not trust ethical bodies and the system for defining and regulating research misconduct; therefore the observed cases of research misconduct are rarely reported. Finally, Croatian scientists are not formally educated about responsible conduct of research at any level of their formal education. All mentioned indicate possible reasons for higher rates of research misconduct among Croatian scientists in comparison with scientists in highly developed countries.
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