A growing body of research demonstrates that political involvement by Christian religious leaders can undermine the religion's social influence. Do these negative consequences of politicization also ...extend to Islam? Contrary to scholarly and popular accounts that describe Islam as inherently political, we argue that Muslim religious leaders will weaken their religious authority when they engage with politics. We test this argument with a conjoint experiment implemented on a survey of more than 12,000 Sunni Muslim respondents in eleven Middle Eastern countries. The results show that connections to political issues or politically active religious movements decrease the perceived religious authority of Muslim clerics, including among respondents who approve of the clerics' political views. The article's findings shed light on how Muslims in the Middle East understand the relationship between religion and politics, and they contribute more broadly to understanding of how politicized religious leaders can have negative repercussions for religion.
What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of moderation? Although a prevalent question in recent years, less is known about the causes and forms of Islamist ...moderation in a systematic fashion. By building on the findings of Communist moderation literature, we introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist party moderation over time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation refers to the kind of moderation where radical parties make a decision on whether to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to shifts in a platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to gain greater popular support. Empirically, we analyse the Italian Communist Party and the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco in a comparative perspective. In providing evidence through structured comparisons and field interviews, we hope to advance a more universal, generalizable theory of radical party moderation.
As Turkey's Gezi Park protests reminded us, Islamist parties the world over demonstrate utter disregard of the environment in their discourse and actions. However, Islam as a religion places strong ...emphasis on environmental protection. Thus, as the representatives of Islam that these parties claim themselves to be, it is puzzling that environmental policy is all but absent from most Islamist platforms. I ask, what explains the poverty of Islamists in regards to the environment? I argue that the reason for this poverty is found within and conforms to political Islam's problematic relationship with modernity, particularly in regards to their strong anti-western sentiment and self-purported victim status. My findings suggest that the inattention Islamists give to the environment is due to their association of environmentalism with the West and because of the uniquely unfavourable socio-economic environments in which they exist, which sends environmentalism to the purview of 'low politics'. This analysis points to an inherent weakness in Islamist ideology - their lack of pragmatic policy. Hence, the peculiar case of Islamists and the environment is but a symptom of a larger issue within Islamism and can be a key element to understanding why and how Islamism is likely to fail.
A.Kadir Yildirim and other scholars have used the term "Muslim Democrat" to describe moderate Islamist political parties, suggesting a parallel with Christian Democratic parties in Europe. These ...parties (MDPs) are marked by their adherence to a secular political regime, normative commitment to the rules of a democratic political system, and the democratic political representation of a religious identity. In this book, Yildirim draws on extensive field research in Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco to examine this phenomenon and assess the interaction of economic and political factors in the development of MDPs. Distinguishing between "competitive economic liberalization" and "crony liberalization," he argues that MDPs are more likely to emerge and succeed in the context of the former. He summarizes that the broader implication is that the economic liberalization models adopted by governments in the region in the wake of the Arab Spring have significant implications for the future direction of party systems and democratic reform.
Although economic liberalization has been argued to promote political liberalization, this relationship is poorly understood and we do not consistently observe greater economic openness leading to ...more open and moderate political systems. We examine the connection between liberalization and moderation in the context of Islamist and Communist parties, both of which are characterized by ideologies opposed to democracy and the market. When will these ideological parties moderate by adopting more pragmatic agendas? We argue that competitive liberalization spurs the emergence of more moderate parties, but crony liberalization does not. In support of this, we use two sets of most different case comparisons in which we compare two instances of competitive liberalization (Turkey and Hungary) and two instances of crony liberalization (Egypt and Bulgaria). Our research offers an important clarification to existing explanations and a more generalizable theory of how and why liberalization is linked to political moderation.
I analyze the positive and leading role religious actors play in democratic consolidation in Turkey in recent years. I argue that major social changes might lead to such outcomes. Empirically, I show ...that two major religious actors in Turkey—the Gulen Movement and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—have adopted favorable positions on EU membership, ethnic and religious minorities, and pluralism in the last decade. This remarkable transformation owes its existence to the economic liberalization reforms initiated in the early 1980s, and the “post-modern coup” of 1997. This transformation reflects the need of both religious actors for greater democracy from a purely self-interested perspective. The Gulen Movement prefers an open and democratic system to sustain its organizational existence. The AKP responds to the preferences of its own constituency. These unique conditions have made two religious actors catalysts of democratization along with some liberal democrats in Turkey. Empirically, I rely on European Union’s Turkey progress reports and a recent analysis of religious Turkish media to support the argument.
Earlier studies on ideological congruence mostly rely on public opinion surveys to measure voter ideology, while politicians' ideology is measured by instruments such as roll call votes, expert ...surveys, and legislative texts. One crucial problem with such approaches is that the tools used to measure the elites' ideology are not identical to those used to measure the voters' ideology. The rapid growth of social media use offers a unique opportunity to directly examine the ideological overlap of elites and the electorate on a common platform using a common technique. This study examines over four million Twitter posts by legislative candidates from four major Turkish parties and their supporters between 2012 and 2016. After applying machine-learning algorithms to clean non-political content from the data, we employ Wordfish text scaling technique to extract the policy positions and compare the party positions to those of other parties and to those of their supporters.
Objectives To evaluate the association of fetuin-A polymorphisms with calcium oxalate nephrolithiasis. Fetuin-A is a circulating calcium-regulatory glycoprotein that inhibits extraosseous ...calcification. Methods Fetuin-A c.742C > T and c.766C > G polymorphisms were investigated in 103 patients with calcium oxalate nephrolithiasis and 73 age- and gender-matched healthy volunteers, using polymerase chain reaction-restriction fragment length polymorphism techniques. Additionally, we compared serum fetuin-A levels in the 2 groups. Results A statistically significant difference was observed between the control and patient groups (χ2 test, P = .003) for the genotype of fetuin-A c.766C > G polymorphism. The odds ratio (95% confidence interval) for the CG genotype in those at risk of stone disease was 4.2 (1.73-10.28). The frequency distribution for fetuin-A c.742C > T polymorphism was not statistically different in stone patients and controls ( P = .77). Serum mean fetuin-A concentration was significantly lower in the patients (710.38 ± 156.42 μg/mL) than in the controls (810.89 ± 173.43 μg/mL, P = .0001). In the patient group (but not in the control group), subjects carrying fetuin-A genotype 1 had significantly higher serum fetuin-A concentrations than the group carrying fetuin-A genotype 2-1 ( P = .001). Conclusions These results reveal that the patients with fetuin-A c.766C > G gene polymorphism may be at higher risk for renal calcium oxalate stone formation.
Turkey has arguably one of the most passionate fan bases in the world. Yet, the political silence that permeates through the ranks of the fan bases of Istanbul's 'big' clubs is puzzling as the ...country slowly decays into authoritarianism. What explains this silence and the surprising apolitical disposition of fans? I argue that a multi-layered de-politicization process hangs over Turkish soccer, nested within a web of clientelistic relations that stretches from the state to the clubs and fan groups. The military's heavy-handed approach to suppressing political expressions of all sorts for several years following the 1980 coup helped ensure the de-politicization of soccer stadiums. Likewise, as major beneficiaries of state funds and sponsorships, soccer clubs sought to avoid political trouble and were actively involved in discouraging fan groups from political activism. Empirically, the article focuses primarily on the post-1980 period and the 'big three' of Istanbul, i.e. Fenerbahce, Galatasaray and Besiktas.
