Data standardization Gal, Michal S; Rubinfeld, Daniel L
New York University law review (1950),
10/2019, Letnik:
94, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
With data rapidly becoming the lifeblood of the global economy, the ability to improve its use significantly affects both social and private welfare. Data standardization is key to facilitating and ...improving the use of data when data portability and interoperability are needed. Absent data standardization, a "Tower of Babel" of different databases may be created, limiting synergetic knowledge production. Based on interviews with data scientists, this Article identifies three main technological obstacles to data portability and interoperability: metadata uncertainties, data transfer obstacles, and missing data. It then explains how data standardization can remove at least some of these obstacles and lead to smoother data flows and better machine learning. The Article then identifies and analyzes additional effects of data standardization. As shown, data standardization has the potential to support a competitive and distributed data collection ecosystem and lead to easier policing in cases where rights are infringed or unjustified harms are created by data-fed algorithms. At the same time, increasing the scale and scope of data analysis can create negative externalities in the form of better profiling, increased harms to privacy, and cybersecurity harms. Standardization also has implications for investment and innovation, especially if lock-in to an inefficient standard occurs. The Article then explores whether market-led standardization initiatives can be relied upon to increase welfare, and the role governmental-facilitated data standardization should play, if at all.
The U.S. v. Microsoft case was filed in 1998, the District Court filed its opinion in 2000, and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion came down in 2001. This article explains why the case continues to stand as ...an important Sherman Act, Section 2 monopolization case. Moreover, if restated and reviewed as a two-sided market case in light of Ohio v. Am. Express Co., the outline would be unchanged.
Our courts were not designed to consider the increasingly complex scientific and technical evidence needed to resolve contemporary legal disputes. Moreover, when conflicting evidence requires an ...understanding and interpretation of scientific or technical issues, allowing the parties to control the presentation of evidence places great strain on the judge and jury. This essay describes and evaluates three prototypical procedures that allow courts to appoint scientists and other experts independent of the parties to assist the court: 1) The appointment of an expert to advise the court and the parties regarding a disputed scientific issue by testifying in open court and being cross-examined by the parties; 2) The appointment of a “technical advisor” who assists the judge regarding scientific issues in much the same way that a law clerk assists regarding legal issues; and 3) The appointment of a special master who takes responsibility for the resolution of a portion of the case and prepares a written report for consideration by the court.
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FREE GOODS Gal, Michal S.; Rubinfeld, Daniel L.
Antitrust law journal,
2016, Letnik:
80, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Many valuable goods and services introduced in recent years are provided in the marketplace free of charge.1 Some examples include Linux's operating system, Google's search engine, Facebook's or ...Twitter's social network, Wikipedia's online encyclopedia, YouTube's online video and music streaming services, Dropbox's online storage services, and Typepad's blogging platforms. ...this abundance of free goods has brought to the forefront issues regarding their welfare effects and the appropriate regulatory and enforcement tools.
Utilizing a privateering competitive strategy, firms sponsor the assertion of intellectual property (“IP”) claims by third parties (patent assertion entities and others), with the ultimate objective ...of raising of rival competitors’ costs. This Article tells the privateering story with respect to both desktop and mobile operating systems competition. It begins with Microsoft’s funding of litigation against Linux—a threat to Microsoft’s desktop operating system monopoly—and continues to an analysis of recent competition in the smartphone space. The Article raises potential competitive concerns and related antitrust and IP enforcement issues.
Yet some have recently argued that the overlapping of shareholding at levels well below control makes an anticompetitive outcome more likely because it creates a potential for tacit collusion, and ...is, or should be, a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.3 Antitrust law and policy are suddenly highly relevant for institutional investors because of the interaction of two forces: the increasing size and concentration of institutional investor holdings in concentrated industries that are ripe for cartelization; and the increasing interaction between firms and their shareholders. In Part I, we analyze the antitrust risks posed by our opening hypotheticals. while we have no personal knowledge of any Section 1 violations, we are aware of litigation claiming otherwise.4 Moreover, we believe that the policy issues raised by the two scenarios are sufficiently important that counsel for institutional investors and portfolio companies should view them with concern. in particular, large institutional investors and investor relations professionals should develop serious antitrust compliance programs. in Part ii, we expand our analysis from mainstream antitrust principles to consider the more speculative challenge to institutional investor common ownership raised by the second scenario. in a series of intriguing articles, several finance economists have presented evidence that existing patterns of common ownership are correlated with and may have caused higher prices in the airline industry and in commercial banking.5 As we detail in Part II with respect to the airline industry, we are intrigued but ultimately unconvinced by the analysis of Jose Azar, Martin Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu and related articles, and we are skeptical of their claim that common ownership of airlines stocks has caused a large increase in the price of tickets. ...we fear that, out of an abundance of concern for legal risk, institutional investors will comply with Posner et al's alternative proposal-complete governance passivity-because doing so would take them within Section 7's "solely for investment" exemption. Because we think this would be an unnecessary and unfortunate response to fear of antitrust liability and would undermine the long-term effort to encourage institutional investor in volvement in corporate governance, we propose a quasi "safe harbor" of 15 percent, so long as investors engage only in "normal" corporate governance activities.8 I.THE antitrust analysis of portfolio manager coordination A. The Section 1 Liability Risk Section 1 of the sherman Act outlaws "contracts, combinations . . . or conspiracies in restraint of trade. "9 The "agreement" requirement can be met by direct evidence of agreement among the parties to a conspiracy or by circumstantial evidence.10 An unlawful conspiracy does not require simultaneous action by the conspirators and acceptance by competitors of an invitation to participate in a plan is sufficient.11 The "ringmaster" who organizes competitors into a "hub-and-spoke" conspiracy, and shares in the profits generated, is a stock figure throughout the history of antitrust, and violates Section 1 either by organizing a cartel where there would not otherwise have been coordination or by converting what might have been viewed as lawful parallel conduct (i.e., tacit collusion) into unlawful collusive behavior.12 For example, in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,13 competing hardwood manufacturers exchanged detailed price and production information through a trade association, the American Hardwood Lumber Manufacturers' Association.
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT HOPPING Dickey, Bret; Huang, Kun; Rubinfeld, Daniel L.
Antitrust law journal,
01/2019, Letnik:
82, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
...FDA regulations and state substitution laws substantially influence generic drug approval and generic drug substitution. A product-hopping strategy may work, given complex contracts between ...insurers and PBMs that are not fully transparent about rebates paid to the PBMs and given customers/ employers who are not investing sufficiently in being sophisticated buyers. ...despite the presence of these agents, it is still possible for a product hop to be financially successful for a branded manufacturer even where the social benefits of the new product do not outweigh the higher social costs.37 III. policy solutions An appropriate solution to this complex policy problem would reliably distinguish real innovations from new product introductions that are mere pretext to avoid generic competition. ...courts have done it: the TriCor court embraced a rule of reason analysis,49 and the Namenda court raised the question whether the defendant's switch "makes economic sense in the absence of the benefit derived from eliminating generic competition. ...it would provide a relatively clear standard that innovators could evaluate ex ante when bringing a new product to market.63 There are potentially difficulties with a no-economic-sense standard. we are aware that in United States v. Microsoft the D.C Circuit Court of Appeals advocated a balancing test, rather than a no-economic-sense test.64 The noeconomic-sense test may also be challenging to implement in practice (although less challenging than a full balancing test). we note as well that there can be counterexamples where a party could fail the no-economic-sense test, even though the new product still benefits some customers.
Google has been accused of manipulating its organic search results to favor its own services. We explore possible choices of relevant antitrust markets that might make these various antitrust ...allegations meaningful. We argue that viewing Internet search in isolation ignores the two-sided nature of the search-advertising platform and the feedback effects that link the provision of organic search results to consumers on the one hand, and the sale to businesses of advertising on the other. We conclude that the relevant market in which Google competes with respect to Internet search is at least as broad as a two-sided search-advertising market. We also ask whether Google has a duty to provide organic search results that are neutral with respect to whether the displayed listing is for a Google rather than a non-Google business. We articulate and apply a standard that asks whether various practices related to Google's organic search results would harm competition that would have otherwise occurred.
Rethinking Federalism Inman, Robert P.; Rubinfeld, Daniel L.
The Journal of economic perspectives,
10/1997, Letnik:
11, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The appropriate federal structure of government is now a policy issue of major debate. This paper identifies three approaches and compares their strengths and weaknesses. Economic federalism ...recommends the use of competitive communities for the provision of congestible local goods and a strong central government for the provision of pure public goods and spillovers. Cooperative federalism recommends intercommunity agreements; democratic federalism prefers a majority-rule representative legislature. Efficiency will sometimes conflict with other constitutional objectives--political participation and the protection of rights--and compromises will often be required.
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