This richly textured cultural history of Italian fascism traces the narrative path that accompanied the making of the regime and the construction of Mussolini's power. Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi reads ...fascist myths, rituals, images, and speeches as texts that tell the story of fascism. Linking Mussolini's elaboration of a new ruling style to the shaping of the regime's identity, she finds that in searching for symbolic means and forms that would represent its political novelty, fascism in fact brought itself into being, creating its own power and history.
Falasca-Zamponi argues that an aesthetically founded notion of politics guided fascist power's historical unfolding and determined the fascist regime's violent understanding of social relations, its desensitized and dehumanized claims to creation, its privileging of form over ethical norms, and ultimately its truly totalitarian nature.
In this article, we draw upon Weber’s concept of charismatic authority to unpack the appeal that YouTube video bloggers have galvanized among their fan communities. We explore how followers interact ...to articulate the appeal of British YouTube personalities and consequently, how they contribute to the nature of these ‘new cults of personality’. By observing the content of seven of Britain’s most popular ‘YouTubers’ and engaging in a sustained non-participant netnography of responses to these videos, we argue new cults of personality differ from their traditional counterparts through collaborative, co-constructive and communal interdependence between culted figure and follower. While Weber maintained charismatic authority has its source in the innate and exceptional qualities of an individual’s personality, we submit that in consumer culture’s current era of consent, the ‘culting’ of social actors becomes a participatory venture. We shed light on the fading and routinization of charisma and the dissipation of the relationship between the culted figure and followers.
In the wake of the recent publications on the centrality of culture in the Fascist totalitarian project, this issue examines Mussolini’s relationship to the arts and vice versa more specifically, ...probing the aesthetic and political aspects of representations (in literature, the performing and figurative arts, and radio) of the “duce” – both in Italy and in their circulation abroad.
The article presents the evolution of the ideological complex of chiefdom in the ideology of the Bolshevik Party and the reflection of this idea in political posters, drawings, paintings dedicated to ...the leaders. The images were studied mainly by I.V. Stalin without connection with the evolution of the ideology of the Bolsheviks. The chronological framework of their works was limited to the years 1930-1950. The chronological framework of this study covers the period from 1917 to the early 1950s. The article examines the prerequisites for the emergence of the cult of the leader in the public consciousness after the February Revolution and in the ideology of the Bolshevik Party. In this ideology, the complex of leadership emerged gradually. At the beginning of his revolutionary activity, Lenin justified the need for leaders for the party. After coming to power in the country, Lenin characterized their role as dictators in the management of the economy. In the 1930s, Stalin came to the conclusion that in Russia the need for a leader lies in the traditional views of the Russian people. This idea was political realism and at the same time a departure from Lenin’s class position. During his lifetime and soon after Lenin’s death, artists presented his image in a friendly and humorous spirit. Later, his image in the visual arts is canonized, the cult of Lenin develops. Images of Stalin have undergone an even greater evolution. In the 1930s, the ideological complex of his cult was formed in literature and embodied in a number of works of fine art. The evolution of the image of the leader in the visual arts in the 1930s and 1940s followed the same path as the entire party-state ideology — from radical concepts and ideas to the revival of traditional ideas and images for Russia.
We offer a novel rational explanation for cults of personality. Participation in a cult of personality is psychologically costly whenever it involves preference falsification, with the costs varying ...across individuals. We highlight two characteristics associated with lower individual costs of preference falsification: (i) loyalty to the regime and (ii) unscrupulousness. Different characteristics might serve the regime better in different roles. Using a simple formal screening model, we demonstrate that one’s participation in a cult of personality improves the dictator’s personnel decisions under a wide variety of circumstances. Decisions are most improved when subordinates’ characteristics that better enable cult participation are correspondingly valued by dictators. Dictators who can manipulate the costs that cult participants pay find it easiest to ensure that correspondence. Our model also highlights the importance to dictators of not believing their own propaganda, and their need to offer increasingly extreme acts of cult participation as old acts become normalized.
In the Munich of the interwar period, many personalities from the political, industrial, intellectual and social spheres were looking towards Fascist Italy and its “Duce”. In the early 1920s, with ...the founding of the NSDAP in Munich and the spread of Nazi ideas, the Bavarian elite developed a strong political interest in the Fascist experience taking place on the other side of the border, since its leader, Benito Mussolini, had risen to power. Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933 and the birth of a German “Führer”, however, marked a turning point in the interest that the Bavarian elites had – and were allowed to have – in the “Duce” and his fascism. At a time when two Providential men were rising in Europe, how did the cults of these two leaders co-exist? Was it even possible for a German citizen to promote Italian fascism in Germany or to praise another “Duce”? Munich thus presents itself as a privileged observatory of the complex relationship that tied those Bavarian elites interested in Italy to the two leaders of nationalism in Europe. Through two case studies, that of the “salon” hostess Elsa Bruckmann and that of the director of the NSDAP press office in Munich, Adolf Dresler, both great admirers of Hitler and Mussolini, we would like to examine two different relationships and two different ways of making these cults of personality coexist, in a double totalitarian context.
Dans le Munich de l’entre-deux-guerres, nombreuses sont les personnalités de la vie politique, industrielle, intellectuelle ou mondaine qui regardent en direction de l’Italie fasciste et de son « Duce ». Au début des années 1920, avec la fondation du NSDAP et la propagation des idées nazies dans la ville, l’élite bavaroise développe un intérêt politique fort pour l’expérience fasciste qui se déroule de l’autre côté de la frontière, depuis que son leader, Benito Mussolini, a accédé au pouvoir. L’arrivée d’Hitler à la tête du pays en 1933, et l’avènement d’un « Führer » allemand, marque cependant un tournant dans l’intérêt que nourrissent – et sont autorisées à nourrir – les élites italianisantes à l’égard du « Duce » et de son fascisme. À un moment où deux hommes de la Providence émergent en Europe, comment les cultes de ces deux leaders coexistent-ils ? Est-ce seulement possible pour un citoyen allemand de promouvoir le fascisme italien en Allemagne ou de faire l’éloge d’un autre « Duce » ? Munich se présente ainsi comme un observatoire privilégié des relations complexes qu’entretiennent les élites italianisantes munichoises avec les deux leaders du nationalisme en Europe. À travers deux études de cas, celui de la salonnière Elsa Bruckmann et celui d’Adolf Dresler, directeur du bureau de presse du NSDAP à Munich, tous deux grands admirateurs d’Hitler et de Mussolini, ce sont deux rapports et deux manières différentes de faire coexister ces cultes de la personnalité, dans un double contexte totalitaire, que l’on souhaite examiner.
Nella Monaco del periodo interbellico, molte personalità del mondo politico, industriale, intellettuale e sociale guardano all'Italia fascista e al suo “Duce”. All’inizio degli anni Venti, con la fondazione del NSDAP e la diffusione delle idee naziste nella città, l’élite bavarese sviluppa un forte interesse politico per l’esperienza fascista che si svolge al di là del confine, da quando il suo leader, Benito Mussolini, è salito al potere. L’arrivo di Hitler alla guida del Paese nel 1933 e l'avvento di un “Führer” tedesco, tuttavia, segnano una svolta nell'interesse che le élite italiane nutrono – e sono autorizzate a nutrire – nei confronti del “Duce” e del suo fascismo. In un momento in cui emergono in Europa due uomini della Provvidenza, come coesistono i culti dei due leader? È soltanto possibile per un cittadino tedesco promuovere il fascismo italiano in Germania o elogiare un altro “Duce”? Monaco si presenta così come un osservatorio privilegiato dei rapporti complessi che legano le élite italianizzanti di Monaco con i due leader del nazionalismo europeo. Attraverso due casi di studio, quello della salottiera Elsa Bruckmann e quello del direttore dell’ufficio stampa della NSDAP di Monaco, Adolf Dresler, entrambi grandi ammiratori di Hitler e di Mussolini, si vogliono esaminare due relazioni e due maniere diverse di far coesistere questi culti della personalità, in un doppio contesto totalitario.
•The importance of Turkey’s survival as a secular and functioning democracy for the international system is evident.•This study examines how Turkey uses social media as a tool for public diplomacy ...and how it leverages its soft-power efforts.•Abolishing the boundaries between the creators and users, social media help create a new type of cult of personality in public diplomacy.•Based on an analysis of Twitter posts, the findings indicate the emergence of a “new” cult of personality in public diplomacy.•The study highlights the instrumental role of social media in changing the leader-follower relationships and points out the dark side of social media.
This study examined how Turkey uses social media as a tool for public diplomacy and how the state’s soft-power efforts have recently changed on the global stage. The researchers constructed a dataset of 2769 Twitter posts by the Turkish government’s most influential public diplomacy accounts. The analyses revealed that the focus of Turkey’s Twitter public diplomacy has become concentrated on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and is thematically focused on the political values embodied by the Turkish president. The findings suggest that public diplomacy remains to be the diplomacy of the government, not of the public, and social media is used as just another tool for propaganda, not as a means of engagement with foreign publics. Further, the findings indicate the emergence of a “new” cult of personality in public diplomacy and point out the instrumental role of social media in changing the dynamics of leader-follower relationship. The study contributes to public relations theory and practice by advancing the burgeoning public diplomacy scholarship at the intersection of social media and relational approaches.
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