The Empirical and the New Empiricisms St Pierre, Elizabeth A
Cultural studies, critical methodologies,
04/2016, Letnik:
16, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
The premise of this article is that social science researchers often rush to application, to empirical method and methodology, before studying the history, philosophy, and politics of various ...empiricisms. Because there are incompatibilities between the empiricisms of different systems of thought, it is dangerous to attempt new empirical work without having studied the old empiricisms, lest those incompatibilities produce weak, fundamentally flawed scholarship. To help prevent such confusions, this article briefly describes two empiricisms commonly used in social science research—logical empiricism and the empiricism of phenomenology—as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s transcendental empiricism, which is being used in much new empirical inquiry.
New Empiricisms and New Materialisms St. Pierre, Elizabeth A.; Jackson, Alecia Y.; Mazzei, Lisa A.
Cultural studies, critical methodologies,
04/2016, Letnik:
16, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This article, which introduces this special issue on new empiricisms and new materialisms, focuses on two of the many conditions that enable this new work: first, an ethical imperative to rethink the ...nature of being to refuse the devastating dividing practices of the dogmatic Cartesian image of thought and, second, a heightened curiosity and accompanying experimentation in the becoming of existence. The article includes a brief description of how matter matters differently in this new work, of Deleuze and Guattari’s description of philosophy as the laying out of a plane that enables new concepts, a discussion of the “new,” and how/if methodology can be thought in the “new.”
VII—Can Arguments Change Minds? Dutilh Novaes, Catarina
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
07/2023, Letnik:
123, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Abstract
Can arguments change minds? Philosophers like to think that they can. However, a wealth of empirical evidence suggests that arguments are not very efficient tools to change minds. What to ...make of the different assessments of the mind-changing potential of arguments? To address this issue, we must take into account the broader contexts in which arguments occur, in particular the propagation of messages across networks of attention, and the choices that epistemic agents must make between alternative potential sources of content and information, which are very much influenced by perceptions of reliability and trustworthiness. Arguments can change minds, but only under conducive, favourable socio-epistemic conditions.
Because post qualitative inquiry uses an ontology of immanence from poststructuralism as well as transcendental empiricism, it cannot be a social science research methodology with preexisting ...research methods and research practices a researcher can apply. In fact, it is methodology-free and so refuses the demands of “application.” Recommendations for those interested in post qualitative inquiry include putting methodology aside and, instead, reading widely across philosophy, social theories, and the history of science and social science to find concepts that reorient thinking. Post qualitative inquiry encourages concrete, practical experimentation and the creation of the not yet instead of the repetition of what is.
A core philosophical project is the attempt to uncover the fundamental nature of reality, the limited set of facts upon which all other facts depend. Perhaps the most popular theory of fundamental ...reality in contemporary analytic philosophy is physicalism: the view that the world is fundamentally physical in nature. The first half of this book argues that physicalist views cannot account for the evident reality of conscious experience and hence that physicalism cannot be true. However, the book also tries to show that familiar arguments to this conclusion—Frank Jackson’s form of the knowledge argument and David Chalmers’ two-dimensional conceivability argument—are not wholly adequate. The second half of the book explores and defends a radical alternative to physicalism known as “Russellian monism.” Russellian monists believe that (i) physics tells us nothing about the concrete, categorical nature of material entities, and that (ii) it is this “hidden” nature of matter that explains human and animal consciousness. Throughout the second half of the book various forms of Russellian monism are surveyed, and the key challenges facing it are discussed. Ultimately the book defends a cosmopsychist form of Russellian monism, according to which all facts are grounded in facts about the conscious universe.
Cognition, it is often heard nowadays, is embodied. My concern is with embodied accounts of language comprehension. First, the basic idea will be outlined and some of the evidence that has been put ...forward in their favor will be examined. Second, their empiricist heritage and their conception of ideas will be discussed. Third, an objection will be raised according to which embodied accounts underestimate the cognitive functions language fulfills. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing for the cognitive indispensability of non‐embodied, representations by highlighting some of the cognitive benefits they bestow upon us.
We outline a research methodology developed around two basic elements: the active discovery and/or creation of mysteries and the subsequent solving of the mysteries. A key element is the reflexive ...opening up of established theory and vocabulary through a systematic search for deviations from what would be expected, given established wisdom, in empirical contexts. "Data" are seen as an inspiration for critical dialogues between theoretical frameworks and empirical work.
Los objetivos de este trabajo son dos. En la primera parte argumento en contra de la interpretación ortodoxa acerca del análisis emotivista desarrollado por A. J. Ayer. Según esta interpretación, en ...Lenguaje, Verdad y Lógica Ayer presentó el emotivismo basándose en su empirismo radical (positivismo). Sostengo que esto no es así. En consecuencia, en la segunda parte desarrollo una nueva interpretación del emotivismo según la cual el análisis del vocabulario moral presentado por Ayer no depende de sus tesis positivistas. El propósito del presente texto es contribuir a la historia de la metaética al ofrecer una correcta interpretación del emotivismo de Ayer.
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