Davidson has famously argued that conceptual relativism, which, for him, is based on the content-scheme dualism, or the “third dogma” of empiricism, is either unintelligible or philosophically ...uninteresting and has accused Quine of holding onto such a dogma. For Davidson, there can be found no intelligible ground for the claim that there may exist untranslatable languages: all languages, if they are languages, are in principle inter-translatable and uttered sentences, if identifiable as utterances, are interpretable. Davidson has also endorsed the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. The early Quine, as well as the later Quine, believe that the indeterminacy of translation casts serious doubt on the existence of facts of the matter about correct translation between languages. In this paper, I will argue that Quine cannot be the target of Davidson’s argument against conceptual relativism, and that Davidson’s argument is in conflict, among others, with his endorsement of the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. I will show how this conflict results in a radical departure from Quine with respect to the matter of factualism about fine-grained meanings.
In this paper, we analyse the five steps of the evidence-based practice (EBP) model and argue that this model has serious limitations, both theoretical and practical. We argue that the relationship ...between evidence and practice cannot be that of supplying a basis, at least not if that notion is understood in any strict logical or methodological sense. Other factors have to be taken account of in addition to evidence and their relation to the evidence has to be explained. Following others, we advocate a more comprehensive view of practice as informed by evidence and theory. Evidence-informed practice (EIP) should be understood as excluding non-scientific prejudices and superstitions, but also as leaving ample room for clinical experience as well as the constructive and imaginative judgements of practitioners and clients who are in constant interaction and dialogue with one another. Under the EIP model, there is no need for the five-steps procedure of the EBP model, but only that practitioners will become knowledgeable of a wide rang of sources—empirical studies, case studies and clinical insights—and use them in creative ways throughout the intervention process.
My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that a cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent ...guidance of action, b these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, c the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests that d the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes.
Toplumsal hayatın idamesi temel olarak toplumsal değerlere dayanır. Ancak bu değerlerin tezahürü de yine toplum içinde gerçekleşir. Buna göre toplumsal bir varlık olarak insanoğlunun kendisini ...gerçekleşmesi toplum içinde mümkün olup toplum dışı insan, felsefî anlamda “insan” değildir. Ancak toplumsal ilişkiler ağında kendisini gösteren insanî durumla, yaratılış gayesine ilişkin ahlakî değerler billurlaşır ve bir toplumsal paradigma inşası mümkün olur. Ne var ki, insanın kendisini bulduğu toplum da nihayetinde yabancısı olduğu bir “dış dünya” ile çevrilidir. Bu nedenle insanın kendisini gerçekleştirme sürecine bir yandan da içinde yaşadığı varlık âlemini tanıma süreci eşlik eder. Buna göre tarihin hangi döneminde olursa olsun insanoğlunun ideal toplum arayışına bir yandan da içinde yaşadığı varlık alemine ilişkin bir “kanaat” eşlik ettiği; “kümülatif” olan bu bilgiyle varlığın “indirgeme” bir simülasyonunun çıkarıldığı (kozmoloji) görülür. Aslında fizik bilimin konusu olan nedensellik de bu dolayımda felsefenin konusu haline gelir. Anlaşılacağı üzere burada önemli bir sorun, toplumsal paradigmanın özünü oluşturan sabit değerler (koşulsuz buyruklar) bu değerlerin tezahüründe kültürel olarak etkili olan değişken dış dünya bilgisi arasında oluşan bağıntıdır. Binaenaleyh, toplumsal düzende kurallar belirlenirken maddî dünyanın mutlak bilgisine sahipmişçesine değil, değerler esasınca hareket edilmelidir. Evrenin ister “yedi kat göklerden” oluştuğuna, “dünya merkezli” olduğuna inanalım, isterse Güneş merkezli; adalet, eşitlik, özgürlük gibi varoluşsal değerler her zaman ve zeminde esastır. Ancak tarih göstermektedir ki, gerçekte bu değerler dizgesi ile sorunlu olanlar, değerler yerine doğa bilgisi üzerinden itirazlar geliştirmişlerdir. Bu nedenle Orta Çağ Avrupa’sının sınıflı toplum düzeninde siyasi paradigmanın temelini oluşturan dünya merkezli evren algısı egemen sınıflar tarafından şiddetle sürdürülmek istenmiştir. Nihayetinde bu evren modeli çökmüşse de aynı siyasi nedenlerle insan hayatına ilişkin ahlaki çözümlemeler bundan sonra da sabote edilmeye devam etmiş, dezenformasyon başlamıştır. Böylece bilimsel çalışmalara ve hakikat arayışına (felsefe), “felsefe süsü” verilmiş bitmek bilmeyen polemikler eşlik etmiştir. Aslında bu durum ister Doğu’da olsun isterse Batı’da, tarihte sürekli kendisini tekrarlayan iki karşıt tavrın yansımasıdır: Paradigmacı tavır (paradigmism), enigmacı tavır (enigmatism). Bu iki tavrın iz düşümü olarak İslam dünyasında Batı modernleşmesini anlamaya dönük ilgiyi bile kategorik olarak sapkınlıkla suçlayan hâkim söylem yeri geldiğinde kaba bir pragmatizmle teyit edildiğini düşündüğü Batılı referanslara başvurmaktan da geri durmamıştır. Böylece Newton fiziği görmezden gelinir, ama kaba bir indirgemeyle klasik metinlerde örtüşme görülerek Aristo fiziğinden, direkt kuantum fiziğine atlanmaya çalışılır. Ne var ki doğa ile ilişkinin polemikten öte maddi sonuçları vardır. Bu sonuçların alınabilmesi, dahası insanın yaratılış gayesine ilişkin İslam’ın değerler dizgesinin modern çağda karşılık bulabilmesi için evrenin güncel bilgisine (modern kozmoloji) geçiş, Batı tecrübesi paranteze alınmadan felsefî ve tarihsel temellerinden görmeyi gerektirir.
This paper reviews Deleuze's theory of language in Logic of Sense, and Deleuze and Guattari's theory of language in A Thousand Plateaus. In the ontology informed by the Stoics described in those ...books, human being and language do not exist separately but in a mixture of words and things. The author argues that this flattened ontology of surfaces is incommensurable with the ontology of depth used in conventional humanist qualitative methodology and recommends beginning new empirical inquiry with a concept instead of with method and methodology.
Artiklen analyserer læringskulturs betydning for rekruttering og fastholdelse i sundhedsprofessionelt arbejde. Centrale normative betydninger knyttet til læringskultur erfares af ...sundhedsprofessionelle som handlingsbydende og derigennem som vigtige for rekruttering og fastholdelse. Udgangspunktet er en kulturteoretisk forståelse af læring, kvalitativ empiri og en fænomenologisk-hermeneutisk fortolkningstilgang. Fire tæt knyttede normative betydninger fremtræder som afgørende aspekter af læringskultur i sundhedsprofessionelt arbejde med relevans for rekruttering og fastholdelse: agens-fornemmelse, fagligt fællesskab, psykologisk sikkerhed og fejlbarlighedskultur. I lyset af de pressede vilkår for det sundhedsprofessionelle arbejde viser artiklen desuden nogle kerneudfordringer for realiseringen af disse betydninger.
What is the myth of the given? O’Shea, James R.
Synthese (Dordrecht),
12/2021, Letnik:
199, Številka:
3-4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The idea of ‘the given’ and its alleged problematic status as most famously articulated by Sellars (1956, 1981) continues to be at the center of heated controversies about foundationalism in ...epistemology, about ‘conceptualism’ and nonconceptual content in the philosophy of perception, and about the nature of the experiential given in phenomenology and in the cognitive sciences. I argue that the question of just what the myth of the given is supposed to be in the first place is more complex than has typically been supposed in these debates, and that clarification of this prior question has surprising consequences. Foundationalism was only one of Sellars’s targets, and this not only in the familiar sense that the more fundamental issues at stake concern the very ‘objective purport’ or intentionality of our empirical thinking in general. When pushed further still, Sellars’s critique in fact hinged on his diagnoses of implicit framework-relative or ‘categorial’ metaphysical presuppositions he exposes in givenist views. Furthermore, the key to his critique accordingly turns out to rest on implicit assumptions concerning the in principle revisability or replaceability of any such presuppositions, whether ‘innate’ or acquired, and including Sellars’s own. Another key result is that widespread assumptions that Sellars’s famous critique is simply inapplicable or irrelevant to either ‘thin’ nonconceptualist views of the given (such as C. I. Lewis’s), since they are ‘non-epistemic’; or alternatively, irrelevant to ‘thick’ conceptualist and phenomenological analyses (since they, too, reject ‘sense-data’ or the ‘bare given’)–both turn out to be mistaken.
New technologies of algorithmisation, data mining, and artificial intelligence appear to elicit contentious impacts on the public sphere. Evaluations of these effects frequently diverge. A noticeable ...schism exists between critical/normative perspective, which highlights the problematic aspects of data exploitation, surveillance, and imperialism, and market-oriented empirical approaches. Drawing on a conceptual-historical argumentation that links current developments to a longer tradition of social communication research rooted in Enlightenment philosophy, the article highlights the contrast between the normative conceptualisations of publicness and public use of reason on the one hand, and empirical approaches aimed at measuring and managing the public(s) and public opinion on the other. The article first identifies the role of the opposition between Humean empiricism, which is based on the principle of conformity to past habits, and Kantian pure law of publicity, which is systematically opposed to such empiricism on many different layers. This opposition is also rooted in the Enlightenment foundational divide between religious and civil communities. It seems that today, with the predominance of data-driven approaches in adapting opinion to past expectations and beliefs, we are paradoxically again returning to the principles similar to those of functioning of pre-modern (religion- and tradition-based) communities.
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