The article seeks to deploy a series of conceptual tools to conceive the subject of education in general and in Physical Education in particular, its mode of constitution and a way to investigate it ...from an epistemological perspective that places its origin in the language. To this end, I propose a series of theoretical links between the concepts of subject, practices, language, knowledge and truth effects; since they are key to a number of approaches, methods and tools that shape certain epistemological and methodological decisions that allow thinking the subject as a research object.
III—The Epistemic Role of Intentions Roessler, Johannes
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
April 2013, Letnik:
113, Številka:
1pt1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
According to David Velleman, it is part of the ‘commonsense psychology’ of intentional agency that an agent can know what she will do without relying on evidence, in virtue of intending to do it. My ...question is how this claim is to be interpreted and defended. I argue that the answer turns on the commonsense conception of calculative practical reasoning, and the link between such reasoning and warranted claims to knowledge. I also consider the implications of this argument for Velleman's project of vindicating the commonsense view by showing it to be consistent with an ‘evidentialist’ epistemology.
This book develops a novel account of the connections between justification, understanding, and knowledge. It lays the foundation for a more systematic and interconnected treatment of these central ...notions in epistemology. The author’s key move is to show first that a specific conception of doxastic justification constitutes our best point of entry into questions pertaining to a subject’s ability to secure understanding of reality. Second, that the traditional order of analysis when it comes to the connection between understanding and knowledge should be reversed: knowledge itself is best conceived of in terms of a specific type of understanding. Rational Understanding will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of science. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Knowing full well Sosa, Ernest
2011., 20101213, 2010, 2011, 2011-01-01, 20110101, Letnik:
3
eBook
In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views ...on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. Sosa develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and theMenoproblem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance-theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.
This article is an analytical report on the 20-year trajectory of the 'medical rationale' category that emerged in the early 1990s in the area of Social and Human Sciences in Health in the field of ...Public Health. Its objective was to study complex and therapeutic medical systems and traditional, complementary and alternative medicines. Based on a critical review of the literature, it presents some aspects of the cultural, political, institutional and social context of its emergence, as well as its main contributions and developments on a theoretical level and on social policies and practices in health. The southern epistemology concept of Boaventura de Sousa Santos is used to reflect upon the contribution of the 'medical rationale' category to the critique of the post-modern scientific rationale and to the creation of a new epistemology in health.
Science and religion are influential social forces, and their interplay has been subject to many public and scholarly debates. The present article addresses how people mentally conceptualize the ...relationship between science and religion and how these conceptualizations can be systematized. To that end, we provide a comprehensive, integrative review of the pertinent literature. Moreover, we discuss how cognitive (in particular, epistemic beliefs) and motivational factors (in particular, epistemic needs, identity, and moral beliefs), as well as personality and contextual factors (e.g., rearing practices and cross-cultural exposure), are related to these mental conceptualizations. And finally, we provide a flowchart detailing the psychological processes leading to these mental conceptualizations. A comprehensive understanding of how individuals perceive the science–religion relationship is interesting in and of itself and practically relevant for managing societal challenges, such as science denial. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)
Social sciences have long lingered on the legitimacy of visual search techniques about the production of knowledge. This happens in an academic context where writing has historically a clear ...supremacy as medium for communication and dissemination of scientific thought. This paper proposes some points for reflection regarding the current debate on the epistemological and methodological view, with particular reference to the cultural and reflexive dimension. After a discussion of some elements of contemporary visual culture and about the dimension of participation, it will be introduced a further element of reflection about the reception of the visual product and the technical possibility of incorporation of multimedia visual content in the press works.
This article aims to show that our acceptance or nonacceptance of certain facts is influenced by our adoption of a philosophical world-picture as a kind of background knowledge on the basis of which ...one decides what does or does not exist, and what is true or false. For this purpose, I discuss the positions of the existential omists. To begin with, it is demonstrated that philosophical facts are accepted on the basis of a world-picture that is itself a tangle of facts, values, and theories exhibiting varying degrees of generality. Whether we embrace them or not is thus not determined by any sort of direct experience. ere are no neutral philosophical facts. Our world-picture suggests what sort of facts we are prepared to accept, and what methods we use to explain them. It is on precisely this that the heuristic role played by world-pictures in “creating” philosophical facts depends.
The KK thesis says that if S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P. Though controversial, it seems able to explain some otherwise puzzling data. For many, this is a strong consideration in ...its favor. In this essay, I will propose a different explanation of the data. My explanation is built around the following norm: one should assert that P only if one believes that one knows that P. Since this norm is more plausible than KK, the explanation I propose undermines the explanatory power of KK and so weakens the case for KK.
Thought experiments play a prominent role in philosophical inquiry. And yet we lack a good understanding of how they work and how they are supposed to supply evidence or knowledge in inquiry. This ...dissertation offers a novel account of the epistemology of philosophical thought experiments, namely, the reason-responsiveness view. The view is inspired by a virtue ethical tradition that flowers in John McDowell (1994) and Miranda Fricker (2007). Drawing on this virtue ethical tradition, I argue that knowing in philosophical thought experiments is achieved through the exercise of the virtue of sensibility, which has three distinct features. First, it is social in origin, acquired through our training in a human language and as ordinary members of a community. Second, it is recognitional in the sense that although our sensibility gives us the ability to classify situations, whether real or hypothetical and to resonate with rational considerations for or against a given classificational judgement (i.e., the judgements we form in thought experiments), it does not equip us with a reflective ability to fully articulate those reasons in an infallible way. And third, it allows us to project across various contexts, both in real and in hypothetical situations. And this ability to project, I argue further, does not come from the ability of people to grasp concepts or to have certain mental episodes or phenomenology or to grasp universals or to have mastery of the application conditions of rules or from belonging to some exclusive club or from enjoying a certain superior access to concepts or access to philosophically interesting phenomena not available to ordinary people. On the contrary, that we do comes down to "our sharing routes of interest and feeling, mode of response, senses of humour and of significance, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation-all the while of organism Wittgenstein calls "forms of life" (Cavell, 1969, p.52). The account is then used to shore up the claim of epistemological continuity, which asserts that the epistemology of thought experiments is an extension of social cognition or social epistemology (Cappelen, 2012; Deutsch, 2015; Williamson 2007), and to offer a claim of epistemological-continuity-style defence of philosophical thought experiments against two major objections in the literature, namely, the negative experimentalist challenge (see Machery, 2017) and the ordinary language challenge (Baz, 2016, 2017).
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