The following work is aimed at portraying the problem of freedom and necessity in Nietzsche’s philosophy with regard to the influence of German pantheistic mysticism tradition and German idealism on ...the philosophy of the German thinker. The historical-analytical method, the comparative analysis method, and the hermeneutical method were used in order to write the following paper.
Through a reading of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History, the following article proposes an analysis of the cleavage between historical and un-historical nations, that is, of the opposition ...between civilization and barbarism. If the development of history represents the progress of the selfconsciousness through its different manifestations, Hegel identifies a radical alterity that remains excluded from such a rational path. By locating its paradigmatic expression in the “African character”, Hegel identifies barbarism as the pathological deviation of spiritual activity that prevents any ethical objectification, any stable political, religious or cultural institution. The inferiorization of the barbarian, however, does not lead to its animalization. Rather it designates a specifically human subjectivity, which, on a given geographical situation, is incapable of developing its freedom in a historical course. Without questioning the universality of the humankind – that is, without subscribing to any naturalistic fatalism – Hegel structures a hierarchy of spiritual existences, that reveals itself as essential for the eurocentric construction of world history.
Considering J. G. Fichte’s texts from his period in Jena, I discuss the insertion of the second person in the transcendental structure of judgement and its relations to the embodiment of the self. ...Recognition of the other and embodiment are not a result of experience, but a priori elements without which experience is not possible. For this purpose, I address the following points: (1) freedom and objective experience are interdependent concepts; (2) the theory of the ‘thetic’ judgement, exposed in the Grundlage of 1794/95, is the demonstration of the previous point; (3) in order to reflect and to be self-conscious, the I must posit a passive element for itself and in itself; (4) the passivity required by the reflective determination of the I, named ‘determinability’, is the I’s body; (5) the I is thus always a body, where its will expresses itself immediately; (6) the determinability has also the form of a plural ‘spiritual’ world of recognition; (7) Fichte’s theory of self-consciousness connects systematically the theories of judgement, human freedom, objective experience, embodiment and intersubjectivity. As a conclusion, I argue that Fichte’s theory of intersubjective recognition has not only a normative, but also a metaphysical or ontological scope.
This paper suggests the hypothesis that a new reading of Fichte’s theory of recognition can enrich the contemporary debate on the subject, since it makes possible to link the question of recognition ...to the construction and maintenance of a community. We propose that this link would enlarge the juridicalpolitical field of the contemporary discussion so as to include in it a symbolic-cultural dimension of recognition.
self-referentiality; transcendental; I; knowledge; certainty;In this paper, guided by the considerations related to certain aspects of the self-referential nature of the basic principles of knowledge ...that we find in Fichte’s and Kant’s transcendental conception, we’ll try to demonstrate that the problem of self-referentiality can be used as a good starting point for more thorough consideration of the transcendental position in general, but also as a region where the critique of certain, self-evident, starting points of traditional, pre-Kantian, philosophies can be carried out differently and more efficiently. Contrary to philosophical conceptions characterized by substantialism, which - whether that they are starting from empiristic whether rationalistic philosophical backgrounds - presupposed a common ontological source in which, with greater or lesser certainty, answers to most philosophical questions were supposed to be found, transcendentalists argued that the basic principles of knowledge could be expressed as principles only in the case when their substantial or referential point had unquestionably been demonstrated as essentially their, autonomous and inseparable, feature and when the givenness of the object of knowledge had been demonstrated as their constitutive/constructive result. Following this path, we’ll deal with the problem of the apophatic nature of self-referentiality and the problem of the practical character of transcendental principles of knowledge, which is essentially connected with it, but also with the question of justification of epistemological advantage of self-referential principles. We’ll try to resolve the latest question by evoking a few basic motives that could be found in the Kantian critique of Hume’s psychologism.
The present article considers Heidegger's thinking about the concept of "system" in Schelling's treatise on Freedom (1809). Heidegger's thoughtful reference to Schelling's treatise is research on the ...principle of system formation and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question about the essence of being. In his interpretation, the necessity of establishing freedom in the system, is raised in the framework of this basic principle of idealism, which is necessary for the establishment of a system, the search for the shaping principle of being, and the research on how it is possible to have a connection in the ground of being. Therefore, the guiding questions of this article are, why does the system become the main point of controversy and the most necessary demand in German idealism? And according to Heidegger's interpretation, to what extent was Schelling successful in establishing a system compatible with freedom?
I propose a new fundamental principle in ethics: everyone who makes a choice has to avoid unwanted arbitrariness as much as possible. Unwanted arbitrariness is defined as making a choice without ...following a rule, whereby the consequences of that choice cannot be consistently wanted by at least one person. Other formulations of this anti-arbitrariness principle are given and compared with very similar contractualist principles formulated by Kant, Rawls, Scanlon and Parfit. The structure of arbitrariness allows us to find ways to avoid unwanted arbitrariness. The two most important implications of the anti-arbitrariness principle are discussed: non-dictatorship and non-discrimination.
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