In 2008 Iceland experienced the deepest and fastest economic crisis ever recorded in peacetime, which included the total collapse of its financial sector, as well as significant erosion of its ...currency. This paper concerns a localized protest movement that occurred in the wake of the 2008 crash in Iceland: the mobilization of protest to a settlement deal, known as the Icesave settlement. We interviewed just over 30 actors involved in the mobilization, including politicians, activists, and academics. Our data show that both sides of the Icesave dispute drew on a set of three interwoven narratives, or framings of the debate, that respectively drew on ideas around natural justice, citizenship, and nationalism. Several key discursive intersections between these narratives and the political and economic landscape in the post-economic crisis not only rendered the Icesave dispute salient and commensurate with the experiences of Icelanders living through the crash, but also gave greater credibility to the no-Icesave campaign. We conclude by arguing that the Icesave dispute provides a unique lens onto central questions concerning democracy and the possibilities of meaningful citizen engagement and participation in an era of increasing globalization and of neo-liberal forms of economic governance. Our findings contribute to this literature by revealing some of the particularities of the Icelandic context that were important in creating the socio-historical moment that led to the success of the anti-Icesave movement.
The paper claims that crisis is a fruitful way to analyse the interrelationship of local and global, neoliberalism and the nation-state, which scholars have explored for the past few years. During ...the Icelandic financial crash of 2008, the failed Internet bank Icesave became a source of intense disputes between the British and Icelandic governments. My paper uses Icelandic discussions of the bankrupt bank to explore how individuals negotiate their imagination of the global and the national and how national identity can be reaffirmed in the context of crisis. The discussion shows that the Icesave debate is based on reification of national communities as well as critical reflection on increased power of transnational institutions and global elites. The paper, furthermore, emphasises how crisis itself can be seen as constituting a field within which to exercise power, as well as a prism to investigate and understand national identities in a globalised world.
The Icelandic internet bank Icesave went bankrupt in late 2008. The insufficient Icelandic deposit guarantee scheme (Tryggingasjó?? did not resist the Icelandic financial meltdown and failed to ...compensate British and Dutch depositors the guaranteed sum of EUR 20,887 as settled in Directive 94/19/EC, which according to the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) regulates the Icelandic financial sector. The British and Dutch deposit schemes paid out guarantees to their national Icesave depositors on behalf of the Icelandic scheme. Subsequently, an agreement was reached between Iceland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. As part of the arrangement, the Icelandic government guaranteed the reimbursement of the British and Dutch bridging loan. The Icelandic referendum of 6 February 2010 rejected the agreement and the Icesave Act, which torpedoed the Icesave reimbursement plan. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) issued a formal reprimand to Iceland. However, this has not been followed by any infringement proceedings as provided for by the EEA agreement. My position is that the ESA position results from a confusion of regulatory commitments with pecuniary liabilities. The key point is whether the Icelandic guarantee is in accordance with EU Directive 94/19/EC. The Directive requires the legislator to act. It is not a directive to force the government to pay (see Directive 94/19/EC Article 3.1.) This provision contributes to the implementation of the ban on Member States against guarantee schemes that distort competition. The schemes are self-financing and fully paid by the financial institutions. In the case of insufficient coverage, all depositors are subject to an equal pro rata reduction in compensation, as the scheme guarantee of full payment of the deposit guarantee sum of EUR 20,887 is an objective to be reached within a reasonable time and not a legal right from day one. Government aid to top up the fund is prohibited, whether it is the intention or consequence. The Icelandic government cannot cover the scheme's insufficiency by granting money to the fund. As the EU enjoys exclusive autonomy over its external relations, Member States cannot bilaterally arrange for such a solution. Thus, depositors not fully reimbursed are stuck with Icelandic bankruptcy proceedings. Claims are considered by the administrators in accordance with the Icelandic Bankruptcy Act on outstanding debts not paid out by the deposit guarantee scheme.
Abstract
After the financial collapse, the Icelandic Parliament set up a Special Investigation Commission to explain the causes of the events. A working group on ethics evaluated the explanations of ...the commission from a moral perspective and placed its analyses in the wider social context. This chapter delineates the approach and the main findings of these investigations. The author argues that the main lessons to be learned are about the need to strengthen democratic structures and professional practices in business, politics and administration. The implications of this structural approach for assessing the responsibility for the collapse are discussed in the light of I.M. Young’s social connection model. While the parliamentary reports were well received, three events hindered Icelanders in learning the reports’ main lessons. In addition to a volcanic eruption immediately after the publication of the report, two major political debates led the reconstruction work astray. The first was about the case of the former prime minister and the second was the fierce Icesave dispute about whether Icelanders should share the financial burden with the citizens of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who lost their savings in the Icesave accounts. This issue dominated Icelandic public discourse for three years and diverted political attention from the message of the parliamentary reports – namely, that the main explanatory factors for the financial collapse were weak governance and flawed practices within Iceland. As a consequence, the political sector has lagged behind other social sectors in efforts to learn lessons from the financial collapse.
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