Immanuel Kant famously wants us to think for ourselves. However, thinking collaboratively is often preferable to solitary thinking, especially in educational contexts. In this paper, I argue that ...Kant does not advocate a problematic form of epistemic or pedagogical individualism. For my argument, I focus on the area that, one might suspect, lends itself the least to collaborative reasoning on Kant's framework: morality founded in rational a priori structures. I show that Kant is aware of both the prospects and limits of reasoning on one's own and with others. According to Kant, openness, rooted in an attitude of mutual trust, is required to reason well with others. Kant, however, does underestimate the significance of diversity for collaborative reasoning.
Interest in the role of casuistry and casuistical questions in Kant's Doctrine of Virtue (DV), i.e. the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals, has grown in recent years. My own position is ...formulated in Schuessler (2012, in German), the main thesis of which will be retained here in an updated form and with some shifts of emphasis. I hold that the casuistical questions concerning perfect duties in the DV are not intended to represent casuistry in Kant's sense. Casuistry and casuistical questions are neither equivalent in the DV nor do they serve the same purposes.
‘The human being’, Kant contends, ‘is the only creature that must be educated’. Thus, for Kant, the concept of education plays a central role in the answer to one of the fundamental questions of ...philosophy: What is the human being? Education is the means by which the rational powers definitive of our humanity are actualised and cultivated. It is thus the process in which individuals ‘become human’ and, at the same time, the process in which humanity strives to improve—indeed perfect—itself so that it should become possible for us to live in conformity with the requirements of morality in a cosmopolitan realisation of the kingdom of ends. This paper examines the extent to which the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into educational practices forces us to rethink Kant's position. It is argued that the answer depends on whether systems embodying AI are viewed merely as tools to enhance educational practices or as fully fledged thinking subjects, capable of independent thought and agency. While the former view leaves Kant's basic position intact, the latter compels us to entertain certain important revisions, forcing us to grant that education is not exclusively a relation between human beings, as Kant maintains, and that some nonhuman entities might themselves educate and be educated. Moreover, AI might force us to rethink Kant's fundamental question ‘What is the human being?’ itself. I conclude, however, that notwithstanding the challenges AI poses, Kant's perspective retains its relevance even if it might benefit from supplementation and revision in light of post‐ and transhumanist perspectives.
According to a widespread view, Kant's claim that moral wrongness has its ground in a contradiction underlying every immoral action is a “bluff” rooted in “dogmatic moralism”. Ever since Benjamin ...Constant's exchange with Kant, counterexamples have played a crucial role in showing why Kant's “universalization procedure” fails to determine the moral validity of our judgments. Despite recent attempts to bring Kant's ethics closer to Aristotle's, these counterexamples have prevailed. Most recently, Jesse Prinz has launched another attack along the same lines. Prinz insists that Kant's universalization procedure fundamentally begs the question and fails to generate plausible results. Even authors who are very sympathetic to Kant, such as Allen Wood, have tried to downplay universalization, focusing instead on other formulations of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I respond directly to four of the most prominent counterexamples. In each case, I aim to show how we can uphold Kant's fundamental claim that the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative articulates the form of our particular moral judgments.
XIV—Kant on the Ethics of Belief Cohen, Alix
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
December 2014, 2014-12-00, 20141201, Letnik:
114, Številka:
3pt3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
In this paper, I explore the possibility of developing a Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the tools provided by Kant's ethics. To do so, I reconstruct epistemic concepts and ...arguments on the model of their ethical counterparts, focusing on the notions of epistemic principle, epistemic maxim and epistemic universalizability test. On this basis, I suggest that there is an analogy between our position as moral agents and as cognizers: our actions and our thoughts are subject to the same rational norm.
This article examines an appendix to the Doctrine of Virtue which has received little attention. I argue that this passage suggests that Kant makes it a duty, internal to his system of duties, to ...‘join the graces with virtue’ and so to ‘make virtue widely loved’ (MM, 6: 473). The duty to make virtue widely loved obligates us to bring the standards of respectability, and so the social graces, into a formal agreement with what morality demands of us, such that the social graces give the illusion of virtue. The existence of such a duty can answer Schiller’s persistent objection that Kant’s ethics scares away the Graces with Duty.
Con el resurgimiento de los talibanes en Afganistán, se presenta una situación única en cuanto a su búsqueda de reconocimiento internacional. Por un lado, sus estrechos vínculos con organizaciones ...terroristas como Al Qaeda y sus cuestionables fuentes de financiación plantean importantes preocupaciones sobre las consecuencias de concederles legitimidad internacional. Por el otro, la comunidad internacional, en particular Estados Unidos, parece reticente a intervenir en esta coyuntura, lo que incita a una reflexión reflexiva. Específicamente, después del reconocimiento, surge la pregunta de si los talibanes persistirán en respaldar actividades terroristas o recurrirán a métodos de financiación ilícitos. En tal caso, determinar la justificación de las intervenciones humanitarias se convierte en una consideración crítica. Además, el alcance de la intervención durante la fase de transición de la anarquía a la legalidad en Afganistán, donde prevalecen los crímenes extremos, exige un examen cuidadoso. En este contexto, es pertinente explorar las perspectivas de Immanuel Kant sobre la humanidad y su obra La pazperpetua, ya que se alinean con la situación actual. Por lo tanto, este artículo pretende valorar ambos lados de la cuestión a través de una lente kantiana y evaluar la idoneidad de la intervención humanitaria en estas circunstancias únicas. En última instancia, este análisis podría configurar un nuevo marco para las intervenciones en situaciones extremas que involucran “crímenes de lesa humanidad” o amenazas contra la vida humana derivadas de tales condiciones.
ABSTRACT
In this article, I offer a novel reading of Michel Foucault's Iranian writings and probe their unexplored linkages with longstanding historiographical debates. I argue that these writings ...run headlong into the conceptual aporias of political modernity by contesting the assumed parallelism between consciousness and history and between subjects of history and history as Subject. I take up this problem through the double frame of revolutionary spectatorship and subalternity. In the first instance, I analyze Kant's contradictory reflections on the French Revolution and Marx and Engel's response to the (failed) revolutions of 1848 to show how uprisings are made to conform to a theory of the subject. In the second instance, in conversation with subaltern studies (Guha, Chakrabarty, and Spivak), I focus on the problem of representing the revolutionary subject or insurgent consciousness. Foucault's Iranian writings problematize the particular way the revolutionary subject (the person who rises up se lève, in Foucault's vocabulary) is represented, or historiographically phrased. I argue that the confounding factor in this phrasing, the hard object that resists integration, is religion. I build a set of relays between genres of writing—philosophical journalism, philosophy of history, and subaltern historiography—that are subtended by this problem of incommensurability in order to illustrate the double bind of phrasing a religious subject in revolt. Across these heterogeneous conceptual grammars of historical analysis, I track “religion” and the “colonial” as différends in relation to what counts as a subject of history or history as Subject, and I show how religious and colonial phrasings (of history and subjectivity) find themselves in a position that has lost the capacity to claim a position.
There is no contradiction between Kant's statement that the proposition, "every alteration has its cause," is of no interest to the Critique of Pure Reason because of its dependence on empirical ...contents (KrV, B 3) and his use of the same proposition as an example of pure a priori knowledge (KrV, B 5). There is only the arduousness and sometimes also the ambiguity of a passage in which Kant attempts to establish a new basis for the validity of the principle of causality.
Kant and Women Varden, Helga
Pacific philosophical quarterly,
December 2017, 2017-12-00, 20171201, Letnik:
98, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Kant's conception of women is complex. Although he struggles to bring his considered view of women into focus, a sympathetic reading shows it not to be anti‐feminist and to contain important ...arguments regarding human nature. Kant believes the traditional male‐female distinction is unlikely to disappear, but he never proposes the traditional gender ideal as the moral ideal; he rejects the idea that such considerations of philosophical anthropology can set the framework for morality. This is also why his moral works clarifies that all citizens, including women have the right, and should be encouraged to strive towards an active condition.
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